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Abstract 
Abstract 
This research has first reviewed the current status and future aspects of marine and 
offshore safety assessment. The major problems identified in marine and offshore 
safety assessment in this research are associated with inappropriate treatment of 
uncertainty in data and human error issues during the modelling process. Following the 
identification of the research needs, this thesis has developed several analytical models 
for the safety assessment of marine and offshore systems/units. Such models can be 
effectively integrated into a risk-based framework using the marine formal safety 
assessment and offshore safety case concepts. 
Bayesian network (BN) and fuzzy logic (FL) approaches applicable to marine and 
offshore safety assessment have been proposed for systematically and effectively 
addressing uncertainty due to randomness and vagueness in data respectively. BN test 
cases for both a ship evacuation process and a collision scenario between the shuttle 
tanker and Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading unit (FPSO) have been 
produced within a cause-effect domain in which Bayes' theorem is the focal mechanism 
of inference processing. The proposed FL model incorporating fuzzy set theory and an 
evidential reasoning synthesis has been demonstrated on the FPSO-shuttle tanker 
collision scenario. The FL and BN models have been combined via mass assignment 
theory into a fuzzy-Bayesian network (FBN) in which the advantages of both are 
incorporated. This FBN model has then been demonstrated by addressing human error 
issues in a ship evacuation study using performance-shaping factors. It is concluded 
that the developed FL, BN and FBN models provide a flexible and transparent way of 
improving safety knowledge, assessments and practices in the marine and offshore 
applications. The outcomes have the potential to facilitate the decision-making process 
in a risk-based framework. Finally, the results of the research are summarised and areas 
where further research is required to improve the developed methodologies are outlined. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter Summary 
It has been ascertained that there is a need for analytical models, which can aid in safety 
assessment, to be effectively integrated into a maritime risk-based system. In addition, 
numerous regulations for ensuring maritime safety have been recognised as being 
reactions to accidents. This makes the system quite deficient in such areas as `human 
element' and `uncertainty' and therefore, the scene of problem definition is set to the 
root causes of contributory factors that could bring about errors or growth 
incidents/accidents. To tackle the causes, two risk-based approaches have been 
recognised and examined in this chapter. Employing any of these approaches should 
establish whether risks are tolerable or need to be reduced further, based on an up to 
standard risk acceptance criteria structured within a risk analysis framework. A risk- 
based framework for maritime safety assessment is then proposed. Finally, this chapter 
presents the goals of the study described in this thesis and establishes a general 
characterisation to the structure of the work. 
1.1 Background 
Ships and offshore installations designed, built, maintained and operated well are 
capable of long, safe, trouble-free and profitable service over their intended life cycle. 
Surprisingly, this has not been the achieved reality and in worst cases, several 
unexpected accidents have occurred. Even with minor examination, a `proactive' and 
`risk-based' stance shows that there is no single previous disaster at sea which could not 
have been either prevented or suppressed in its scale. Thus, headlines on `safety' now 
need a permanent spotlight in the 21 s` century marine and offshore industry more than it 
ever revealed itself in the aftermath. 
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Following many notable marine disasters (e. g. Piper Alpha, Herald of Free Enterprise, 
Estonia), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) reacted positively to ensure 
that such accidents did not repeat (IMO, 2001 a; Wang, 2002). Nevertheless, worrying 
accidents did occur again and this made the IMO realise the need for a better resolution. 
One result of this resolution option is the `formal safety assessment (FSA) concept' 
(IMO, 2002b), which represents a fundamental change from what was previously a 
largely piecemeal and reactive regulatory approach to one that is proactive, integrated, 
and above all based on risk evaluation and management in a transparent and justifiable 
manner (THEMES, 2001). Essentially, the concept provides an elegant route to 
application of well-established risk analysis methods. 
Once data and information is provided, some of the novel risk analysis techniques can 
be developed and used in an integrated manner to yield powerful risk assessments. For 
example, the time between the occurrences of events can be an important parameter 
(Nielsen, 1971) and this can be treated using a cause-consequence diagram (CCD). 
Basically, the CCD method is a tool, which, like fault tree analysis, documents the 
failure logic but has the extra capability enabling the analysis of systems subject to 
sequential failures. In addition the CCD identifies the complete set of systems 
responses to any given initiating event. In principle, incorporate significant features of 
both fault and event trees. Thus, the CCD could well prove to offer a sophisticated tool 
for enriching reliability and with respect to risk contribution tree modelling. 
The nature of the FSA framework requires that relevant accident scenarios be 
established to enable hazard identification exercises, which will then feed into the risk 
assessment of any safety-critical marine and offshore application. Accident databases 
usually provide statistical input to the scenarios, though the information acquired from 
these are somewhat subject to inherent uncertainties and may only be acquired 
incrementally. Decision-making is essential to the risk assessment task and therefore, 
under the realm of uncertainty, Bayesian network (BN) (Jensen, 1993) can be adopted 
to enable a powerful marine and offshore decision-support solution. The focal 
mechanism for this network's inference process relies on the sound Bayes' theorem 
(Groen & Mosleh, 2001) to perform a probabilistic logic/reasoning of the domain. 
Also, BN models can be expanded into influence diagrams for use as a communication 
tool in the decision-making process. 
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Whilst the analysis, under conditions of uncertainty, can adopt a probability-based 
approach due to randomness in the modelling data, another feasible choice is a 
possibility-based approach due to a nature of vagueness. On this note, analysis of safety 
and reliability capabilities of ships and offshore installations can be undertaken in view 
of the fact that fuzzy logic (FL) (Zadeh, 1975) has emerged as a uniquely efficient 
linguistic and numerical tool for safety assessment. In addition to its modelling from 
fuzzy set theory, FL could be combined with evidential reasoning (Yang & Xu, 2002) to 
enable a justified weighted ranking in terms for safety and utility. The possibility 
values of fuzzy set can be transformed into probabilities to enable BN and FL 
integrative modelling via the theory of mass assignment. In-service behaviour of 
safety-critical systems in marine and offshore applications can be investigated using 
these developed modelling techniques. Such techniques can also be applied to address 
the assessment of safety due to the relevant and thoughtful technological 
modifications/added features that are made by designers and the vessel operators. 
1.2 Problem Definition in the Safety Issue 
It is essential for regulations to be set in order to ensure maximum safety to the 
maritime industry. Unfortunately, regulations have been reactive to accidents and prone 
to several deficiencies. The time-honoured causation of historic incidents and accidents 
offers an inadequate setting to resolving safety for complex systems of the likes of 
maritime vessels and installations. 
1.2.1 Deficiencies due to Regulating by Disasters 
A huge amount of the change to regulations and procedures in shipping activity has 
resulted from tragedies. Figure 1.1 gives an event breakdown of the prominent 
consequences in most marine disasters. Obviously, many important lessons have been 
learnt from those past maritime accidents. 
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Maritime disasters 
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Loss of life 
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Figure 1.1: Consequences in the majority of marine disasters 
Ships such as Titanic, Torrey Canyon, Amoco Cadiz, Herald of Free Enterprise, Exxon 
Valdez, Scandinavian Star, Estonia (Br$felt & Larsson, 2000; Wang, 2002) and others 
shown in Table 1.1, represent highly controversial tragic accidents which led to 
response strategies but left many issues unresolved. The Exxon Valdez case 
(NTSB, 1990), for example, led to the introduction of mandatory requirements for 
double hulls, notwithstanding the fact that it was largely due to a navigational error. In 
fact, it did nothing much to address the human element issue. Therefore, as the 
traditional structure of shipping is being transformed, such an example indicates clearly 
that a system which merely reacts to disasters is basically flawed. 
The accident categories of grounding, stranding, collision, fire and explosion have 
become a driving force for new legislation and the focus of safety training standards. 
Nevertheless, it can be acknowledged from such invariably devised responses that the 
way in which the industry is regulated has evolved in an unstructured manner. 
Regulation has been so much reactive rather than proactive and regulators clearly 
struggle to keep up with the rapid pace of technological and operational developments 
within the industry. As such, a change of regulatory approach is desperately desirable 
in pursuit of "a safety culture". However, this change has to create a proactive rather 
than reactive system of controlling maritime safety and environmental protection, and 
one in which underlying issues such as `human element' and `uncertainty' are no longer 
neglected. The system should further allow for model integration of risk-based 
assessments into the appropriate methodology steps, which are set to meet an acceptable 
risk criterion. 
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Table 1.1: Maritime disasters that greatly influenced worldwide maritime regulations 
Date Vessel/Unit Accident Location Consequence Resolutions 
Sank after a South of SOLAS 15 April 1912 Titanic collision with Grand Banks 1,503 lives lost Convention 
an iceberg 
8 September Morro Castle 
Caught fire Gulf of New 134 lives lost Fire Safety 
1934 and grounded Jerse 
Grounding Civil Liability 
18 March Torrey and West Coast of 120,000 tonnes Convention 
1967 Canyon subsequent England of spilled oil , MARPOL 73/78 
oil spill 
16 March Amoco Cadiz Grounding 
Northern 
Coast of 
223,000 tonnes 
Pollution 
Liability Limits, 
1978 France of spilled oil STCW 78/95 
19 July 1979 
Atlantic Collision 
Trinidad and 287,000 tonnes Tanker Safety 
Express Tobago of spilled oil 
9 September Derbyshire Sank in a North Pacific 44 lives lost 
Bulk Carrier 
Safet 1980 typhoon y 
Herald of Passenger Ferry 
6 March 1987 Free Foundered Zeebrugge 193 lives lost Safety I, ISM 
Enter rise Code 
North-east Safety Case, 
6 July 1988 Piper Alpha 
Fire after an 
explosion coast of 
167 lives lost ALARP 
Scotland Established 
Tanker 
24 March Exxon Ran to a West Coast of 37,000 tonnes Construction, 
1989 Valdez shoal Alaska of spilled oil OPA 90 
Directional 
6 April 1990 
Scandinavian Caught fire Skagerak 158 lives lost Sound Star Evacuation 
Grounded in 
5 January Braer 
severe 
weather 
The Shetland 85,000 tonnes Tanker Traffic 
1993 , following Isles of spilled oil Routing 
engine failure 
27 September Estonia 
Sank in a South of Uto 852 lives lost Passenger Ferry 
1994 storm (Finland) Safety II 
15 February Sea Empress Grounding 
Milford 
Haven (South 72,000 tonnes HNS 
1996 Wales) of spilled oil 
Convention 
16 January 
in two Gulf of St. 
Bulk 
1998 
Flare ing rough during Lawrence 21 
lives lost ign & Design 
weather Construction 
12 December Erika Broke in two 
West Coast of 10,000 tonnes Sub-Standard 
1999 France of spilled oil Tankers 
13 November Prestige 
Broke in two 
and sank 6 
Northwest 
Coast of 
77,000 tonnes Establishment 
2002 days later Spain of spilled oil of PSSAs 
where; SO LAS means is the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea 
MARPOL is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
STCW is the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
ISM means international Safety Management 
ALARP means As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
OPA means Oil Pollution Act 
HNS means Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
PSSA means Particularly Sensitive Sea Area 
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1.2.2 Overlooked Contributory Causes of an Undesirable Event 
Many lessons still need to be learnt from the past maritime accidents. There is also no 
doubt that the less dramatic, or less well-publicised accidents, incidents/ near misses, as 
well as certain unsafe acts bringing about errors and those of recovery occurrences, do 
have equally valuable lessons to be learnt from. In fact, it is possible that accidents may 
have propagated from the later and yet these are often overlooked as likely sources of 
the problem with the safety issue in the maritime industry. Thus, within existing 
maritime safety regulations, there are several amendments to be undertaken that may 
prove invaluable in preventing even the likely occurrence of an incident from 
developing any further. 
Unwanted 
consequences 
A 
Accidents 
Incidents / near misses 
Errors and recoveries 
Human 
factors 
Technical 
factors 
Organisational 
factors 
Societal 
factors 
Environmental 
factors 
Figure 1.2: A multiple causation growth model of an accidental event 
It is extremely difficult to prevent accidents in the absence of an understanding as to 
how near misses, incidents or accidents are caused. Prior to the 1980's (Peterson, 
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1996), all the knowledge, tools, and techniques of events existing prior to an accident 
were built on a set of principles that were first derived by Heinrich (1931). Perhaps the 
most important of these principles behind a built model of the causes of an accident is 
the domino theory of accident causation. This principle implies that accidents result 
from a sequence of events and suggests that removal of one single event in this 
sequence of events will prevent an accident from occurring. As such, the domino model 
has been noted as a one-dimensional sequence of events, which has proved to be 
inadequate for complex systems like ships and offshore installations. 
In complex systems, accidents are usually multi-factoral and develop through relatively 
lengthy sequences of changes and errors. This has led to the principle of multiple 
causation. According to Peterson (1978), behind every accident there lie many 
contributing factors, causes and sub-causes. The theory of multiple causation is that 
these factors combine together, in random fashion, causing accidents. Therefore, during 
maritime accident investigations and in the casual modelling studies, there is a need to 
identify as many of these causes as possible, rather than just one for each stage of the 
domino sequence. Figure 1.2 depicts a multiple causation growth model of an 
accidental event in which the combination of contributory human, technical, 
environmental, societal and organisational factors is seen as the root that gives rise to 
the growth chain of hazard-to-accident problems in the maritime industry. Thus, these 
factors are of great importance in the safety modelling of a maritime application. 
1.3 Research Resolution as a Risk-Based Issue 
A risk-based resolution is desirable in offering a holistic and systematic approach to 
developing and thus implementing proactive standards, regulations and strategies to 
protect human, ships, offshore installations, property and the marine environment from 
adverse effects of hazardous situations based on risk assessment. Proceeding on the 
basis of sound criteria, the risks level can be determined for tolerability. 
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1.3.1 Reviewed State of Proactive Safety Practice 
One way of ensuring that action is taken to avert the cause of an incident or accident in 
the maritime industry is the use of a risk-based concept. This is termed `safety case' 
and `formal safety assessment' approach for offshore and marine systems respectively. 
1.3.1.1 Offshore Safety Case Concept 
Most international safety legislative regimes were highly prescriptive before the Piper 
Alpha oil platform disaster in the North Sea, off the UK (in 1988). One of the most 
significant findings of the inquiry into the disaster, headed by Lord Cullen, was that 
prescriptive regulation provides no guarantee of excellent safety performance 
(DOE, 1990). It guaranteed nothing more than compliance to a minimum level. Thus, 
the Lord Cullen Report recommended the establishment of the objective based safety 
case (SC) regime and its concept has ever since been adopted in the offshore oil and gas 
industry. 
The SC (HSE, 1998) is a detailed document that outlines the types of safety studies 
undertaken and the results obtained, and the management arrangements to ensure the 
continued safety of an offshore facility and persons on it. It should demonstrate that the 
operator knows what technical and human activities occur, how they are to be managed 
and how safety will be assured throughout the operating life of the facility. It must also 
identify the methods used for monitoring and reviewing all activities on the facility. 
1.3.1.2 Marine Formal Safety Assessment Concept 
The House of Lords committee, headed by Lord Carver, asserted in 1992 that modem 
science and technology were not being adequately applied in the many fields that affect 
shipping safety and that the time had come for a radical change (House of Lords, 1992). 
In respect of the regulatory regime for shipping, the Carver Report envisaged the 
adoption of safety goals based upon a quantified assessment of risks, costs and benefits, 
coupled with the introduction of a ship SC regime for every commercial vessel. 
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Although, the idea had considerable merit on the basis of such quantified assessments, 
the UK government made clear that to contemplate a SC for every individual vessel 
would be impractical for the foreseeable future as such a regime would put unrealistic 
demands upon the resources of both the regulator and the regulated operator 
(MSA, 1996). Hence, the concept of formal safety assessment (FSA) was proposed. 
FSA (IMO, 2002b) allows a systematic and proactive view to be taken of ship safety 
enabling informed decisions to be made based on the objective analysis of risk. The 
concept involves using the techniques of risk assessment and cost benefit analysis, not 
for individual ships, but as a tool to assist in the International Maritime Organisation's 
(IMO's) decision-making process in formulating new and amended rules for shipping in 
general. The UK reasoned that adoption of FSA would enable safety and pollution 
issues at IMO to be prioritised, and regulations to be derived that are cost effective and 
proportional to risk. 
1.3.2 Basic Definitions to Understanding Risk Evaluation Process 
A risk-based approach for a safety-critical maritime system/unit should be one in which 
any perceived risk to the system can be evaluated so as to reflex where there may be a 
need for possible risk reductions or design modifications (See Section 1.3.3). The 
following basic definitions give clarity to fundamental expressions in the risk evaluation 
process for the system: 
(a) Hazard 
A hazard is defined as a physical situation with the potential for human injury, damage 
to property, damage to the environment, economical loss or some combination of these. 
Hazards are classified according to the severity of their potential effects, either in terms 
of safety, economics or other consequences. Such classifications alone are purely 
subjective and usually require qualification and quantification, by definition of the 
precise form of the hazard and quantified evaluation of the consequences 
(Warner, 1992). 
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(b) Risk 
Risk is a combination of the probability, or frequency, of occurrence of a defined hazard 
and the magnitude of the consequences of occurrence on lives, property and the 
environment. Criteria for acceptability of some predicted risk or measured risk can be 
set voluntarily by the organisation responsible and/or subjected to the hazard, or be set 
mandatorily by some regulatory organisation (Warner, 1992). 
(c) Safety 
Safety is a term that denotes freedom from unacceptable risks/personal harm. 
(d) Reliability 
Reliability is the probability of failure-free operation for a specified length of time. 
1.3.3 Framework for Risk Criteria 
The simplest framework for risk criteria is a single risk level that divides tolerable risks 
from intolerable ones (i. e. acceptable activities from unacceptable ones). Such criteria 
give attractively simple results, but they need to be used very carefully, because they do 
not reflect the uncertainties both in estimating risks and in assessing what is tolerable. 
For instance, if applied rigidly, they could indicate that, an activity, which just exceeded 
the criteria, would become acceptable as a result of some minor remedial measure that 
in fact scarcely changed the risk levels. A more common approach to dividing tolerable 
and intolerable risks is to use two criteria, known as "maximum tolerable" and 
"negligible" levels. These divide risks into three tiers as shown in Figure 1.3 
(HSE, 1992), that is: 
" An intolerable region (above the "maximum tolerable" criterion) within which 
the risk is generally intolerable whatever the benefit may be. Risk reduction 
measures or design changes are considered essential. 
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"A middle band (between the "maximum tolerable" and "negligible" criteria) 
where risk reduction is desirable. In the UK, risks in this region are considered 
to be tolerable only when they have been made "as low as reasonably 
practicable" (ALARP). This requires risk reduction measures to be 
implemented if they are reasonably practicable, as evaluated by cost-benefit 
analysis. 
"A negligible region (below the "negligible" criterion) within which the risk is 
generally tolerable, and no risk reduction measures are needed. 
Unacceptable region 
The ALARP or Tolerability 
region (Risk is undertaken only 
if a benefit is desired) 
Risk cannot be justified except in 
extraordinary circumstances 
Tolerable only if risk reduction is 
impracticable or its cost is grossly 
disproportionate to the 
improvement gained 
Tolerable if cost of reduction 
would exceed the improvement 
gained 
Broadly acceptable region (No Necessary to maintain assurance 
need for detailed work to that risk remains at this level 
demonstrate ALARP) 
Negligible risk 
Figure 13: The ALARP principle framework for risk acceptability 
An extremely important measure that is robust enough to define a maximum tolerable 
risk in absolute terms is the individual risk, i. e., the annual probability of death due to 
accidents onboard a ship. HSE gives the individual risk acceptance criteria as follows 
(Spouge, 1997): 
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" Maximum tolerable risk for crew members is 10-3 (i. e., 1 in 1,000) per year. 
" Maximum tolerable risk for passengers is 10-4 (i. e., I in 10,000) per year. 
" Maximum tolerable risk for public ashore is 10-4 (i. e., I in 10,000) per year. 
However, if all individual risks are below 10-6 per year, this suggests that risks are 
negligible and cost benefit analysis need not be justified (Spouge, 1997). 
One of the main objectives of the SC and FSA approaches is the demonstration (to the 
regulator) that measures are appropriate and adequate to ensure that risks from potential 
major accidents have been reduced to a level `as low as reasonably practicable' 
(ALARP). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Health and Safety Commission 
(HSC) has proposed replacing the requirement to demonstrate that major accident risks 
are ALARP for the offshore SC with that of a demonstration that such risks are 
estimated and relevant statutory provisions are complied with (HSE, 2002; HSC, 2004). 
In this thesis however, risk criteria will be set, relevant to the vessel and its operational 
context, and in accordance with the ALARP principle. 
1.4 Risk Analysis Methodology 
A safety assessment can provide an effective approach that will serve as the foundation 
for avoiding further maritime disasters and even situations of near misses. Through risk 
analysis, it is possible to identify hazards, assess and then mitigate the associated risk. 
Such an analysis entails the development of a very robust systematic methodology such 
as that generically given by Figure 1.4, based upon the following sequence of activities: 
" Define the system being studied. 
" Identify the hazards associated with that system. 
" Estimate the frequency of the hazards occurring and how each might progress to 
various outcomes. 
" Estimate the consequences associated with each outcome. 
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" Multiply hazard frequency and consequence to obtain the risk associated with 
each outcome. 
" Sum the risks associated with the outcomes to produce an overall risk. 
" Check if risk is acceptable based on the criteria as given by the ALARP 
principle. 
" If risk is acceptable, carry out risk mitigation otherwise modify system. 
In practice, both the SC and FSA approaches apply this risk assessment methodology. 
Therefore, the resulting development of this research can be effectively integrated into 
this aspect of both approaches. It should be noted that the measure of the frequency of 
the hazards occurring is a function that is deduced from its possibility, evidential or 
probability distribution. Thus, with the recognition that quantitative risk assessment is 
not always the most appropriate due to its too prescriptive nature (HSC, 2004), the idea 
should be that risk analysts use effective risk assessment techniques, selected to be 
appropriate to the circumstances. 
System description 
Identify hazards and 
accident scenarios 
Estimate 
frequency of 
occurrence 
Risk 
determination 
Acceptable? 
Ensure risk 
control 
Estimate 
consequence of 
outcomes 
-13- 
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Figure 1.4: Generic process of the risk analysis framework 
An obvious benefit of risk assessment is that the results serve as the basis for a cost- 
effective means for risk mitigation and avoidance. With respect to these, it is often 
possible to undertake actions that will reduce the potential of the occurrence of an 
incident or accident. 
I Risk analysis 
i 
Basic causes 
Technical factors 
Organisational 
factors 
Human factors 
Review 
a 
Ir costs 
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Fire/explosion 
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Figure 1.5: Proposed research framework for risk-based assessments 
In order to implement the outlined risk analysis methodology effectively, Figure 1.5 
gives a proposed framework for which the risk-based assessment settings of this 
research can also be achieved via a cost effective means. It has been developed by 
Recommendations for decision-making 
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moulding the multiple causation growth contributory causes of an undesired event (see 
Section 1.2.2) into the risk analysis process whilst also effecting the treatment of 
uncertainty (a vital issue of problem definition as stated in Section 1.2.1) for the safety 
assessment of the maritime application. Following from this, the final risk that would 
be determined for the application may then be reduced based on the ALARP Principle 
(Section 1.3.3). Cost effectiveness can thus be demonstrated via the assessment of the 
benefits of the risk reduction and the implementation costs for greater risk reduction 
measures (HM Treasury, 1997; Mathiesen, 1997; HSE, 2001) of life saving and 
environmental protection for the safety-critical maritime application. 
Recommendations for decision-making can be provided based on the level of cost- 
effectiveness for each risk control measure that is deemed appropriate and feasible on 
risk reduction scale of the ALARP principle framework. For example, `TRCO', 
`ORCO' and `HRCO' may represent the `technical', `organisational' and `human' risk 
control option (RCO) recommendations that can be respectively implemented. In 
theory, a number (e. g., 1,2,3, etc) may be used after respective to distinguish one RCO 
from another RCOs (e. g., TRCO1, TRCO2, TRCO3, etc, in the technical factors 
category). Furthermore, individual RCOs may be combined, and the end result may just 
be expressed as `RCO' with an attached number (e. g., RCO1, RCO2, TRCO3, etc). 
1.5 Thesis Aim and Objectives 
The overarching aim of this research is to generate proactive risk-based analytical 
models that implement novel techniques within a safety framework. In an attempt to 
achieve this aim, the thesis takes upon the following main objective tasks: 
" To review the current status of safety practice in both marine and offshore 
industry. 
" To establish appropriate data statistics for carrying out risk-based assessment. 
" To identify key risk analysis techniques that are currently in use within the 
maritime industry. 
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" To examine formal safety assessment procedures and review the developments 
of its trial application to ships. 
" To facilitate the incorporation of uncertainty treatment into the maritime 
application domain of risk-based reasoning. 
" To demonstrate how the adoption of Bayesian network (BN) can enable a 
powerful marine and offshore decision-support solution. 
" To demonstrate the application of fuzzy logic (FL) towards evidential reasoning 
synthesis in maritime engineering safety analysis. 
" To investigate the integration of BN and FL for the incorporation of the human 
element into probabilistic risk-based modelling. 
These goals are being established more clearly as the work proceeds through each 
chapter of the thesis. 
1.6 General Scope of Work 
The chapters in this thesis have been organised to express a certain flow of thought or 
line of argument. Figure 1.6 summaries the logical structure of the thesis. Obviously, 
the structure starts off with this introductory platform chapter that gives light into the 
much-needed risk-based approach to marine and offshore safety as its Chapter 1. 
Sourced data for carrying out safety assessment tasks may need to be treated 
statistically, which Chapter 2 demonstrates, before they can be well utilised. Chapter 3 
presents some typical risk analytical techniques that are used in maritime safety and 
reliability assessment studies. In Chapter 4, a structured formal safety assessment 
(FSA) methodology that allows for proactive risk control measures to be permitted is 
presented and this chapter further provides a review of the noteworthy developments in 
the trial application of FSA to some ship types. Chapter 5 explores the incorporation of 
uncertainty treatment into the application domain of risk-based reasoning. Bayesian 
network (BN) is adopted in Chapter 6 to enable a powerful decision-support solution 
under the realm of random uncertainty, whilst fuzzy logic (FL) treats the vague 
uncertainty and then offers a safety analysis solution in Chapter 7 via evidential 
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reasoning synthesis. In Chapter 8, an integrated risk model of BN and FL is achieved in 
a fuzzy-Bayesian network of an induced mass assignment paradigm. Chapter 9 
concludes the thesis with an overall review and also then presents its principal findings, 
major limitations and recommendations for future work of the research. 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
ý---------- -- --------------- 
Chapter 2: 
Statistical Data 
Treatment 
___ 
4f 
Chapter 3: 
Risk analytical 
techniques 
4; 
_NV 
Chapter 5: 
Treatment of 
uncertainty 
I 
i 
Chapter 4: 
Formal safety 
assessment 
11 
Chapter 6: 
Bayesian network 
modelling 
I 
At 4 
Chapter 7: 
Fuzzy logic 
modelling 
I 
Chapter 8: 
Fuzzy-Bayesian 
network modelling II 
Chapter 9: 
Conclusion i Figure 1.6: Structure of the thesis 
1.7 Concluding Remarks 
In the field of marine regulations, the high number of casualties and oil pollutions has 
acted as a catalyst in triggering a positive reaction that led to the adoption of reforms 
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designed to improve maritime safety. Nevertheless, such systems have often 
overlooked the areas of several contributory factors (such as the human factor) and their 
causes, which can result into errors, incidents and accidents. Besides, an account of 
uncertainty is not habitually taken into consideration. The approach of SC and FSA is 
currently adopted in the offshore and marine industry respectively to proactively 
establishing safety at sea. 
Preparation and submission of a SC constitute a key strategy in the drive for improved 
safety in the offshore oil and gas industry, whilst FSA for the marine industry delivers 
the maximum level of safety and pollution prevention in a cost-effective manner. Both 
industries apply the ALARP principle as the risk criteria. Furthermore, a risk analysis 
methodology has been presented, which establishes the generic framework upon that the 
safety assessments in this thesis are embarked upon. 
The research aim is to achieve the generation of proactive and integrative risk-based 
assessment models within its safety analytical framework. Hence, several goals have 
been established within a well-structured outline of the chapters in the thesis. 
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Chapter Summary 
Data for risk and uncertainty modelling usually needs to be treated statistically in order 
to satisfy their use in an application tool. Several useful maritime databases provide 
reliable failure and repair rates, or information/data on accident category types, such as 
the nature and number of occurrences of incidents/accidents. Some supplementary data 
can also be obtained from expert judgement, models or simulations. Failure probability 
distributions are then used to enable the probabilistic modelling of failure and repair 
activities. In the related consequence term, the frequency of occurrence of accidents, as 
obtained from a historical database and the distribution of the numbers of fatalities in 
such accidents are required to give a frequency-number of fatalities graph. The area 
under this graph provides a convenient one-dimensional measure of societal risk, which 
is termed the potential loss of life. 
2.1 Introduction 
Reliable failure and repair data is a paramount item in developing any kind of safety and 
reliability assessment. The existence of these prime data will enable any authority to 
determine the probability of occurrence and the extent of the consequences of a 
hazardous event or its associated failed components and systems. The available data 
will also help to determine the nature of risk analysis methods, such as qualitative or 
quantitative, to be utilised in the process of the maritime risk-based methodology (e. g., 
`safety case' or `formal safety assessment'). 
Various authorities or bodies attend to safety issues from different perspective in order 
to facilitate their own interest. For example, data from classification societies will 
mainly deal from the viewpoint of compliance with various sets of rules and regulations 
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in force. Meanwhile, data from protection & indemnity (P&I) clubs tend to deal with 
the matter from the viewpoint of financial losses due to lack of safety (Sii & Wang, 
2003). When there is insufficient data from the database, then expert judgement, 
physical models, simulations and analytical models may be used to achieve valuable 
results (IMO, 2002b). Nonetheless, any data that is obtained, whether from database or 
otherwise, should always be critically evaluated. 
The obtained data is usually treated from its raw form depending on its intended use 
within the analysis structure. In some cases, such as with accident or initiating events, 
available data may be need to be treated and supplied in terms of frequency per 
ship/installation operating year. The best way to assign a frequency to an event is to 
research industry databases and locate good historical frequency data that relates to the 
event being analysed. Before applying historical frequency data, a thoughtful analysis 
of the data should be performed to determine its applicability to the event being 
evaluated. The analyst needs to consider the source of the data, the statistical quality of 
the data (reporting accuracy, size of data set, etc. ) and the relevance of the data to the 
event being analysed. Also, the data may best be utilised for safety assessment by 
converting a failure or a repair rate into a corresponding probability value. 
Just as data for every error, incident or accident event are required to be treated, it is 
imperative that the data for their developing sequence of events and including their final 
consequences are dealt with. In this sense, every data that would proceed into risk or 
uncertainty analysis would have been completely justified for its suitable use by such 
statistical data treatment. 
2.2 Collection of Failure and Repair Data 
It is essential to obtain reliable statistical failure and repair data of components in order 
to apply safety assessment techniques. Generally, such failure and repair data of 
components can be obtained from field experience, life testing under controlled 
conditions in laboratory and/or laboratory testing of similar components (Misra, 1992). 
The collection of these data based on life tests of ships and offshore installations is 
precluded as a very expensive and labour demanding operation. Extensive use is made 
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of those collected from laboratory tests and field reports on similar components (generic 
data collection programmes). In addition, repair data may also be compiled from the 
agreed judgmental estimates of experts (Misra, 1992). 
It should be noted that, for some components, there is fairly close agreement between 
different data banks and in other cases, there is a wide range of failure rates (Smith, 
1992). The latter may be due to a number of reasons as, for example: 
" Some failure rates involve the replacement of components during preventive 
maintenance whereas others do not. 
" Failure rates are affected by so many factors that a variation in values exists. 
" Although nominal environmental and quality levels are described in some 
databases, the range of parameters covered by these broad descriptions is 
large. 
Great care should be taken to use failure and repair data obtained from data banks to 
reflect the environment to which the product is designed. When no data for a 
component failure mode can be obtained, it may be possible to express the failure in 
terms of fundamental and quantifiable parameters and to analyse it using limit state 
reliability analysis (Wang, et. al, 1993), although there is uncertainty about the relevant 
distributions. 
How critical the reliability of the failure and the repair data is depends on the aims of 
the safety analysis. If the safety analysis aims at obtaining the best absolute estimate of 
system safety, as may be required by statutory requirements, the failure and repair data 
is obviously critical. In such cases, validation of the data becomes as important as the 
validation of the safety assessments themselves, and verification procedures should be 
implemented to ensure that the obtained data for components is reliable. Modification 
of the obtained data may also be required (Figure 2.1). However, when the estimates of 
the system safety are used for comparison purposes, the criticality of such data is greatly 
reduced. Safety analysis is then used to provide the sensitivity of the system safety and 
to indicate the relative benefits of design changes on system performance. 
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Figure 2.1: Sourcing of data for statistical data treatment and representation 
The following sources may be useful for obtaining failure and repair data to carry out 
quantitative safety analysis. 
" FARADIP. THREE (Smith, 1992): This database is a summary of many useful 
databases and shows, for each component, the range of failure values. The 
failure data of various components such as alarms, mechanical items and 
instruments is included in this database. 
" US Military Handbook 217: This data source is produced by the Rome Air 
Development Center under contract to the US Department of Defence and is an 
electronic failure data bank. 
" Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data - NPRD3 (1985): This document is 
produced by the Rome Air Development Center. It contains field data 
information of electromechanical, mechanical, hydraulic and pneumatic parts. 
" Handbook of Reliability Data for Electronic Components Used in 
Telecommunications Systems HRD4 (1986): This document is produced, from 
field data, by British Telecom's Materials and Components Centre. 
" Electronic Reliability Data - INSPEC/NCSR (1981): This book, published 
jointly by the Institute of Electrical Engineers and the National Centre of 
Systems Reliability (Warrington) in 1981, consists of simple multiplicative 
models for semiconductors and passive electronic components with tables from 
which to establish the multipliers according to the environment, temperature 
and other parameters. 
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" OREDA- Offshore Reliability Data (DNV, 1992): It is a collection of offshore 
failure rate and failure mode data with an emphasis on safety-related 
equipment. It covers a great range of components and equipment. 
" Green and Bourne - Reliability Technology, Wiley, 1972: This book contains 
failure rate data obtained mostly from US and UK atomic energy sources. 
" UK Atomic Energy SRD Data Bank: It contains the generic reliability data of 
various components and is maintained by the SRD (Systems Reliability 
Department) at the UKAEA (UK Atomic Energy Authority at Culcheth), 
Warrington, Cheshire. 
" Lloyds Data Bank (LR, 1982): It mainly covers the failure data in the shipping 
industries. 
" Others: The reliability data of the various electronic and non-electronic 
components may also be obtained from various published papers and books 
such as (Smith, 1985 and 1992). 
It is also becoming useful to record and utilise data from near misses and errors. 
Furthermore, to ensure that there is an accurate applicability of the safety assessment 
carried out, novel techniques should integrate expert judgement with the obtained data 
in a formal manner (See Figure 2.1). 
2.3 Categorisation of Hazardous Events 
For the available data of any resourceful database(s) to be well utilised in a safety 
assessment study, accidents, incidents or errors that might affect or impair the 
seaworthiness of the vessel are categorised according to the nature of their occurrence. 
There resulting consequences can also be categorised similarly 
2.3.1 Category of Major Accidents 
Some of the major maritime accidents can be associated with one or more of the 
following categorises (LMIS, 1995): 
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" Contact and collision: Striking or being struck by another ship or external 
object, regardless of whether underway, anchored or moored. This category 
includes striking drilling rigs/platforms, regardless of whether in fixed position 
or in tow but it does not include striking underwater wrecks. 
" Grounding and stranding: Being aground or hitting/touching shore or sea 
bottom or underwater wrecks. 
" Fire or explosion: Accidents where the initial event is an uncontrolled process 
of combustion characterised by heat or smoke or flame or any combination of 
these, which engulfs sections of or the entire ship. 
" Missing vessel: Ship whose fate is undetermined with no information having 
being received of conditions and whereabouts after a reasonable period of time. 
" War loss and hostilities: Ship lost or damaged as a result of any hostile acts. 
" Heavy weather damage: Ship suffering damage caused by severe weather and 
wave conditions that can occur unexpectedly. 
" Loss of structural integrity: Structural failure resulting in the ingress of water 
and/or loss of strength and/or stability. 
" Flooding and foundering: The ingress of water that leads to ship sinking as a 
result of causes such as heavy weather, springing of leaks and breaking into two. 
" Miscellaneous: Lost or damaged ships that cannot be classified into any of the 
above categories or due to lack of information. For example, an accident 
starting by the cargo shifting (and not as a consequence of events of any of the 
above categories) would typically be classified as miscellaneous. 
The rate of occurrence of such accidents is usually expressed in terms of frequency per 
ship operating year. 
2.3.2 Category of Major Consequences 
The accident categories in Section 2.3.1 have also been known to be the initiating event 
that can lead to one or more of the following serious consequences (LMIS, 1995): 
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" Ship casualty: Breakdown resulting in the ship being towed or requiring 
assistance from ashore, flooding of any compartment and/or structural, 
mechanical or electrical damage requiring repairs before the ship can continue 
trading. 
" Total ship loss: Ship having ceased to exist after a casualty, either due to it 
being irrecoverable (actual total loss) or due to it being subsequently broken up 
(constructive total loss). Constructive total loss occurs when the cost of repair 
exceeds the insured value of the ship. 
" Cargo damage/loss: Commonly by cargo contact with oil spill, fresh water or 
seawater and/or entire shipping package being missing at destination arising due 
to hull penetrations or insufficient/improper securing. 
" Environmental spillages/pollution: Oil spills, general pollution, ecological 
destructions and dangerous gas releases. Spills are generally categorised by size 
(<7 tonnes, 7-700 tonnes and >700 tonnes), although the actual amount spilt is 
also recorded (ITOPF, 2005). 
" Human injury/fatality: Human suffering that requires hospital treatment and 
in the worst of cases, loss of life. In cases were both injury and loss of life are 
combined, weightings such as, for example, 100 minor injuries are equivalent to 
I fatality; and 10 major injuries are equivalent to I fatality, is generally assumed 
(IMO, 1997c). 
This list of consequences is not comprehensive, but rather it provides a representative 
sample that is meant to reflect some of the most unwanted cases during risk 
amplification of a critical event. The rate of occurrence of such consequences is usually 
expressed in terms of casualty, spill or fatality rate per ship year. 
2.4 Data Forms of a Risk Variable 
A risk variable (e. g., hazardous or consequential event) can be measured numerically 
measured from obtained data, otherwise it may be presented in qualitative or linguistic 
form. The measured numerical variable may be either discrete or continuous (See 
Figure 2.2, which also shows the distribution of the outcome/occurrence of an event, x). 
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Figure 2.2: Types of variables and their occurrence distribution 
As can be seen from Figure 2.2, a discrete variable is one in which its values are 
countable. In other words, it can assume only certain values (x; where i=1,2,3,4,5, 
etc) with no intermediate values. In its most basic form, the discrete model defines the 
probability of each individual outcome, P(x, ). A continuous variable is one that can 
assume any numerical value over a certain interval (a to b) or intervals. In its most 
basic form, the continuous model is a mathematical expression (function) useful in 
computing probabilities of certain outcomes, Ax, ). Time and distance are perhaps the 
most common continuous variables. A linguistic variable takes on certain grades such 
as small, medium, big or large over that describes a set interval or intervals. 
2.5 Failure Probability Distributions 
Failure frequency (i. e., rate of occurrence) data supplies the necessary input for carrying 
out maritime risk and uncertainty analysis. On the basis of such frequency/rate, there 
are a number of probability distributions for modelling failures. The most widely used 
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of these for discrete random variables are the binomial and the Poisson distribution. 
The exponential and the normal distribution are most extensively applied to continuous 
random variables. Law & Kelton (1982) and Henley & Kumamoto (1992) are excellent 
sources for additional detailed information on the distribution types. 
2.5.1 Binomial Distribution 
The binomial distribution describes the possible number of times that a particular event 
will occur in a sequence of observation. When there are just two possible outcomes, 
e. g., success and failure, then the binomial distribution is characterised by the equation: 
ýP + 4)n (2.1) 
where; 
p= probability of event occurring (failure). 
q= probability of event not occurring (success). 
n= number of failures in the trial sequence of observation. 
To get probabilities for any one term, put p and q into the formula: 
n! x n-x P(x) __ 
x! (n !P4 
where; 
x is the number of failures. 
2.5.2 Poisson Distribution 
(2.2) 
The Poisson distribution best predicts probabilities of what can be considered `rare and 
random events', where the event is rare relative to the number of times it could possibly 
occur and each event is independent of previous events in the sampling unit (time 
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period or unit of space). The Poisson equation for predicting the probability of a 
specific number of defects or failure (x) in time (t) is (Sherwin, 2004): 
(ý)'e-x' P(x) _ (2.3) 
n! 
where; 
n= number of failure in time (t) 
A= failure rate per hour 
t= time expressed in hours 
P(x) = probability of getting exactly n failures in time t. 
While the Poisson distribution governs the occurrence of random events in time, space, 
volume, etc, the intervals between such events is controlled by the exponential 
distribution. 
2.5.3 Exponential Distribution 
For many items, the relationship of failure rate versus time can be modelled by a 
"bathtub" curve. The idealised "bathtub" curve shown in Figure 2.3 has the following 
three stages: 
" Initial period: The item failure rate is relatively high. Such failure is usually 
due to factors such as defective manufacture, incorrect installation, learning 
curve of equipment user, etc. Design should also aim at having a short "initial 
period". 
" Useful life: In this period of an item, the failure rate is constant. Failures appear 
to occur purely by chance. This period is known as the "useful life" of the item. 
Weardown period: In this period of an item, the item failure rate rises again. 
Failures are often described as wear-out failures. 
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Failure 
rate (X) 
Figure 23: The "bathtub" failure rate curve 
A risk assessment often concentrates on the useful life region of the curve, for which the 
failure rate is constant. In other words, a failure could occur randomly regardless of 
when a previous failure occurred. The failure density function of an exponential 
distribution is as follows: 
fit) = ýe-k (2.4) 
where failure rate X= 1/Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and t= time of interest. 
Failure probability of an item at time t is: 
P(t) =I- e-)` (2.5) 
For example, given that the MTBF for an item is 10,000 hours, the failure probabilities 
of the item at t=0,10,000 and 100,000 hours if failures follow an exponential 
distribution can be calculated as follows: 
X= 1IMTBF = 0.00001 per hour. 
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Whent=O, P(0)= 1 -e-k= 1 -e°=0. 
When t= 10,000, P(10,000) =1-ek=1- e-0*0°°1i10,00° = 0.632. 
When t= 100,000, P(100,000) = 1- ek=1- e-0'0°°1x100'000 =1 
From the above calculation, it can be seen that at t=0 the item does not fail until after a 
considerable (i. e., useful) time. 
2.5.4 Normal Distribution 
Normal distributions are widely used in modelling repair activities. The failure density 
function of a normal distribution is: 
f(t) =1 e_(1_0)2 
/2a2 
27L6 
(2.6) 
where p and bare mean and standard deviation oft. When p =0 and a=1, it is called 
the standard normal distribution. The failure density for the standard normal 
distribution is: 
f(t) = e-1Z ýz 
7r 
2.6 Empirical Frequency-Number of Fatalities Graph 
(2.7) 
FN-curves are a graphical presentation of information about the frequency of fatal 
accidents in a system and the distribution of the numbers of fatalities in such accidents. 
In maritime systems, they plot the frequency per vessel operating year F of accidents 
against N or more fatalities (IMO, 1997c), where N ranges upward from 1 to the 
maximum possible number of fatalities in the system. Values of both F and N can 
sometimes range across several orders of magnitude. In fact, FN-graphs are usually 
drawn with logarithmic scales (HSE, 2003). 
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There are two general methods for constructing FN-curves. One method calculates the 
FN-curve directly from empirical frequency data on the past maritime accidents while 
the other develops and uses a probability model to estimate the frequencies. There is a 
spectrum between these extremes, and most practical methods involve a mixture of 
empirical data and modelling (HSE, 2003). In addition, equivalent fatalities for loss of 
life (equating 100 minor injuries to 10 major injuries to 1 loss of life) are approved 
weightings utilised within the maritime field of application (IMO, 1997c). 
Values of F for high values of N are often of particular political interest, because these 
are the frequencies of high-fatality accidents. Society in general has a strong aversion 
to multiple casualty accidents. There is a clear perception that a single accident that 
kills 1,000 people is worse than 1,000 accidents that kill a single person (IMO, 2004). 
Thus, frequency and fatality are combined into a convenient one-dimensional measure 
of societal risk. This is also known as potential loss of life (PLL), which can be 
calculated as follows: 
PLL= EF, N; 
, _ý 
(2.8) 
PLL is a type of risk integral, being a summation of risk as expressed by the product of 
consequence (i. e., fatality) and frequency. The integral is summed up over all potential 
undesired events that can occur. In other words, PLL approximates to the area under 
the FN-curve, as shown in Figure 2.4 (IMO, 2004), although it is typically measured as 
fatality per ship-year. 
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Figure 2.4: Generation of potential loss of life 
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2.7 Concluding Remarks 
Every risk or uncertainty modelling has to be supplied with reliable failure and repair 
data input, which will enable the quantification process to be achieved. A vast amount 
of reliable maritime database is available to serve this purpose. When no data for a 
component failure mode can be obtained, it may be possible to express the failure in 
terms of fundamental and quantifiable parameters and to analyse it using limit state 
reliability analysis, although there is uncertainty about the relevant distributions. 
Casualty includes any accidental grounding, or any occurrence involving a vessel which 
results in damage by or to the vessel, its apparel, gear, cargo, or injury or loss of life of 
any person; and includes among other things, collisions, strandings, groundings, 
founderings, heavy weather damage, fires, explosions, failure of gear and equipment 
and any other damage which might affect or impair the seaworthiness of the vessel. 
Societal risk data are normally presented in the form of an F-N curve the slope of which 
is a measure of the risk aversion towards accidents with multiple fatalities. If injuries 
and fatalities are required to be taken into account in a particular assessment, it is 
helpful to combine these into a single measure of the number of equivalent fatalities. 
The maritime industry makes use of relative weightings of 0.1 and 0.01 for major and 
minor injuries respectively. 
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Chapter Summary 
Risk-based modelling for safety assessment of marine and offshore units and their 
systems would necessitate risk analysts to identify hazardous events and enquire into 
their risk causes and consequences via a variety of dependable risk analytical 
techniques. Good use of such tools leads to an improved understanding of the systems 
posing the risks and lays the foundation for planning and taking action to improve 
safety. A general review is provided of the well-established safety and reliability 
assessment techniques as these methods have been widely accepted and applied in the 
industrial setting. A critical review is made of human reliability analysis tools for 
incorporate the human element into risk-based modelling because, not addressing the 
risks posed by human operators means that the risk analysis are necessarily 
underestimates. Finally, literature reviews are undertaken to permit developments for 
modelling techniques that can analysis and treat uncertainties arising from the domain 
model of study and its parametric values. 
3.1 Introduction 
When studying the safety aspects of a large ship or offshore installation, it is almost 
impossible to treat the system in its entirety, owing to nature of its complex engineering 
structure (Sen, et at, 1993; Wang & Ruxton, 1998). A logical approach may be to 
break down the system into functional entities comprising subsystems and components, 
so that the interrelationships can be examined and finally a system safety model can be 
formulated to assess the safety parameters. This will therefore necessitate risk analysts 
to utilise some very well dependable analytical tools and techniques in the formulation 
of the assessment model. 
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A large number of techniques/methods exist for the identification of hazards and hazard 
scenarios as well as for use in risk estimation. These well established methods have 
seen continuous usage within industries because knowledge about the method is well 
documented in the literature (Mannan, 2005) and the analyst's own knowledge increases 
if focused on a basic amount of methods. The methods also lay down foundations for 
the development of novel techniques and may adjust to new applications (Harms- 
Ringdahl, 2001) especially as the depth of technology continuous to increase. They 
differ according to different dimensions (Hauge, 2001), e. g. depth of analysis, way of 
conducting analysis, whether they are quantitative or qualitative, and search method 
used. Obviously, safety assessments should be quantified only to the extent that is 
realistic and practicable (O'Connor, 1993). Which method to use, must be decided for 
each specific project as this enables the analyst to focus on the issue of concern and 
allows the analysis to be undertaken to an appropriate level of detail. Besides, use of 
different techniques might make it easier to both discover new hazards (bottom-up 
approaches, i. e. inductive/forward logic) and find causes for specific hazards (top-down 
approaches, i. e. deductive/backward logic) (Hansen, et al., 2002). 
Failing to addressing the risks posed by human operators mean that the risk analysis are 
necessarily underestimates (Redmill, 2002) and therefore, this calls for human 
reliability analysis (HRA) for the safety-critical maritime application. HRA is the 
method by which the probability of a system-required human action, task, or job will be 
completed successfully within the required time period and that no extraneous human 
actions detrimental to system performance will be performed (Hollnagel, 1994). 
Results of the HRA can then be used as inputs to probabilistic risk assessments, which 
analyses the reliability of entire systems by decomposing the system into its constituent 
components, including hardware, software, and human operators. However, HRA does 
not contribute fully to risk analysis, not only because of its deficiencies but also because 
there is a need for engineering risk analysts to become familiar with the techniques and 
to study human cognition and the models developed to explain human error. This is 
important with respect to modern systems especially as automation has increased rather 
than reduced the problems facing a human operator and the need to assess them. 
Though tricky, HRA needs to be carried out. Yet, it is omitted from many, if not most, 
maritime risk analysis and safety assessments, and their techniques are largely unknown 
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to engineering risk analysts. Further, engineers have little guidance on the subject as 
most safety standards do not advise on it. For example, the influential international 
safety standard, IEC 61508-SER (IEC, 2005) addresses hardware and software 
functional safety in great detail, but offers no advice on human factors. HRA methods 
are in some respects flawed, but if used with care, they facilitate a significant but 
overlooked aspect of risk analysis that needs to be incorporated into modem safety- 
critical marine and offshore applications. 
Uncertainties in risk analysis inputs are propagated through the risk assessment and 
evaluation steps of the safety assessment to obtain estimates of the level of confidence 
in the assessment outcomes (Chauhan & Bowle, 2003). Such uncertainties require 
techniques that can handle its treatment efficiently and effectively for the safety-critical 
maritime systems. The techniques are used to help predict how the systems would 
behave if they were to be hit by unforeseen catastrophic events such as the likes of fire, 
explosions, collisions, and loss of hull integrity (See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1 for more 
details). Therefore, a review of related work is necessary for the development and 
application of uncertainty analysis methods that can appropriately deal with qualitative 
and quantitative factors of the risk assessment study. A method that can deal with both 
types of uncertainty may be necessary for the incorporation of the human element from 
an appropriate HRA study. 
3.2 Qualitative and Quantitative Safety Assessment 
Based on the requirements of safety analysts and the safety data available, either a 
qualitative or a quantitative analysis can be carried out to study the risks of a system in 
terms of the occurrence probability of each hazard and its possible consequences. A 
severe hazard with a high occurrence probability requires priority attention whilst that 
which is not likely to occur and which results in negligible consequences usually 
requires minimal attention (Aldwinckle & Pomeroy, 1983). 
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3.2.1 Qualitative Safety Assessment 
Qualitative safety analysis is used to locate possible hazards and to identify proper 
precautions (design changes, administrative procedures, etc. ) that will reduce the 
frequencies or consequences of such hazards. It should become an integral part of the 
marine or offshore safety and reliability process. It may be performed with one or more 
of the following objectives: 
" To identify hazards in design and operation. 
" To document and assess the relative importance of the identified hazards. 
" To provide a systematic compilation of data as a preliminary step to facilitate 
quantitative analysis. 
" To aid in the systematic assessment of the overall system safety. 
The general steps in a qualitative system risk assessment are to: 
" Identify significant hazards. 
" Display the above information in a table, a chart, a fault tree or other format. 
The consequences of a hazard can be classified as one of the four severity categories as 
shown in Table 3.1 (Halebsky, 1989). They range from "catastrophic" to "negligible". 
The occurrence probability of a hazard can be described using the levels ranging from 
`frequent" to "remote" as shown in Table 3.2 (Halebsky, 1989). 
Table 3.1: Hazard consequence classification 
Category Description Equipment Personnel Environment 
I Catastrophic System loss Death Severe damage 
II Critical 
Major system 
damage 
Severe injury/illness Major damage 
III Marginal Minor sage tem Minor injury/illness Minor damage 
IV Negligible < Minor system 
damage 
Minor 
in'</illness 
Negligible damage 
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Table 3.2: Hazard probability 
Level Description Frequency 
A Frequent Likely to happen 
B Probable Several times during lifetime 
C Occasional Likely to happen once 
D Remote Unlikely but possible during lifetime 
Engineering judgement and past experience is required to carry out a qualitative risk 
assessment. Measures can be taken to eliminate or control hazards based on the 
information produced from such an assessment. Table 3.3 forms the basis of 
determining design actions based on the combined consequence severity and occurrence 
probability of each hazard (Halebsky, 1989). A catastrophic hazard, for example, 
requires some corrective action regardless of the probability of occurrence, whereas a 
marginal hazard with a remote probability of occurrence would not normally receive 
any corrective action. 
Table 3.3: Risk assessment matrix 
Hazard Severity 
Hazard Probability 
A (Frequent) B (Probable) C (Occasional) D (Remote) 
1- Catastrophic A-1 B-1 C-1 D-1 
2- Critical A-2 B-2 C-2 D-2 
3- Marginal A-3 B-3 C-3 D-3 
Negligible hazard 
4- Negligible No action required 
10 
0 Design action is required to eliminate or control hazards classified as A-1, A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2, and 
C-1. 
" Hazard consequences must be controlled or hazard probability reduced for hazards classified as 
B-3, C-2, and D-1. 
" Hazard control is desirable if cost effective classified as C-3 and D-2. 
" Hazard control is not cost effective for hazards classified as D-3. 
3.2.2 Quantitative Safety Assessment 
The purpose of a quantitative safety analysis is to help the designer to be aware of the 
characteristics of the system and to provide the designer with the quantified occurrence 
probability of each critical failure condition and the associated consequences. 
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Quantitative risk analysis utilises what is known and assumed about the failure 
characteristics of each individual component to build a mathematical model that is 
associated with some or all of the following information: 
" Failure rates 
" Repair rates 
" Mission time 
" System logic 
" Maintenance schedules 
" Human error 
" System layout 
Typical parameters that need to be obtained in a quantitative risk analysis include both: 
" The occurrence probability of each system failure event -A system failure event 
results from simultaneous occurrence of the basic events associated with each of 
the minimal cut sets leading to this system failure. The occurrence probability 
of a system failure event may be calculated on the basis of the identified cut sets 
and failure probability data of the associated basic events. 
" The magnitude of its possible consequences - The possible consequences of a 
system failure event can be quantified in terms of possible loss of lives/human 
injuries, property damage and the degradation of the environment caused by the 
occurrence of the failure event. With respect to the particular operating 
situation, experts normally quantify them. 
Consistency checking is required to validate the results produced from quantitative 
analysis. The following studies are always useful for obtaining the reliable results: 
" Sensitivity analysis. 
" Comparison with prior analysis if possible. 
" Model checking. 
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3.3 Methods for Safety and Reliability Assessment 
A number of well-established safety and reliability analytical methods are useful to aid 
the assessments of a risk-based nature. The appropriate technique(s) that can be applied 
to carryout assessment tasks would depend on the clarified hazards, their available data 
and the stage reached in the analysis. 
3.3.1 Preliminary Hazards Analysis 
A preliminary identification of the system elements or events that lead to hazards is the 
first step of a risk analysis. If it is extended in a more formal manner to include 
considerations of the event sequences that transfer a hazard into an accident, as well as 
corrective measures and consequences of the accident, the study is called a preliminary 
hazards analysis (PHA). PHA was introduced in the late sixties after the US 
Department of Defense requested safety studies to be performed at all the stages of 
product development. They issued guidelines that were applied from 1969 onward 
(DOD, 1969; DOD, 1999). It is also part of the mandatory activities required by MOD 
(1996) and SAE (1996). 
PHA is a qualitative approach that involves a mixture of inductive and deductive logic. 
It is conducted on the basis of information such as casualty statistics and comprehensive 
knowledge of similar systems. A PHA may provide an essential foundation for further 
analysis of individual hazards, with particular reference to fault tree analysis and event 
tree analysis (Sen, et al., 1993). The typical steps of a PHA are described as follows: 
" Identification of hazardous events. 
" Identification of hazardous event causes. 
" Identification of hazardous event effects. 
" Classification of risks. 
" Determination of preventive measures. 
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The format of a typical PHA is as shown in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: The format of a typical preliminary hazards analysis 
No.: PHA 
Subsystem name: 
Hazardous condition: 
Possible hazardous event: 
Probable hazardous result: 
Result impacts: People only 
Equipment only , 
both 
Hazard classification: I, II III ' IV 
Recommendations: 
Remarks: 
Prepared by 
Hazard classifications I, II, III and IV stand for catastrophic, critical, marginal and 
negligible, respectively. PHA may be very useful in the problem definition and hazard 
identification phases of the safety and reliability assessment process. It is strongly 
suggested that PHA be carried out in the initial stages of the marine and offshore system 
design process. 
3.3.2 What-if Method 
The intention of "what-if' approach (CCPS, 1992) is to ask questions that will cause a 
multi-disciplinary team to consider potential failure scenarios and ultimate 
consequences that such failures might create. It has also been referred to as scenario 
analysis or deterministic simulation (Groumpos & Merkuryev, 2002). It uses a mixture 
of inductive and deductive logic. 
"What-if' studies may often begin with the words "How could", "Is it possible", etc. 
Other forms of questions are perfectly acceptable. Some studies of this method 
incorporate checklists (DOD, 2000) at the end of the brainstorming to act as "sweeper 
questions", in order to ensure that potential hazards are not omitted. For example, a 
piece of work commissioned by the UK Department of Trade and Industry in 2003 
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required a group of risk experts to utilise a structured what-if technique (SWIFT) to 
ascertain hazards that may result from leaks of CO2 from geological formations 
(Vendrig, et al., 2003). The SWIFT follows a procedure that combines brainstorming, 
structured discussion and checklists to determine potential hazards. As its name 
suggests, SWIFT will generate answers more quickly than HAZOP (see Section 3.3.5) 
but is less thorough in looking at the detail (RINA, 2002). Furthermore, "What-if' 
analysis of a model considers the question: "What happens to the result if a particular 
change to a parameter is made"? If the change of a parameter is small this is also called 
sensitivity analysis: "How sensitive is the result to a small change of a parameter"? 
Generally, the "What-if' approach may be very useful in the problem definition and 
hazard identification phases of the safety and reliability assessment process. 
3.3.3 Parts Count 
The inductive parts count method is often used to produce an upper bound of failure 
probability of a large and complex system. Parts count analysis models predict 
reliability of a system (EPSMA, 2004) by summing the part failure rates, while 
accounting for conditions, such as the environment, stress, and quality of workmanship. 
The failure rates used in the analysis are based on historical data. This analysis is used 
to evaluate configurations in the preliminary design phase when the number of parts is 
reasonably fixed. In addition, the overall complexity is not expected to change 
appreciably during later development and production. This analysis can also be used to 
provide verification data and have generally been used to predict the reliability of 
electronic components. However, the models can be extended to mechanical 
subsystems when appropriate data is available. A parts count analysis assumes the time 
to failure of the parts is exponentially distributed (that is, a constant failure rate). It also 
assumes that all elements of the item reliability model are in series or can are assumed 
to be in series for purposes of approximation. Thus, the general expression for item 
failure rate, them, with this method is given as (DOD, 1995; Telcordia Technologies, 
2001; FAA, 2005): 
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Nta'gi7rQi 
1=1 
where; 
n= number of different generic parts categories; 
Ni = quantity of ith generic part; 
2gi = generic failure rate for the ith generic part; and 
Grp; = quality adjustment factor for the ith generic part. 
(3.1) 
Quality adjustment factors are usually applied to the failure rates to account for items, 
such as differences in application, temperature, and stress (FAA, 2005). For other parts 
such as non-electronics, ,=1 providing that parts are procured in accordance with 
applicable parts specification. The parts count technique may be very useful in the 
hazard identification and risk estimation phases of the safety and reliability assessment 
process. 
3.3.4 Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) is one of the oldest and most 
frequently applied hazard identification methods. It is a combination of failure mode 
and effects analysis (FMEA) and criticality analysis (CA). FMECA was developed in 
1967 by Society of Automotive Engineers to offer criticality analysis for the FMEA 
process (SAE, 1967). The FMEA technique was originally developed in the US 
Department of Defense in 1949 as a mechanism for improving the quality control of its 
weapons and military equipment (Pentti & Atte, 2002). FMEA was used as a reliability 
evaluation technique to determine the effect of system and equipment failures 
(Coutinho, 1964). Failures were classified according to their impact on mission success 
and personnel/equipment safety. The formal application of the technique was quickly 
adopted by the aerospace industry, where it was already used during the 1960s Apollo 
space missions. In the early 1980's, US automotive companies began to formally 
incorporate FMEA into their product development process (Pentti & Atte, 2002). 
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FMECA can be carried out at any indenture level required to examine each failure mode 
of an item and its possible consequences. An FMECA may consist of the following 
steps (DOD, 1980): 
" Define the constraints and assumptions of the analysis. 
" Break down the system to its indenture levels such as the sub-system level and the 
component level. 
" For each item at the level analysed, identify all possible modes of failures and 
respective causes. 
" For each identified failure mode, identify or provide the following information: 
- All the distinctive operating conditions under which failure may occur. 
- The failure rate of the identified failure mode. 
- The effects (consequences) on the safety and operability of the higher levels 
(including the level analysed). 
- The possible means by which failure may be identified. 
- Design provisions and/or actions in operation to eliminate or control the 
possible resulting effects. 
- The severity class of the possible effects where such a class may be defined 
by one of the following linguistic variables: 
Catastrophic: Involving death, system loss and/or severe environmental 
damage. 
Critical: Involving severe injury, major system damage and/or major 
environmental damage. 
Marginal: Involving minor injury, minor system damage and/or minor 
environmental damage. 
Negligible: Involving no injury and negligible damage to the system and 
the environment. 
" Failure consequence probability defining the likelihood that the effects of the 
identified failure mode will occur, given that the failure mode has taken place. 
" Criticality analysis 
Criticality analysis allows a qualitative or a quantitative ranking of the criticality of the 
failure modes of items as a function of the severity classification and occurrence 
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likelihood. So long as the probability of occurrence of each failure mode of an item can 
be obtained from a reliable source, the criticality number of the item under a particular 
severity class may be quantitatively calculated as: 
N 
C=ýE; L; t (3.2) 
where; 
E; = failure consequence probability of failure mode I; 
L; = likelihood of occurrence of failure mode I; 
N= the number of the failure modes of the item, which fall under a particular 
severity classification; and 
t= duration of applicable mission phase. 
Once the criticality numbers of the item under all severity classes have been obtained, a 
criticality matrix can be constructed to provide a means for criticality comparison. Such 
a matrix display shows the distributions of criticality of the failure modes of the item 
and provides a tool for assigning priority for corrective action. Criticality analysis can 
be performed at different system/sub-system levels and the information produced at low 
levels may be used for criticality analysis at a higher level (Wang, et al., 1995). 
An FMECA is an inductive process that involves the compilation of reliability data, 
where available, for individual items. It can be integrated into the hazard identification 
phase of the safety and reliability assessment process and information produced from it 
may also be used to assist in construction of fault trees and also in construction of 
Boolean representation tables (Wang, et al., 1995). To maximise its usefulness as a 
decision making tool, it should be initiated at the earliest stage of design, and then 
updated and expanded to lower levels as the design progresses. In the maritime 
industry, the Det Noske Veritas (DNV) and the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) 
adopted the requirement for FMEA/FMECA in the mid 1970s and early 1980s (Coggin, 
2001). Furthermore, guidance for dynamically positioned vessels FMEA has been 
provided by IMCA (2002) to provide a practical amalgamation of current regulations, 
operating procedures and good practice. 
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3.3.5 Hazard and Operability studies 
A HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) study is an inductive technique usually regarded 
as an extended FMECA (see Section 3.3.4) that can be applied by a multidisciplinary 
team to stimulate systematic thinking for identifying potential hazards and operability 
problems, particularly in the process industries (Henley & Kumamoto, 1992). Its basis 
was laid by Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd in 1963 from so-called "critical 
examination" techniques (Kletz, 1974; Lawley, 1974) at the time in which its 
application first became known as operability and hazard studies (Hendershot, et al., 
1998). It was soon after improved upon and to emphasize the importance of process 
safety, the name HAZOP (HAZard and OPerability) was coined (CIA, 1977). The 
technique was then used to run a pilot study on an agricultural chemical manufacturing 
plant that proved a great success (Hendershot, et al., 1998). It went on to arouse greater 
interest and within ten years it had become widely acknowledged as one of the most 
powerful hazard identification technique (CIA, 1977; Henley & Kumamoto, 1992). The 
distinctive features of the HAZOP methodology are: 
"A focus on state variables rather than mechanical components. 
" An emphasis on an expert team approach. 
" An explicit consideration of operator effects. 
"A good foundation for subsequent quantitative risk analysis. 
A HAZOP study investigates the proposed scheme systematically for every conceivable 
deviation, and looks backward for possible causes and forward for the possible 
consequences. It is normally based on a word model and the flow sheet or diagram of 
the system to be examined. The level of detail, depending on the time and merits, 
determines HAZOP study planning and as such, good knowledge of the system is 
essential. HAZOP studies involve normal plant operation, foreseeable changes in 
normal operation, start-up and shutdown, suitability of plant materials and failures of 
equipment and instrumentation. A HAZOP study may involve the following basic steps 
(McKelvey, 1988): 
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1. Define the scope of the study. 
2. Select the correct analysis team. 
3. Gather the information necessary to conduct a thorough and detailed study. 
4. Review the normal functioning of the process. 
5. Subdivide the process into logical, manageable sub-units for efficient study 
and confirm that the scope of the study has been correctly set. 
6. Conduct a systematic review according to the established rules for the 
procedure being used and ensure that the study is within the special scope. 
7. Document the review proceedings. 
8. Follow up to ensure that all recommendations from the study are adequately 
addressed. 
HAZOP studies can be integrated into the hazard identification phase of the safety and 
reliability assessment process and is one of the most commonly used hazard 
identification techniques in the marine and offshore industry (HSE, 2002). The form of 
HAZOP notes closely parallels the requirements of fault tree analysis (see Section 
3.3.6) as a HAZOP study yields a clear identification of top events and a detailed 
description of failure sequences and associated operating conditions. FMECA (refer to 
Section 3.3.4), cause-consequence analysis (refer to Section 3.3.9) and Boolean 
representation analysis (refer to Section 3.3.7) can also make use of the information 
produced from HAZOP studies. In recent years, HAZOP studies have become 
increasingly recognised as an essential part of the process plant design by both the 
process industries (Kennedy & Kirwan, 1998; Tweeddale, 2003) and the regulatory 
authorities (Andrews & Moss, 1993). Thus, it is strongly suggested that HAZOP 
studies be conducted in the initial stages of the process plant design process. 
3.3.6 Fault Tree Analysis 
The idea of analysing potential faults using fault trees was first envisaged by Watson 
(1961) of Bell Telephone Laboratories, as a plan to evaluate the safety of the launch 
control system for the Minuteman missile. Scientists at the Boeing Company led by 
Haasl (1965) improved the technique to a modem theory and then applied it to the entire 
Minuteman Missile System. Other divisions within Boeing realised the usefulness of 
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the results from the Minuteman program and began using the fault tree technique during 
the design of commercial aircraft. In later years the technique was adopted by the 
nuclear power industry (Veseley, et al., 1981) and nowadays its grown to become one 
of the most widely used methods in system reliability analysis (Veseley, et al., 2002; 
FAA, 2005). 
Table 3.5: Commonly used fault tree symbols 
Types Symbol Description 
The OR-gate indicates that the output event occurs if any 
of the input events occurs 
OR-gate 
Logic gates 
The AND-gate indicates that the output event occurs only 
if all the input events occur at the same time 
AND-gate 
The basic event represents a basic equipment failure that 
requires no further development of failure causes 
Input events 
(states) 
The undeveloped event represents an event that is not 
examined further because information is unavailable or 
because its consequences are insignificant 
Description of The comment rectangle is for supplementary information 
state 
Transfer 
out The transfer-out symbol indicates that the fault tree is 
Transfer symbols developed further at the occurrence of the corresponding 
Transfer 
i transfer-in symbol n 
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The fault tree analysis (FTA) is probably the most widely applied technique for hazard 
identification and risk evaluation. Such an analysis is a process of deductive reasoning 
that can be applied to the safety assessment of a system of any size. It is particularly 
suitable for the risk assessment of large marine and offshore engineering systems for 
which the associated undesired (top) events can be identified by experience, from 
previous accident and incident/accident reports of similar products, or by some other 
means. The top events of a system to be investigated in FFA may also be identified 
through PHA (see Section 3.3.1), incident/accident reports, system Boolean 
representation modelling (see Section 3.3.7), etc. The information produced from 
FMECA (see Section 3.3.4) may be used in construction of fault trees. 
FTA provides an engineering capacity to identify potential problem areas, to evaluate 
their overall system impact, and to numerically assess the level of safety inherent in the 
system design. Careful consideration must be given to the selection of the top event; it 
must be sufficiently defined to constrain the fault tree to the specific conditions to be 
investigated. Intimate knowledge of the system design is required to perform a fault 
tree analysis as the analyst must be familiar with the various modes of system 
operations and the types of component failures that can occur. Since a fault tree 
construction is event-based, human error (caused by operators, design or maintenance), 
hardware or software failures, environmental conditions or operational conditions can 
be taken into account (Sen, et al., 1993). The steps in FTA are outlined as follows: 
" Identification of top events. 
" Representation of each top event by means of a fault tree. 
" Evaluation of the occurrence probability of each top event. 
" Determination of critical failure modes. 
Fault trees are built using gates and events (blocks). The symbols used for the most 
common of these (and as used in this research) are given in Table 3.5. In an FTA, an 
event with a catastrophic nature or an event that cannot be tolerated, such as total loss of 
a system, is usually selected as a top event for investigation. The selected top event is 
placed at the top of the logic diagram, and the failure events that lead to the top event 
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are located immediately below in successive levels. The pathways through the fault tree 
diagram represent all the events that give rise to the top event. These pathways are 
known as "cut sets" or "implicant sets" (Bozzano & Villafiorita, 2003). After the 
simplification rules have been applied, the irreducible pathways can be obtained and 
these irreducible pathways are referred to as "minimal cut sets" or "minimum implicant 
sets" (Wang, et al., 2000; 2001). 
The laws for simplifying sets and obtaining the minimum cut sets leading to the top 
event in a fault tree are based on the basic logic gates of AND, OR and NOT being used 
in differing combinations. Suppose """ stands for "AND" and "+" stands for "OR", 
and suppose that "A" and "B" represents the events of "not A" and "not B" 
respectively, then the typical Boolean algebra rules are described as in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Basic rules of Boolean algebra 
Name of the rule AND form OR form 
Identity law A- 1= A A+ 0= A 
Null (or dominance) law A"0=A A+1=1 
Idempotent law AAA A+ A= A 
Inverse law A- A= 0 A+ A= 1 
Commutative law A"B=B"A A+B=B+A 
Associative law (A " B) "C=A" (B " C) (A + B) +C=A+ (B + C) 
Distributive law A+(B"C)=(A+B)"(A+C) A"(B+C)=A"B+A"C 
Absorption A- (A+B)=A A+A"B=A 
De Morgan's law A"B=A+B A+B=A B 
Double Complement law A=A 
Owing to such simplification rules, the occurrence probability of a top event can be 
obtained from the associated minimum cut sets. The following two mini-trees in 
Figure 3.1 are used to demonstrate this. 
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(a) Event occurrence due to an "AND" gate (a) Event occurrence due to an "OR" gate 
Figure 3.1: Logic gate representation in a fault tree 
Suppose P(A) and P(B) are the occurrence probabilities of events A and B respectively. 
If both these event are independent of each other, the occurrence probability of top 
event Z due to an "AND" gate as shown in Figure 3.1(a) is given by: 
P(Z) = P(A " B) = P(A) x P(B) (3.3) 
However, the occurrence probability of top event Z due to an "OR" gate as shown in 
Figure 3.1(b) is: 
P(Z) = P(A + B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A " B) 
= P(A) + P(B) - P(A) x P(B) (3.4) 
FTA can be used in both reliability and risk assessment. The principles of FTA in both 
of these assessments are the same although in reliability assessment it is usually used 
for measuring system performance while in risk assessment it is used for investigating 
undesirable events with serious consequences. It may be carried out in the hazard 
identification and risk estimation phases of the safety and reliability assessment process 
to identify the minimal cut sets associated with system top events and to assess the 
occurrence probability of each top event in order to assist in design decision making. 
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3.3.7 Decision Table Method (Boolean Representation Method) 
Decision table analysis was initially introduced as an automatic fault tree construction 
technique in the 1970s (Dixon, 1964; Fussel, 1973; Henley, 1992) because its logical 
approach reduced the possibility of omissions of failure causes that could easily occur in 
the fault tree construction. A decision table is a Boolean representation model. 
An engineering system can be described in terms of components and their interactions. 
A component can be described by a set of input events and a set of output events. Each 
output event specifies the state of the output and a set of input events specifies the states 
of inputs. Each event may have several states. For instance, output pressure from a 
valve may be assigned to one of the five states such as "too high", "high", "normal", 
"lox' and "too lox', each of which corresponds to a range of values. The interactions 
of components can be modelled by studying the system process diagram. 
Given sufficient information about a system to be analysed, this approach can allow a 
rapid and systematic construction of a Boolean representation table of the system on the 
basis of the Boolean representation models of the components and their interactions. 
Once components and their interactions have been modelled, Boolean representation 
modelling can be started initially at the component level, progressed up to the 
subsystem level if necessary, and finally to the system level in order to obtain the final 
system Boolean representation description. The final system Boolean representation 
table contains the possible system top events and the associated prime implicants (cut 
sets). Although the construction of such a table is not diagrammatic, as FTA can be, it 
can allow a less cumbersome representation of failure modes for components having 
multiple states, and it can also allow systems with feedback loops to be easily modelled 
(Henley, 1992; Kumamoto & Henley, 1979; Wang, et al., 1993). This method is 
extremely useful for analysing systems with a comparatively high degree of innovation 
since their associated top events are usually difficult to obtain by experience, from 
previous accident and incident reports of similar products, or by other means. 
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3.3.7.1 Simplification of Boolean Representation Tables 
Events or variables used in Boolean representation modelling can be classified in the 
following two categories: 
1. Intermediate events/variables: These are the outputs from a component within the 
system 
2. Primary (basic) events/variables: These are the events/variables that are inputs from 
the system environment or an internal mode of a component. An internal mode of a 
component represents its functioning for which the failure data is known. 
Each primary variable or intermediate variable may have several states. Suppose the 
number of the states of a variable A and a variable B both equal three, as given by F, W 
and N, which stand for `failed", "working" and "normal", respectively. Then the rules 
for Boolean representation simplification, which are absorption (see Table 3.7(a)) and 
merging (see Table 3.7(b)), can be applied to obtain the output of a variable C. The 
symbol "*", as used in Table 3.7, represents a "don't care" state. Such a state is used 
to signify that it makes no difference whichever state the specified input variable is in. 
Table 3.7: Simplification rules for Boolean representation 
(a) Absorption 
AB Co tW, 
N* 
NN 
High 
High 
4 
AB Covpur 
N* High 
AB C. tl,,,, 
FF High 
FW High 
FN High 
(b) Merging 
4 
AB Co rp, r 
Fý High 
The input entries of a final system Boolean representation table should be primary 
variables. Therefore, intermediate variables should be eliminated by substitution with 
primary variables. During the elimination process, some intermediate variables may be 
used to replace other intermediate variables. Gradually, all intermediate variables are 
eliminated and a Boolean representation table in which all the entries are primary 
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variables is obtained. At this stage, the simplification of the Boolean representation 
table can be carried out. If the number of the entries of a Boolean representation table is 
large the simplification process may prove time-consuming. Therefore, it is suggested 
that the simplification rules be applied after each intermediate variable is eliminated. 
3.3.7.2 Relationship Between Fault Tree and Boolean Representation Model 
To demonstrate the relationship between fault tree modelling and Boolean 
representation modelling, a simplified example is used. Suppose that an electrical 
circuit system is composed of the three components: "battery", "bulb" and "circuit", as 
shown in Figure 3.2(a), for which the desired outcome is "light". Each of these 
components may be in either a working (W) or failure (F) state. The top event that 
indicates the failure of the electrical circuit system is "no light". Therefore, the fault 
tree leading to this top event is built as shown in Figure 3.2(b), where the basic events 
Fbattery, Fbu/b and Fcircuit stand for the failure state of the respective subscripted 
component. The "OR" gate in the fault tree indicates that if any of Fbattery, Fbu/b and 
Fcircuit happens, then the top event "no light" occurs. 
1 
I 
(a) Circuit's line diagram (b) Circuit's fault tree 
Figure 3.2: Fault tree illustration of an electrical system 
Also, let Wbattery, Wbu, b and Wc;, c.; t stand for the working state of the respective 
subscripted component. By studying all the possible combinations of the both working 
and failure states of the three components, the preliminary Boolean representation table 
is built as shown in Table 3.8. Note that "Y" and "1V" represent "yes" and "no" 
respectively for "light'. After the rules for simplifications and deducing extra prime 
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implicants have been applied to Table 3.8, the final Boolean representation table is 
obtained as shown in Table 3.9. From Table 3.9, it can be seen that if any of Fbanery, 
Fbob and Fci, ci: happens, top event "no light" occurs. 
Table 3.8: A preliminary Boolean representation table of an electrical system 
Battery Bulb Circuit Light 
Wbattery Wbulb Wcircuit Y 
Wbattery Wbulb r' circuu 
N 
Wbattery Fbulb Wcircuit N 
Wbattery Fbulb Fcircuit N 
Fbattery Wbulb Wcircuit N 
Fbattery Wbulb Fcircuit N 
Fbauery Fbulb Wcircuit N 
Fbattery Fbulb Fcircuit N 
Table 3.9: A concluding Boolean representation table of an electrical system 
Battery Bulb Circuit Light 
Wbattery Wbulb Weircuit Y 
Fbattery * * N 
" Fbulb * N 
* * Fcircuit N 
From the above, it can be seen that the same result is obtained using both the fault tree 
method and the Boolean representation modelling approach. From the obtained 
Boolean representation table, it can also be seen that the working condition for the 
system is modelled. In general, the fault tree model is a special case of the Boolean 
representation model, and its analysis process only deals with failure events. Thus, 
when modelling events with multiple state variables, the Boolean representation 
approach is considered to be more appropriate. The Boolean representation approach 
may also be more appropriate to model systems with complicated interrelations between 
components. In terms of the ways the two approaches are applied, the major difference 
is that fault tree analysis is a deductive reasoning process while the Boolean 
representation approach uses the inductive logic, as described previously. 
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3.3.8 Event Tree Analysis 
In many accident scenarios the initiating (accidental) event may have a wide spectrum 
of possible outcomes, ranging from no consequences to catastrophes. In most well 
designed systems, a number of safety functions, or barriers, are provided to stop, or 
mitigate the consequences of potential accidental events. The safety functions may 
comprise technical equipment, human interventions, emergency procedures, and 
combinations of these. Examples of safety functions are: fire and gas detection systems, 
emergency shutdown (ESD) systems, fire-fighting systems, firewalls and evacuation 
systems. The consequences of the accidental event are determined by how the accident 
progression is affected by subsequent failure or operation of these safety functions, by 
human errors made in responding to the accidental event, and by various factors like 
weather conditions, time of the day, etc. 
The accident progression is best analysed by an inductive/bottom-up method. The most 
commonly used method is the so-called event tree analysis (ETA), which was originally 
developed when the risk analysis for the WASH- 1400 nuclear power system was done 
(NRC, 1975). The safety team for the nuclear power system tried to make a FTA from 
the top even "accidental release of radioactivity" but the tree became tremendously 
complex and finally they had to give up. Instead they adapted the more general 
decision-tree formalism from business, so as to break up the problem in smaller pieces, 
and this method became the ETA (Leveson, 1995). 
ETA is a logic tree diagram (Halebsky, 1989) that starts from a basic initiating event 
and provides a systematic coverage of the time sequence of event propagation to its 
potential outcomes or consequences (i. e., forward logic) step-by-step. In the 
development of the event tree, each of the possible sequences of events that result is 
followed from assuming failure or success of the safety functions (Henley, 1992; NRC 
1991) affected as the accident propagates. Each event in the tree will be conditional on 
the occurrence of the previous events in the event chain. The outcomes of each event 
are most often assumed to be binary ('true' or `false' - `yes' or `no'), but may also 
include multiple outcomes (for example, `yes', `partly' or `no'). 
Chapter 3- Review of Analytical Techniques 
ETA has been used in the safety and reliability assessment of a wide range of 
technological systems. This analytical technique is a natural part of most risk analysis, 
but may also be used as a design-tool to demonstrate the effectiveness of protective 
systems in vessels. This technique is also used for human reliability assessment. 
The ETA may be qualitative, quantitative, or both, depending on the objectives of the 
analysis and may be developed independently or follow on from fault tree analysis. It 
(ETA) is usually carried out in the following six steps: 
1. Identification of a relevant initiating (accidental) event that may give rise to 
unwanted consequences. 
2. Identification of the safety functions that are designed to deal with the initiating 
event. 
3. Construction of the event tree. 
4. Description of the resulting accident event sequences. 
5. Calculation of probabilities/frequencies for the identified consequences. 
6. Compilation and presentation of the results from the analysis. 
Figure 3.3 shows an event tree for an initiating event "major overheat" in an engine 
room of a ship. If a failure occurs, then this overheat may propagate through the system 
and result in some possible consequences. From this event tree, it can be seen that 
when initiating event "major overheat" takes place, if there is no fuel present to aid 
combustion, then the consequences will be negligible in terms of fire risks. If there is 
fuel present, then it is required to look at if the "detection fails". If the answer is "no", 
the consequences are "minor damage", otherwise it is required to investigate if the 
"sprinkler fails". If the sprinkler works, then the consequences will be "smoke"; 
otherwise it is required to see if the alarm system works. If the alarm system works, 
then the consequences will be "major damage"; otherwise "injuries/deaths" may result. 
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Major 
overheat 
Fuel present 
to aid 
combustion 
P3 
Initiating 
event 
PI 
Yes 
I -PI 
No 
Failed 
detection 
P2 
Yes 
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fails 
Yes 
I -P3 
Alarm 
system fails 
P4 
Yes 
I -P4 
No 
Consequence 
Injuries/ 
deaths 
Probability 
P1xP2xP3xP4 
Major PI xP2xP3x(I-P4) damage 
Smoke PIxP2x(I_P3) 
No 
1 -P2 
Minor 
No 
damage PI x (I -P2) 
Negligible ý_ pl 
damage 
Figure 3.3: Example event tree for an Initiating event in a ship's engine room 
Quantitative analysis can be carried out on the event tree to assess the occurrence 
probability of each possible resulting consequence. As shown in Figure 3.3, P1, P2, P3 
and P4 are the probabilities for the "yes" condition of `fuel present to aid combustion", 
`failed detection", "sprinkle fails" and "alarm system fails", respectively. I- P1,1 - 
P2,1 - P3 and I- P4 are their "no" condition probabilities. The ETA also gives the 
calculated probabilities of occurrence for all the consequences, i. e., "injuries/deaths", 
"major damage", "smoke", "minor damage" and "negligible damage", that results from 
the analysis. The sum of all probabilities of occurrence for all the resulting 
consequences is equal to 1. 
Such an analysis can be integrated into the hazard identification and risk estimation 
phases of the safety and reliability assessment process. 
3.3.9 Cause-Consequence Analysis 
A technique that possesses the ability to identify the causes of an undesired event and 
from this event develop all possible system consequences is the Cause-Consequence 
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Diagram (CCD) method. This analytical diagram method, also termed Cause- 
Consequence Analysis (CCA), was developed in the 1970s at RISO National 
Laboratories in Denmark (Nielsen, 1971) to specifically aid in the reliability and risk 
analysis of nuclear power plants in Scandinavian countries (Villemeur, 1992a). The 
method was created to assist in the cause-consequence accident analysis of the nuclear 
plants, which involved identification of the potential modes of failure of individual 
components and then relating these causes to the ultimate consequences for the system 
(Nielsen, & Runge, 1974). It has been perceived as being superior to the ETA 
(Villemeur, 1992a) and in addition to this, can account for time delays, which is not a 
feature available in the ETA method. Nielsen (1971) stated that as well as being a tool 
for illustrating the consequences of particular failures, the method could also serve as a 
basis from which the probability of occurrence of the individual consequences could be 
evaluated. The consequences evaluated include those that illustrate the system 
functioning as intended and those that illustrate an undesirable failure sequence. 
The technique has been used as the main analysis tool for conducting safety assessment 
(Nielsen, 1975; Nielsen, et al., 1975; Nielsen, et al., 1977; Taylor, 1977) and for 
assessing the reliability of sequential systems (Andrews, & Ridley, 2001). 
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Figure 3.4: Cause-consequence diagram of a hazardous event 
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CCA is a marriage of fault tree analysis (to show causes) and event tree analysis (to 
show consequences) (Henley & Kumamoto, 1981). CCA is a diagrammatic approach 
as shown in Figure 3.4. Construction of cause-consequence diagrams starts with a 
choice of a critical event. The "consequence tracing" part of a CCA involves taking the 
initial event and following the resulting chains of events through the system. The 
"cause identification" part of a CCA involves drawing the fault tree and identifying the 
minimal cut sets leading to the identified critical event. CCA is extremely flexible as it 
can work forward using event trees and backward using fault trees. 
Although CCA incorporates features from FTA and ETA, it is not commonly used since 
the CCD for a fairly simple process is detailed and somewhat cumbersome. It is mostly 
used when the logic model for the concerned event is simple enough for a graphical 
display. The detailed description and applications of this approach are the same as 
discussed in FTA and ETA. 
3.3.10 Digraph-Based Analysis 
Digraph-based analysis (DA) is an aid in determining fault tolerance, propagation, and 
reliability in large interconnected systems. The technique permits the integration of 
data from a number of individual FMECAs/FMEAs, and can be translated into fault 
trees, described in Section 3.3.6, if quantitative probability estimates are needed (Lapp 
& Powers, 1977; Shishko, 1995). Vaidhyanathan & Venkatasubramanian (1995) have 
used digraph-based models for automated HAZOP analysis. 
A directed graph or digraph exhibits a network structure and resemble a schematic 
diagram. It is on the whole a finite set of nodes together with a finite set of directed 
edges in which each edge can be followed from one node to another. These nodes are 
usually drawn as circles or ovals whilst the edges are drawn as straight or curved lines 
having a terminating arrowhead. Figure 3.5 shows a simple digraph of three nodes that 
are represented by A, B and C. An edge begins from an influencing node and terminates 
at an influenced node. Also, A4B signifies that "A influences B". 
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B 
C 
Figure 3.5: A simple digraph 
In a DA, the nodes correspond to the state variables, alarm conditions or failure origins, 
and the edges represent the causal influences between the nodes. Digraph 
representation provides explicit causal relationships among variables of systems with 
feedback loops. From the constructed digraph, the causes of a state change and the 
manner of the associated propagation can be easily found (Umeda, et al., 1980). The 
rules generated from such an analysis can be used as knowledge of an expert system for 
plant operations. 
DA is a bottom-up event-based qualitative technique. DA may be integrated into the 
hazard identification phase of the safety and reliability assessment process and may be 
very efficient for identifying possible causes of process disturbances (Kramer & 
Palowitch, 1987). Digraphs can also be used to model and reconstruct accident 
scenarios of hazardous events. As a result, both hazard analysis and accident 
investigation processes can be improved via modelling event sequences (FAA, 2005). 
3.3.11 Simulation Analysis 
Simulation analysis refers to any analytical method that is capable of imitating the 
behaviour of a real-life system under safety and reliability assessment study. For 
example, Monte Carlo simulation (Cortazar & Schwartz, 1998) is an eminent simulation 
method that uses the idea statistical trials in calculating multiple scenarios (i. e., 
evaluating substantive hypotheses) of the risk-based analytical model by repeatedly 
sampling values from the probability distributions for the uncertain variables to get an 
approximate solution to a problem. There is a random process where some parameters 
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of the process are equal to the required quantities of the problem. Since these 
parameters are not known exactly, many observations are made so that the parameters 
of the process can be determined approximately. Each time a value is randomly 
selected, it forms one possible scenario and solution/outcome to the problem. Together, 
these scenarios give a range of possible solutions/outcomes, some of which are more 
probable and some less probable. Unfortunately, this also means that it is computer 
intensive and best avoided if simpler solutions are possible. Therefore, the most 
appropriate situation to use Monte Carlo methods is when no other solutions exist or 
they are difficult to use. 
Monte Carlo analysis methods are used in the oilfield to estimate the risks involved in 
new exploration projects, evaluation of development schemes and evaluation of validity 
of reservoir models (Cortazar & Schwartz, 1998; Armstrong, et al., 2005). 
3.3.12 Subjective Reasoning Analysis 
Whenever data are sparse for safety and reliability assessment, it may become very 
difficult for the risk analyst to precisely obtain the parameters of basic failure events to 
carry out quantitative analysis using the probabilistic analytical methods outlined above 
since a great deal of uncertainty is involved. Therefore, the need for models that reflect 
subjective reasoning or understanding will dominate choices in parameterisation. 
Subjective reasoning analysis (SRA) may prove relatively easier to deal with such 
problems with uncertainty. An example of SRA is where subjective descriptors such as 
cold, cool, warm or hot is used by the safety analyst to present the value state at which 
the temperature of a room is at. Clearly, it is not accurate to define a transition from a 
quantity such as `warm' to `hot' by the application of one degree centigrade of heat. In 
the real world a smooth (unnoticeable) drift from warm to hot would occur. This 
natural phenomenon can be described more accurately by fuzzy set theory (See 
Chapter 7 for more details). 
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It can be combined with FMECA to form mixed approaches for modelling the safety 
and reliability assessment of a system more efficiently and conveniently. This method 
can be used in the hazard identification and risk estimation phases of the safety process. 
3.4 Selection of Safety and Reliability Methods 
Each phase in the safety and reliability assessment process involves the use of the 
analytical methods outlined previously. Best practice dictates the use of a combination 
of the different methods, since each provides different information about the system 
under consideration. It is realised that use of these safety and reliability assessment 
methods in an integrated manner may make risk assessment comparatively efficient and 
convenient since safety information and the advantages of each method may be more 
efficiently explored by doing so (Wang, et al., 1993). In such integration, one method 
may be used to process the information produced using another method. 
To make full use of the risk assessment methods, an analysis of their input requirements 
and outcomes is required. The possible inter-relationships of the various methods are 
identified as shown in Figure 3.6. This network of data flows (as collected from 
Chapter 2) and these analytical methods constitute a general framework within which 
the safety of a system may be assessed as the design evolves. The outlined analytical 
methods, classified as either top-down or bottom-up event-based as described 
previously, may be applied to study the system states, operational conditions, 
environmental conditions and other design considerations which contribute to the 
occurrence likelihood of the hazardous conditions associated with a ship or an offshore 
installation and define the magnitude of possible resulting consequences. 
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Figure 3.6: Information flow diagram of risk assessment methods 
The selection of the outlined methods, or the decision as to which methods are more 
appropriate for the risk assessment of a particular product, is dependent on the 
following considerations: 
" The level (system, subsystem or component level) of the product breakdown at 
which the hazard identification is carried out. 
" The degree of complexity of the inter-relationships of the items at the 
investigated level of the product breakdown. 
" The degree of innovation associated with the product design (the availability of 
product failure data for risk assessment). 
Expert judizement 
I, 
Fault Tree 
Analysis 
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The applicability of each risk assessment method has been discussed with reference to 
the phases of the safety and reliability assessment process. When there is a lack of 
knowledge or experience regarding the design solution and its possible effects on 
product safety, inductive bottom-up methods, although more time-consuming, should 
yield a higher level of confidence that hazardous system states and respective failure 
modes are identified, otherwise top-down methods may prove more convenient and 
efficient. If, however, it is difficult to describe the basic failure events of a system using 
probabilistic risk analysis methods, subjective reasoning analysis may be more 
appropriate to assess the safety of the system. 
3.5 Critical Review on Human Reliability Analysis Techniques 
As early as the 1960s, the importance of human reliability was realised by Rook (1962) 
who defined as the probability that an agent accomplish successfully his mission under 
fixed time and fixed conditions. Attempts followed to classify human error in industrial 
settings (Swain, 1963; Farmer, 1967). Then during the 1970s and early 1980s, there 
was an increasing awareness of the importance of human-error as a factor in incidents 
and accidents involving complex technologies. This offered significant advances to be 
made in the knowledge of human behaviour so as to quantify the propensity of humans 
to make errors under the conditions of interest. An early model to explain error 
mechanisms was developed by Rasmussen (1983) whilst analysing the errors made by 
seasoned operators on the basis of an extensive review of incident and accident reports 
from hazardous industries. Rasmussen's framework proposed three types of error: 
skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based. This framework was built on by Reason 
(1990), who defined the basic error types as being slips, lapses and mistakes. Since this 
time, various approaches have been taken to this area in the past and detailed accounts 
of the history of HRA are given in Villemeur (1992b) and Reason (1990). Recently, 
Kletz (2001) went on to included violations and mismatches to the types of human error. 
In parallel with attempts to model the causes and mechanisms of human error, risk 
analysts sought to develop methods and techniques (Caccuabue, 1997) to quantify the 
reliability of a human operator as a system component, in order for human-error to be 
accounted for in an overall assessment of the risk associated with a system. Such 
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techniques included: Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) (Swain, & 
Guttmann, 1983), Human Cognitive Reliability (HCR) (Hannaman, et al., 1984), 
Operator Action Trees (OATS) (Hall, et al., 1982), Success Likelihood Index 
Methodology (SLIM) (Embrey, et al., 1984) and Human Error Assessment and 
Reduction Technique (HEART) (Williams, 1988). Reason (1990) provides an 
overview, and critique of these techniques. Their differences are noticed when 
considering their goals (identify, quantify or reduce errors (see Kirwan, 1992)), their 
features and the consequences of their applications (Gerdes, 1995). 
In the first place, the techniques approximate to hazard identification methods in that 
they provide ways of analysing operators' tasks and working environments and 
identifying likely causes of error. In the second place, they approximate to hazard 
analysis methods by attempting to attach probabilities to the identified hazards. This 
quantitative approach was not unnatural given that, at the time the techniques were 
developed, industrial risk analyses were mostly probabilistic and HRA techniques were 
intended to achieve similar aims of identifying and analysing risks. Although the 
hazard identification processes were qualitative and based largely on human judgement, 
the techniques were not seen as complete if they did not provide ways of attributing 
probabilities to error occurrences. Besides this quantitative analysis formation on a 
qualitative and judgmental foundation, such first-generation HRA techniques are weak 
because they do not embrace the most recent knowledge of human behaviour. The 
human factors experts have for a long time acknowledged this and called for the 
development of a new generation of techniques. Williams (1985) stated that these 
methods were neither accurate nor easily usable by non-specialists, while at the same 
time its developers have yet to demonstrate, in any comprehensive fashion, that their 
methods possess much conceptual, let alone, empirical validity. Swain (1988) declared 
that all HRA models had serious limitations, are often ill-founded relative to human 
behaviour and the task of calibrating the models had not been seriously addressed. 
Dougherty (1990) agreed and in asserting that inadequate HRA modelling can lead to 
increased risk, called for second-generation methods to be developed and for advances 
in error psychology and cognitive science to be accommodated within the HRA 
framework. Later, Hollnagel (1996) complained of the obsolescence of the state of the 
HRA art and Dear-den & Harrison (1996) expressed the fact that all these approaches 
suffer from their inability to adequately take into account aspects of the human-machine 
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interface that might affect the probability of human-error. However, reliable second- 
generation methods have not yet replaced the first-generation methods. The second- 
generation methods includes, Quantification of Errors of Intention (INTENT) 
(Gertman, et al., 1992), Cognitive Event Tree System (COGENT) (Gertman, 1993), 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) (Hollnagel, 1998) and 
Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) method 
(Gertman, et al., 2004). 
In spite of the serious flaws of current HRA methods within their scope of applicability, 
the HRAs have been highly successful in terms of identifying significant deficiencies 
related to human performance. Thus, genuine success for analysing manual and 
repetitive tasks due to numerous modifications such as new procedures, revision of 
procedures or technical specifications, revised training, installation of additional 
hardware and operator support systems or automated capabilities, and modifications of 
systems (including actuation logic) have resulted from the HRA modelling. These 
findings are in most cases considered as robust in spite of the normally large numerical 
uncertainties. Fortunately, some of these techniques are still being updated, combined 
and evaluated as to their relative effectiveness as a perspective means of improving 
safety culture. It is envisaged that their qualitative effects and incorporation into 
quantified form, based on the consideration of uncertainty, can be enabled via the 
development of a fuzzy-Bayesian network (FBN) modelling. A literature review is 
provided for the FBN in Section 3.6.3. 
3.6 Literature Review on Uncertainty Treatment Techniques 
The previous sections in this chapter have outlined several risk analysis methods that 
are widely applied in maritime risk analysis. Nevertheless, in some situations where 
there is a lack of data, it may be difficult to apply them with confidence to the 
assessment task. Over the recent years, some techniques such as Bayesian network 
(BN), fuzzy logic (FL) and fuzzy-Bayesian network (FBN) have attracted much 
attention in safety assessment and in situations where traditional risk analytical tools 
cannot be applied with confidence due to the high level of uncertainty in data. This 
research work will investigate such techniques. Detail descriptions and case study 
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application of these developed techniques to marine and offshore systems will be given 
in more detail in Chapters 6,7 and 8. 
In this section, a brief review of the BN, FL and FBN is given herein to highlight the 
research progress in the development of such techniques. 
3.6.1 A Review on Bayesian Network 
Until twenty years ago, the issue of ordering possible beliefs, both for belief revision 
and for action selection, was seen as increasingly important and problematic, and at the 
same time, dramatic new developments in computational probability and decision 
theory directly addressed perceived shortcomings. The key development (Pearl, 1988) 
was the discovery that a relationship could be established between a well-defined notion 
of conditional independence in probability theory and the absence of arcs in a directed 
acyclic graph (DAG). This relationship made it possible to express much of the 
structural information in a domain independently of the detailed numeric information, in 
a way that both simplifies knowledge acquisition and reduces the computational 
complexity of reasoning. The resulting graphic models have come to be known as BNs. 
BNs are at the cutting edge of expert systems research and development. Unlike the 
traditional rule-based approach to expert systems, they are able to replicate the essential 
features of plausible reasoning (reasoning under conditions of uncertainty) and combine 
the advantages of an intuitive visual representation with a consistent, efficient and 
mathematical basis in Bayesian probability. Critically they are capable of retracting 
belief in a particular case when the basis of that belief is explained away by new 
evidence. Because of the development of propagation algorithms (Pearl, 1988; Russell 
& Norvig, 2003), followed by availability of easy to use commercial software and 
growing number of creative applications, BN has caught the sudden interest of research 
in different research fields since early 90's. Perhaps the greatest testament to the 
usefulness of Bayesian problem-solving techniques is the wealth of practical 
applications that have been developed in recent years. After about ten years' research, 
BNs have succeeded in creating models for practical applications in areas of intelligent 
decision, safety assessment, information filtering, autonomous vehicle navigation, 
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weapons scheduling, medical diagnosis, pattern recognition, and computer network 
diagnosis. For a nice collection of papers on applications of Bayesian techniques, see 
the March 1995 special issue of the Communications of the ACM (Heckerman, et al., 
1995). Since most real life problems involve inherently uncertain relationships, BN is a 
technology with huge potential for application across many domains. 
Influence diagrams, which further extend the notion of BNs by including decision nodes 
and utility nodes, have been used in human reliability assessment (Humphreys, 1995) 
and decision-making on explosion protection offshore (Bolsover & Wheeler, 1999). A 
good reference work for the computational method underlying the implementation of 
them in Hugin is described in Jensen, et al. (1994). The Hugin software (Jensen, 1993) 
enables a powerful risk assessment solution that is easy to use, flexible, and appropriate 
for use on marine and offshore applications. Other renowned program packages for BN 
building and influencing include MSBNx (Kadie, et al., 2001), created at Microsoft 
Research, and Netica (Netica, 2002), the commercial program developed by Norsys 
Software Corp. 
3.6.2 A Review on Fuzzy Logic 
Forty years ago, it was conceived that items in the real world are better described by 
having partial membership in complementary sets rather than by having complete 
membership in exclusive sets and this notion that gave rise to the theory of fuzzy set 
(Zadeh, 1965). This theory was then applied to traditional logic to develop the concept 
of FL (Zadeh, 1975), a modelling technique which employs human analysis to provide 
an approximate and yet effective means to describe the behaviour of situations that are 
too complex or too ill-defined to allow precise mathematical analysis. Every since, the 
technique has been further developed to include methodologies such as modelling, 
evaluation, optimization, decision-making, control, diagnosis and information (Terano, 
et al., 1992). 
Zadeh (1973) presented fuzzy algorithms for complex systems and decision processes. 
Whilst using this algorithm in an attempt to control a steam engine and boiler 
combination by synthesizing a set of linguistic control rules obtained from experienced 
Chapter 3- Review of Analytical Techniques 
human operators, Mamdani (1975) proposed a fuzzy inference system (FIS) in which 
the rule consequence is defined by fuzzy sets. Takagi, Sugeno and Kang (Sugeno, 
1985) later went on to propose an inference scheme in which the conclusion of a fuzzy 
rule is constituted by a weighted linear combination of the crisp inputs rather than a 
fuzzy set. For this reason, Takagi-Sugeno FIS may only need a smaller number of rules 
since their output is already a linear function of the inputs rather than a constant fuzzy 
set. However, the Mamdani-type scheme has emerged as the most commonly used FIS 
owing to the fact that FL systems do not necessarily require mathematical equations to 
establish a relationship between input and output parameters. Such a relationship can 
be set via simple IF-THEN rules that are defined by a knowledge basis. Kosko (1992) 
uses another approach to generate fuzzy IF-THEN rules and shows that the fuzzy sets 
can be viewed as points in a multidimensional unit hypercube. This makes it possible to 
represent a set of inference rules by the guise of a fuzzy associative memory (FAM) in 
an inference matrix or table. This FAM matrix can thus give the risk matrix for a risk 
assessment task. 
FL modelling can be particularly useful where there is no analytical model of the 
relation under consideration and/or where there are insufficient data for statistical 
analysis (Salski, et al., 1996), as it provides a logical means for linguistic computation. 
As such, the logic can be applied to problems in the domains of engineering, business, 
medical and related health sciences, and the natural sciences. Whilst it cannot substitute 
for deterministic modelling techniques, FL does complement the set of such techniques 
and can be coupled to them, thus enabling a better and more extensive risk assessment 
in cases of vague and incomplete project information. 
After an aggregation process of the Mamdani FIS rule consequences, there is a fuzzy set 
for each output variable that needs defuzzification. If the defuzzification is carried out, 
this transforms the fuzzy reality into a crisp one. The emerging crisp reality carries less 
information than the underlying fuzzy reality and moreover, there is an irreversible loss 
of information that may be vital or significant in the assessment task for a safety-critical 
application. With Dempster-Shafer evidence theory (Shafer, 1976) holding a 
connecting relationship to fuzzy set theory, an evidential reasoning (ER) approach 
(Yang & Xu, 2002) may best utilise the aggregated fuzzy output set to establish the 
most useful and practical results of a risk analysis. Besides, the ER approach shows 
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great potentials in handling multiple attribute/criteria decision analysis (Yang & Singh, 
1994; Yang & Xu, 2002) and also in hierarchical evaluation problems (Yang & Sen, 
1993) under uncertainty. In following this setting therefore, FL modelling can thus 
permit the risk-based modelling of safety-critical marine and offshore application 
domains. 
3.6.3 A Review on Fuzzy-Bayesian Network 
The combination words "fuzzy-Bayesian" have seen increasing usage owing to 
developments achieved whilst tackling both vague and random uncertainties within a 
modelling domain. Clark & Kandel (1990) recognised that a FBN may provide a more 
holistic, graphical approach that lends itself well to implementation in expert systems on 
personal and small computers. With Pan & McMichael (1998) putting up thoughts on a 
causal model that could possibly provide a high-level generic architecture for fusing 
data incoming from multiple sensors, an ideal integration of Bayesian probability theory 
(Bayes, 1763) and FL lead to fuzzy causal probabilistic networks (another term in the 
ideology behind FBNs). This was followed through by Pan & Liu (1999) study on 
hybrid BNs (the most general form of BNs demanded by practical applications), in 
which continuous variables and discrete ones may appear anywhere in a DAG. In such 
BNs, discretization of continuous distributions can allow approximate inference in the 
network without limitations on relationships among continuous and discrete variables. 
As explained by Pan & Liu (2000), although all the variables are defined to be discrete, 
the subset of some variables, such as temperature or pressure, for example, can be 
genuinely continuous. On the other hand, it considers FL as an approximate reasoning 
formalism that may be easy to use and possibly sufficient in many ordinary 
applications. Thus, the proposition presented that FBNs may quite possibly realise 
anything FL can do and as well, may inherit the entire rigor, flexibility and other 
superior properties of probabilistic approaches (Pan & Liu, 2000). Furthermore, there is 
the tendency to combine BN and FL modelling techniques so that one will complement 
the shortfall of the other. 
Viertl (1987) explains the necessity of developing a fuzzy Bayesian inference and this 
paved way for the first works on this inference, which come from safety project studies 
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in structural reliability researches (Chou & Yuan, 1993; Frühwirth-Schnatter, 1993; 
Itoh, & Itagaki, 1989). The research results based on two examples, a reinforced 
concrete beam and a structural frame, showed that the fuzzy-Bayesian approach is a 
viable enhancement to the safety assessment of existing structures (Chou & Yuan, 
1993). Nonetheless, that inference suffered from numeric stability problems in trying to 
achieve a justified fuzzy-probability transformation and further overlooked the 
conditional cases that can arise between fuzzy/possibility distribution events. The 
developed theory of mass assignment (MA) by Baldwin, et al. (1996) provide a bi- 
directional transformation platform between Bayesian probability theory and 
possibility/fuzzy set theory, and Dubois & Prade (1997) introduce a Bayesian 
conditioning operation in possibility theory, adapted to the idea of focusing on a body of 
knowledge for a reference class described by some evidences. 
The work carried out so far on FBN cannot suitably be applied in the maritime domain, 
since the renowned leap in possibility-probability distribution inference process, as 
brought about by the theory of MA, is worthy of appropriate modifications to previous 
methodologies. With such modifications in place, the innovative FBN can now rightly 
be based on a more realistic inference process and may as well offer a stable practical 
solution for those domains containing continuous and discrete variables and also those 
of random and vague uncertainties. 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
As followed from the collection of reliable failure and repair data for which a number of 
useful database sources are ascertained, typical risk analytical methods need to be 
applied in order to conduct safety and reliability assessments. Such an assessment can 
then be carried out qualitatively or quantitatively depending on how much data is or has 
made been obtainable/available, in addition to the competence of expert judgement that 
can be provided to the safety analyst. 
Some of the analytical methods, such as PHA, what-if, part count, FMECA and HAZOP 
are most usefully applied from hazard identification phase, whilst others like FTA, 
decision table, ETA, CCA and DA are used mainly in performing risk estimation. Best 
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practice dictates the use of a combination of different methods, since each method 
provides different information about the system under consideration. These safety and 
reliability techniques can also be used in an integrative manner to produce a more 
efficient and convenient safety assessment, and therefore, they have gained substantial 
acceptance for use in formal maritime safety practice, as can be noticed in Chapter 4. 
Human-error also can be accounted for in an overall assessment of the risk associated 
with a safety-critical maritime system via HRA techniques. First-generation HRA 
techniques such as THERP, HCR, OATS, SLIM and HEART have been developed to 
quantify the reliability of a human operator, although the hazard identification processes 
were qualitative and based largely on human judgement. Their use leads to an increased 
understanding of the human sources of risk that transpired into genuine success for 
analysing manual and repetitive tasks. It is realised that they do not embrace the most 
recent knowledge of human behaviour and therefore, there has been a growing demand 
for the development of new generation methods. Reliable second-generation methods 
have included INTENT, COGENT, CREAM and SPAR-H, but these have not yet 
replaced the first-generation methods. Nevertheless, both qualitative and quantitative 
effects of human influences need to be incorporated into the risk analytical domain 
model. 
The developed techniques of BN, FL and FBN are used in situations where these 
traditional risk analytical tools cannot be applied with confidence due to the high level 
of uncertainty in data. The FBN may also provide the platform for which the human 
element of the safety assessment can be incorporated into risk-based models. More 
details on these developed techniques can be found in Chapters 6,7 and 8. It is 
envisaged that the use of uncertainty analysis in conjunction with risk assessment would 
provide enhanced information for decision makers. 
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Chapter 4: Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
Chapter Summary 
Formal safety assessment (FSA) as a method supporting the decision-making for 
maritime legislation offers a more rational approach than the traditional "regulation by 
disaster" method. Its adoption for shipping represents a fundamental cultural change, 
from a largely reactive and piecemeal approach, to one that is integrated, proactive, and 
soundly based upon the evaluation of risk. The incentives that FSA can offer have 
prompted its trial application to high speed passenger catamaran ferries and bulk carrier 
ships for which this chapter briefly reviews the outcome of their risk analysis. In spite 
of highlights reached in these FSA trial developments so far, there are still many 
important hurdles to cross. The chapter further discusses these problems and delineates 
the road that lies ahead in advancing and properly setting FSA in place. 
4.1 Introduction 
In general, improvements in safety have been driven by accidents, that is, the traditional 
"regulation by disaster" approach to safety. It is as though there is the need for the 
shock of a catastrophe to force some corrective action to be taken, and even then the 
results achieved are often proportionate to the political, media and public outrage and 
pressures generated. By introducing a more structured risk analysis process through a 
formal safety assessment procedure, regulators are compelled to examine potential 
hazards and to introduce appropriate measures or standards before a tragedy occurs. 
Formal safety assessment (FSA) is a process of identifying hazards, assessing the 
associated risks, studying alternative ways of managing those risks, carrying out cost- 
benefit assessment of alternative management options, and finally making decisions on 
which option to select (MSA, 1996). The concept of FSA provides an elegant route to 
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application of well-established risk analysis methods (see Chapter 3), already widely 
used in other industries within shipping activities, whereas the proposition of moving 
rapidly towards a safety case regime would be extremely difficult, putting unrealistic 
demands on both the regulator and the regulated. 
In addition to a direct involvement in the FSA Methodology (Section 4.4), the 
application of safety assessment techniques has for many years been actively 
considered, hence promoting the use of such methods in the marine industries 
(Aldwinckle & Pomeroy, 1983; Pomeroy, 1985). In parallel the experience gained in 
the preparation of safety cases for offshore installations has provided experience of the 
application of the key techniques of analysis (Stansfeld, 1994). 
It is important to recognise that any approach suitable for assisting IMO in setting the 
international framework of rules for shipping must be equally valid when looking at the 
Rules for classification. Changes to the Rules for classification are proposed for many 
reasons, including changes in technology and as a consequence of service experience, 
the proposed changes could be tested by using a generic ship type risk model. It is 
possible to set up a number of generic models for this purpose and to assess the benefit 
of the changes. This approach would give greater transparency and objectivity to the 
rule making process of the classification societies. 
4.2 Adoption of Formal Safety Assessment 
In 1992, Lord Carver's report into marine safety raised the issue of a more scientific 
approach to ships and recommended that emphasis be given to a performance-based 
regulatory approach. This introduced the concept of formal ship safety assessment. In 
general, over the last several years the application of formal ship safety assessment has 
reached an advanced stage as a result of several serious marine accidents (IMarE, 1997) 
such as those mentioned tragedies in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1. The established statutory 
safety regulations that govern ship safety have been in use for many years and these are 
prescriptive in nature. However, they do not reflect the requirements of individual ships 
and a "goal setting" approach involving FSA was thought to be of vital importance. 
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The UK government reasoned that adoption of FSA would enable safety issues at IMO 
to be prioritised, and regulations derived that are cost effective and proportional to risk. 
Thus, in 1993, the UK proposed to the IMO that FSA should be applied to ships to 
ensure a strategic oversight of safety and pollution prevention. The UK Maritime 
Safety Agency (now the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, MCA) developed the 
concept of the FSA, recognising that the uniformity and minimum standards of the 
existing prescriptive requirement must be maintained. 
The principle that FSA should be adopted as a systematic and rational process for 
assessing risks associated with any sphere of activity, and for evaluating the benefits of 
mitigation options has been accepted by IMO and the interim guidelines were approved 
in 1997 (IMO, 1997a). These interim guidelines had since been replaced by an IMO 
approved formal guideline in 2002 (IMO, 2002b). 
4.3 Problem Definition to the Vessel Type 
Prior to undertaking an FSA the problem under analysis and its boundaries should be 
carefully defined. The definition should be consistent with operational experience and 
current requirements taking into account all relevant aspects (IMO, 1997a). In order to 
achieve this, written submissions discussing aspects of the problem definition are 
sought from a number of technical experts. These are presented to a working meeting 
comprising a wider range of expertise in shipping, its operations, and also in human 
factors so as to gain a consensus view. 
4.3.1 Preparation for the Study 
Those aspects that may be considered relevant when addressing ships are: 
" Ship category (e. g. type, length or gross tonnage range, new or existing, type of 
cargo). 
" Ship systems or functions (e. g. layout, subdivision, type of propulsion). 
Ship operation (e. g. operations in port and/or during navigation); 
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" External influences on the ship (e. g. vessel traffic system, weather forecasts, 
reporting, routing). 
" Accident category (e. g. collision, explosion, fire). 
" Risks associated with consequences such as injuries and/or fatalities to 
passengers and crew, environmental impact, damage to the ship or port facilities, 
or commercial impact. 
4.3.2 The Generic Ship Type 
In order to set the context for application of FSA to specific ship types, it is useful to 
define a "generic ship type risk model". This means those features, characteristics and 
attributes which are common to all ships, or relevant to the problem under 
consideration. The generic model can thus be a collection of systems, including 
organisational, management, operational, human, electronic and hardware, which fulfil 
the defined function, and not as an individual ship in isolation. Identified generic ship 
functions are as shown in Figure 4.1 (IMO, 1998). 
Bunkering/ 
storing 
Pollution 
prevention Stability 
Power 
propulsion 
Figure 4.1: Generic ship functions 
The life cycle of the generic ship comprises: 
" Design, construction and commissioning. 
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" Entering port, berthing, unberthing and leaving port. 
" Loading and unloading. 
" Passage. 
" Dry dock and maintenance period. 
" Decommissioning and disposal. 
Generic ship definitions are also used to assist in identification of hazards, underlying 
causes, risk assessments and risk control options. 
4.4 The Formal Safety Assessment Methodology 
FSA is a risk-based tool for the management of safety. The word "risk" is used here to 
encompass consideration of both the likelihood and the consequences of an unwanted 
event. 
The FSA process consists of five individual steps as shown in Figure 4.2 (Riding, 1997; 
IMO, 1997a; 1997b; 2002b). These are: 
Step 1: Identification of hazards (a list of all relevant accident scenarios with 
potential causes and outcomes). 
Step 2: Assessment of the risks associated with those hazards (evaluation of risk 
factors). 
Step 3: Consideration of alternative ways of managing the risks (deriving 
regulatory measures to control and reduce the identified risks). 
Step 4: Cost-benefit assessment of alternative risk-management options 
(determining cost effectiveness of each risk control option). 
Step 5: Recommendations for decision-making (information about the hazards, 
their associated risks and the cost effectiveness of alternative risk 
control options is provided). 
In this context, it is recognised that nowhere in the 5 steps defined above is there a point 
at which a judgement of acceptability is made. Some people have reasoned that, as part 
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of the FSA process, a target level of risk ought first to be established, and that before 
starting on Step 3a judgement be made on whether any risk reduction measures are 
needed at all. There is clearly logic in this approach, particularly at a detailed level. 
However, in the first instance it is more important to be able to identify all hazards, and 
to rank them relative to each other, so that attention can first be given to the more 
significant contributors to total risk. 
Decision makers 
Criteria 
1 
Step 1 
Hazard 
identification 
Ak ilk 
F------------------ 
Step 2 
Risk 
assessment 
ý 
Step 3 
Risk control 
options 
ý)l 
Step 4 
Cost benefit 
assessment 
-ý 4. 
Review 
L-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 4.2: Flow chart of the FSA process 
It should also be pointed out that even with inclusion of risk targets and acceptability 
judgements, the overall safety management process is not complete. To manage risk 
effectively, there needs to be a loop established, whereby the effects of changes based 
upon the decision making of Step 5 are monitored to ascertain whether the desired level 
of safety is being achieved, and if not, further options are examined. However, the core 
process comprises the five steps set out above. It is these objective and rational 
analyses that facilitate systematic judgement, and effective management, of risk 
(Peachey, 1995). 
4 
Step 5 
Decision-making 
recommendations 
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4.4.1 FSA Step 1- Identification of Hazards 
Hazards may or may not have already been realised as accidents. With the passage of 
time, changing technology, and the influence of human factors, new hazards will arise, 
and existing hazards may materialise into accidental events not previously experienced. 
Identification of hazards is therefore a vital first step in the FSA process. Its objective is 
to describe the activity, and identify the hazards that might impair the functions of the 
generic ship type (or subject undergoing FSA analysis). This is achievable by the use of 
standard techniques, such as brainstorming, to identify hazards that can contribute to 
accidents, and by screening these hazards using a combination of available data and 
expert judgement in preparation for Step 2. 
Various techniques exist for hazard identification. The most common of these in the 
shipping industry are: 
" Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), described in Section 
3.3.4 of Chapter 3, which is particularly suitable for hardware systems such as 
machinery controls. 
" HAZard and OPerability studies (HAZOP), described in Section 3.3.5 of 
Chapter 3, which is particularly appropriate for identifying hazards in "soft" 
systems involving activities and operations. 
" Compartment studies in which the effect of an event such as fire or flooding on 
every system or piece of equipment within a compartment, is systematically 
examined. 
Details of other typical hazard identification techniques can be found in Chapter 3. 
4.4.1.1 Hazard Screening 
The purpose of the hazard screening during step I is to provide a quick and simple way 
of ranking hazards. It is a process for establishing, in broad terms, the risk of all 
identified accident categories and accident subcategories, prior to the more detailed 
quantification that will be used in Step 2. 
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Lists of accident categories that have been determined by the Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch (MAIB) as a guide for safety analysis of the generic ship are 
(Brennan & Peachey, 1996; Loughran, et al., 2002; and see also Chapter 2, 
Section 2.3.1): 
" Collision (striking between ships). 
" Contact (striking between ship and other objects). 
" External hazards (natural). 
" External hazards (others). 
" Grounding/stranding. 
" Hazardous substances. 
" Explosion. 
" Fire. 
" Flooding. 
" Machinery failure. 
" Payload related. 
" Loss of hull integrity. 
Having identified the accident categories, their causes are then sorted into risk exposure 
groups of the identified generic ship functions. 
4.4.1.2 Risk Matrix Ranking 
This stage consists of analysis of incident and accident data coupled with expert 
judgement. In order to check the robustness of the resulting hazard rankings and to 
assist in the resolution of the rankings in cases where several hazards have similar 
ranking level, the risk matrix approach is used. 
The FSA guidelines (IMO, 1997a; 2002b) propose a two-dimensional qualitative risk 
matrix as shown in Figure 4.3: 
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ý 
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\ 
................. :............... _................... ............ ....................................... ý.. 
Minor Major Catastrophic 
CONSEQUENCE 
Figure 43: A two-dimensional qualitative risk matrix 
Risk level boundaries (Negligible/ALARP/Intolerable) in Figure 4.3 are purely 
illustrative. ALARP is used to refer to where a risk has to be shown that it is "As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable" (See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2). The FSA guidelines leave the 
selection of the definition of frequency, consequence and the risk level boundaries to the 
member or organisation undertaking the FSA study. 
The risk matrix in the FSA guidelines uses qualitative definitions of frequency and 
consequence that are generally understandable to those interpreting data or making 
future projections. However it leaves definition of the risk level boundaries open as 
there is no IMO or other internationally agreed guidance on defining these boundaries. 
It is proposed for the generic ship FSA study that a risk matrix, based on that in the 
Interim Guidelines is used, but with risk ranking in place of defining risk boundaries. 
Qualitative definitions of frequency and consequence can then be defined from the 
definition of the ship operations and the accident categories selected for the ship's FSA 
study. 
4.4.1.3 Results of Step I 
The output of Step 1 comprises: 
9A prioritised list of hazards and their associated scenarios prioritised by risk 
level. 
Chapter 4- Formal Safety Assessment 
"A preliminary description of the development of causes and effects. 
4.4.2 FSA Step 2- Assessment of Risks 
Once hazards have been identified, the risk associated with the realisation of those 
hazards can be evaluated, so as to ascertain whether those risks are significant. 
Establishing the level of risk involves determining both the frequency of occurrence of 
the event and its severity. For most hazards, such as, fire or explosion, there are several 
possible initialising events, and several possible outcomes, depending upon 
circumstances. This leads to there being numerous different scenarios to evaluate. 
4.4.2.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Assessment 
The process of risk assessment is initially performed qualitatively and later extended 
quantitatively to include data when it becomes available. The interactions and 
outcomes of both these process are seen in Figure 4.4 (ABS, 2000). 
Estimating risk in a qualitative way is done by categorising each of the two components 
of risk descriptively. For example, the likelihood of an event could be described as 
"frequent", "unlikely", "extremely improbable", etc. and its consequence as "minor", 
"major", "catastrophic", etc. The result of a qualitative risk assessment can be 
presented in the form of a risk matrix. 
Qualitative risk assessment can be done using historical data (which reflects past 
experience), and judgement (which can take a forward look), or a combination of the 
two. Subsequently, this qualitative evaluation can be improved upon by quantifying the 
result using appropriate data (for example, error rates, reliability data, accident 
statistics) and analysis or modelling methods (for example, of fire growth) where these 
are available. Quantification is not necessary, however, and meaningful judgements, 
particularly of risk ranking can be made based upon qualitative assessment of risk. 
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Figure 4.4: Modelling process via qualitative and quantitative analysis 
Quantitative risk assessment utilises what is known and assumed about the failure 
characteristics of each individual component to build a mathematical model. From this 
assessment, typical parameters including the probability of occurrence of each failure 
system and possible consequences need to be obtained. Normally quantified by experts 
with respect to the particular situation, consistency checking is required to validate the 
results produced from quantitative analysis. Also, there will inevitably be uncertainty in 
such assessment of risk. This uncertainty does not negate the value of the assessment, 
but needs to be taken into account when considering the results. 
Human error is generally recognised as being a significant factor in many accidents. 
Likewise, human intervention can prevent an incident occurring, or control or reduce 
the degree of escalation. Human factors therefore need to be fully taken into account 
during the risk assessment stage. The objective nature of the risk assessment techniques 
mentioned above, in which contributory factors and alternative outcomes are 
systematically examined, facilitates an objective evaluation of both the negative effect 
of human error and the potentially positive effect of appropriate human intervention. 
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Systematic techniques, such as task analysis (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992), are available 
for analysing human behaviour, enabling explicit account to be taken of this factor, even 
if at this time reliable data on human performance is scarce and the resulting uncertainty 
is relatively high. 
4.4.2.2 Risk Modelling 
As with Step 1 of FSA (hazard identification), techniques for the assessment of risk are 
also well established and proven. They include, for example: 
" Fault tree analysis (FTA), described in Section 3.3.6 of Chapter 3, which 
systematically looks at the combinations of circumstances and failures that can 
lead to an accidental event. 
" Event tree analysis (ETA), described in Section 3.3.8 of Chapter 3, which is a 
systematic and logical means of exploring the escalation potential of an 
accidental event to establish all possible outcomes and their severity. 
The construction and quantification of both such event and fault trees can be used to 
build a risk model. An example of a conceptual risk model is the risk contribution tree 
(RCT). The RCT provides a mechanism for displaying diagrammatically the 
distribution of risk amongst accident categories and subcategories, as shown in 
Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: Example of a risk contribution tree 
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Whilst the example makes use of fault and event tree techniques, other established 
methods could be used if appropriate. 
4.4.2.3 Factors which Influence Risk 
Factors which influence risk include: 
" Stakeholders - "interested entities". 
" Influence diagrams -" regulatory impact diagrams". 
Stakeholders 
Stakeholders are any persons, organisations, company or nation state (as in Figure 4.6), 
which are directly affected by shipping accidents or the cost effectiveness of the 
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industry. Their attitudes and actions are probably the greatest single influence over 
safety. Hence, FSA includes stakeholder identification, and consideration of the impact 
and equality of potential regulatory options for each stakeholder. 
Figure 4.6: Typical stakeholders in shipping venture 
Influence Diagrams 
An influence diagram identifies the influences that affect the likelihood of an accident, 
and enables those influences to be quantified. An influence diagram also provides 
information for use in Step 3 of the FSA process. In the context of developing an 
overview of risk, influence diagrams are complementary to fault and event trees in the 
construction of the RCT. 
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Figure 4.7: A generic influence diagram 
An influence diagram takes account of three different types of influence. These are 
those due to: 
" Human failures. 
" Hardware failure. 
" External events. 
Influencing factors are assumed to exist at three levels as shown in Figure 4.7, that is: 
" Direct level: Factors that directly influence the likelihood of occurrence. 
" Organisational level: Company/organisational level factors that underlie the 
direct level factors. 
" Policy level: The level at which rules and regulations are made, with a view to 
influencing the organisational and direct level factors. 
4.4.2.4 Results of Step 2 
The results from Step 2 can be summarised as follows: 
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" An identification of high risk areas to be controlled. 
" An identification of the principal influences that affect the level of risk. 
4.4.3 FSA Step 3- Risks Control Options 
Having concentrated on identification and assessment of high-risk areas/events, Step 3 
begins the process of managing risk by developing causal chains along the lines, which 
may be expressed as in Figure 4.8 (IMO, 2002b). 
Figure 4.8: Casual chain of a failure event 
Causal chains are required for all potential likely high-risk scenarios in enabling a range 
of risk control measures (RCMs) to be identified. These are either `preventive' control 
measures or those that provide a measure of `mitigation'. In order to assist logical 
thought process about RCMs they are divided into three categories (Canter, 1997). 
" Category A: Fundamental type of risk control, for example, preventive or 
mitigating. 
" Category B: Type of action required and its cost, for example, engineering/ 
design/ procedural/ human. 
" Category C: Confidence placed on measures, for example, passive/active, 
independent/dependent, auditable/non-auditable, quantitative/ qualitative etc. 
(a) Areas Needing Control 
It is aimed to screen the output of Step 2 so that effort is focused on the areas that need 
the most control. The main aspects of this assessment are to review the following: 
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" Review risk level. 
" Review severity. 
" Review probability. 
" Review confidence. 
(b) Risk Control Measures Low 
Generation of RCMs is aimed to: 
" Reduce the frequency of failure. 
" Mitigate of the effort of failure. 
" Alleviate circumstances where failure may occur. 
" Mitigate the consequences of accidents. 
Creating this log involves the following steps: 
(i) Identifying existing RCMs as identified in Step 2. 
(ii) Developing new RCMs for high risk areas identified in Step 2 that are not 
sufficiently covered by existing measures; 
(iii) Ensuring the RCMs are comprehensive and cover all the possible hazards 
and risks. The two tools, `risk attribute' and `causal chains', can be used for 
both steps (ii) and (iii); 
(iv) Entering the RCMs identified into `risk control measures log'. Then, they 
are reviewed with reference to the influence of each individual RCM on 
other high risk areas identified by Step 2. 
(v) Draft of `risk control measures log' is reviewed before generating `risk 
control option log'. Examples of these logs are shown in Table 4.1 and 
Table 4.2 (IMO, 1996). 
(vi) At any stage of the process above, it is necessary to refer back to Step 1 or 
Step 2 of FSA for more information or further analysis. 
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Table 4.1: A typical risk control measures log form 
Ref Risk profile element Description of measures Attributes Assumptions/reasoning 
Outcomes 
Initiating event 1 
Initiating event (2) 
Initiating event (n) 
Magnitude factors 
Event tree node (1) 
Event tree node (2) 
Event tree node (n) 
Progression factor 
Fault tree base event (1) 
Fault tree base event (2) 
Fault tree base event (n) 
Initiating factors 
Fault tree base event (1) 
Fault tree base event (2) 
Fault tree base event (n) 
Human factors 
Influence diagram event (1) 
Influence diagram event (2) 
Influence diagram event (n) 
Step 1 hazards 
Hazards 1 
Hazards (2) 
Hazards n 
Table 4.2: A typical risk control options log form 
Ref. 
Description of risk 
control 
Attributes 
Benefit 
Quantitative Af-n Qualitative 
Supporting 
information 
Note that Of--n represents the change in frequency of fatal accident (f) versus number of 
fatalities (n) (See Chapter 2, Section 2.6 for more details). 
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(c) Risk Control Options 
The output result of risk control option (RCO) details the cost of the options in terms of 
cost types defined by Step 4. It should also show sufficient data on who bears the risk, 
who benefits from the risk reduction and who has to implement the measures. This 
provides the sources of information for the subsequent principles of "risk imposer pays" 
and stakeholders. 
4.4.3.1 Results of Step 3 
The output from Step 3 comprises: 
"A wide range of RCOs, which are assessed for their effectiveness in reducing 
risk. 
" An inventory of interested entities affected by the identified RCOs. 
4.4.4 FSA Step 4- Cost Benefit Assessment 
Cost benefit assessment (CBA) in risk assessment is normally used to assess the 
marginal return of additional safety measures comparing: 
" The cost of implementing the measure. 
" The benefit of the measure, in terms of the risk that would be averted. 
The purpose of CBA is to show whether the benefits of a measure outweigh its costs, 
and thus indicate whether it is appropriate to implement the measure. CBA cannot 
provide a definitive decision, because factors other than risks and costs may be relevant, 
but provide a useful guide. There are several indices that can express cost effectiveness 
in relation to safety of life. In order to compare different RCOs, the risks and costs are 
expressed as a ratio, known as the implied cost of averting a fatality (ICAF). The 
definition is: 
Chapter 4- Formal Safety Assessment 
ICAF = 
Net annual cost of measure 
reduction in annual fatality rate 
The potential loss of life (PLL) values, given in units of lives/vessel/year (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.6), can then be determined for the system before, b, and after, a, 
the introduction of a risk reduction measure respectively. Then, the reduction in PLL 
can be calculated as: 
Reduction in annual fatalities rate = PLLb - PLLa 
where, 
PLLQ = PLL after RCO is implemented. 
PLLb = PLL before RCO is implemented. 
Other indices based on damage to and affect on property and the environment may be 
used for a CBA relating to such matters. Calculating these indices should also provide 
comparisons of cost effectiveness for the RCOs. 
Costs are estimated as life cycle costs, including initial, operation, training, inspection 
and certification costs. Benefits include reduction of costs for fatalities, injuries, 
environmental damage, clean-up, liability claims, ship deterioration, etc. 
4.4.4.1 Results of Step 4 
The result of the Step 4 comprises: 
" Costs and benefits for each RCM identified in Step 3 from an overview 
perspective. 
" Costs and benefits for those interested entities which are the most influenced by 
the problem under concern. 
" Cost effectiveness expressed in terms of suitable indices, such as ICAF. 
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4.4.5 FSA Step 5- Recommendations for Decision Making 
The overall aim of Step 5 is to collate all the information generated by Steps 1 to 4, to 
assist in the choice of cost effective and equitable changes to regulations. For example, 
information about risk levels before and after implementation of risk control would be 
recorded alongside justification to iterate any part of the process. This step recognises 
FSA to be a tool, not a decision maker, and seeks to enhance the quality of information 
by first considering the cost effectiveness of a proposed option on an industry wide 
basis. A second stage examines whether the effect on all interests involved is equitable 
(that is, one or more interests may be carrying a risk or cost at a level disproportionate 
to expected returns). Given this information, the normal decision making process can 
proceed, taking into account all the social, political and cultural influences that are a 
necessary part of obtaining consensus on an international basis. Hence, there is a 
systematic, robust and auditable basis to guide decision makers. 
4.4.5.1 Results of Step 5 
The results of Step 5 will include: 
" An objective comparison of alternative options, based on potential reduction of 
risk and cost effectiveness, in areas where legislation, procedures or rules should 
be reviewed or developed. 
" Feedback information to review the results of the previous steps. 
4.4.6 Incorporation of the Human Element 
In deriving the generic ship model that forms the basis of FSA it rapidly becomes 
apparent that human factors dominate many of the risk scenarios. Casualty data 
confirms that the general assumptions, which often suggest that around sixty to eighty 
percent of casualties result directly from human error (The Nautical Institute, 2003), are 
valid. It comes as no surprise to any safety analyst that it simply is not possible to 
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separate technical safety from the influence of operators, in the widest sense. The FSA 
methodology does not allow consideration of a technical solution without due regard 
being paid to the interactions with people. 
PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Generic Model 
k-, 
CAccident 
Category under Concerns 
Relevant Regulations 
Step 5 
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Step 4 
COST-BENEFIT ASSESSMENT 
Cost-Benefit Assessment 
- Consideration of future anticipated trends 
- Techniques from financial management 
- Cost per Unit Risk Reduction (CURR) 
Step 3 
RISK CONTROL OPTIONS 
Risk Control Measures Log 
- Measure description and expected benefits 
- Measure attribute (category A/B/C) 
- Affected stakeholders 
- Relevant hazard ID and node in event tree 
- Preventative/ mitigating attribute 
Step I 
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
C Conduction of HAZID Meeting 
C Primary/Secondary Stakeholders 
C Task Inventory - Consideration of human factors 
CFMEA Worksheets -Consideration of structural failures 
C HAZID Worksheets 
- Hazard description 
- Cause and effect 
- Accident scenario 
-Frequency and consequences 
Prioritised List of Accident Scenarios F Risk matrix 
Step 2 
Ir 
e-t-I %4--4 
C Risk Control Options Log Preventative attribute (frequency) 
--- . Re-analysis of regulatory impact diagram 
Mitigating attribute (consequence) 
- Re-analysis of regulatory impact diagram 
) 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
Risk Contribution Tree 
- Fault tree analysis 
- Top event occurrence rate 
Event Tree -ý F-N curve 
- Escalation scenario of initial event 
- Nodal probabilities 
- Mitigating attribute 
- Damage to structure, cargo and life 
- Potential risk evaluation 
Casual Chain 
Regulatory Impact Diagram 
- Rating and weighting 
- Preventative attribute 
- RID index 
Figure 4.9: Procedures of formal safety assessment 
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As a result of failure to address such human factors issues, casualty cases have been put 
ever so often in the spotlight. In order to make a step improvement however, any new 
approach to safety needs to target the human factor in a rational and systematic manner. 
FSA adopts this approach by allowing for the human element to be incorporated into its 
process from a human reliability analysis that takes details squarely with the 
contributing factors to human error. 
4.5 Procedure Summary of Formal Safety Assessment 
Figure 4.9 summarises the procedures of FSA as discussed in Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.5 and 
the flow of inputs/outputs at each procedure. 
Additionally, absolute decisions about acceptability require a degree of confidence in 
both the results of risk analysis, and in the acceptable level of risk, which are probably 
not justified at the present time for an industry as diverse as shipping. This is due partly 
to the paucity of data and resulting uncertainties, and also to the lack of experience of 
using FSA in the shipping industry. The FSA process is therefore probably best seen 
and relied upon as a comparative rather than an absolute method for the time being. 
4.6 Incentive for Utilising Formal Safety Assessment 
FSA involves much more scientific aspects than previous conventions. The benefits of 
adopting FSA as a regulatory tool include (MSA, 1993): 
"A consistent regulatory regime, which addresses all aspects of safety in an 
integrated way. 
" Cost effectiveness, whereby safety investment is targeted where it will achieve 
the greatest benefit. 
"A proactive approach, enabling hazards that have not yet given rise to accidents 
to be properly considered. 
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" Confidence that regulatory requirements are in proportion to the severity of the 
risks. 
"A rational basis for addressing new risks posed by ever changing marine 
technology. 
Furthermore, application of FSA in ship design and operation may offer great potential 
incentive that could: 
" Improve the performance of the current fleet, be able to measure the 
performance change and ensure that new ships are of good designs. 
" Ensure that experience from the field is used in the current fleet and that any 
lessons learned are incorporated into new ships. 
" Provide a mechanism for predicting and controlling the most likely scenarios 
that could result in incidents. 
4.7 Brief Review of FSA Trial Application to Key Generic Ships 
On an international acclaim, large-scale FSA studies have been mainly undertaken for 
high speed passenger catamaran ferries (HSC) and bulk carrier (BC) ships. These 
vessels have been considered an appropriate basis for the FSA approach as they embody 
new technology largely without an extensive historical basis of experience. To this end, 
focus of the studies is deployed only to highlight a brief review to the results in their 
significant progress. 
4.7.1 Trial FSA Application to High Speed Passenger Catamaran Ferries 
The final report of the FSA to HSC (IMO, 1997c), as undertaken by the United 
Kingdom, focused on the safety of passengers and crew. To provide a broad 
perspective, both of hazards and of a variety of different aspect of HSC design, 
construction and operation, the following accident categories were selected for trial 
study: 
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" Collision and contact; 
" Fire; and 
" Loss of hull integrity (including structural failure) 
Event tree for Event tree for Event tree for 
Fire escalation Collision & contact Loss of hull integrity 
Event tree for 
Evacuation 
Evacuation 
Overall F=2x10.3 
Fire/explosion 
Overall F=7.1 x 10"3 
PLL=0.011 lives/vessel/vear 
Collision & contact 
Overall F=7.3 x 10.2 
PLL=1.15 lives/vessel/vear 
Loss of hull integrity 
Overall F=3x 10"3 
PLL=0.00031 lives/vessel/vear 
ýýý 
Contribution fault tree 
Influence diagram 
Contribution fault tree 
Influence diaeram 
Contribution fault tree 
Influence diagram 
rN V*ý-N V-N 
Figure 4.10: Components of HSC risk contribution tree 
Following causes and outcomes of the accident scenarios being identified for 
consideration, the risk analysis of the HSC trial study presents the risk contribution tree 
(RCT), which is briefly outlined in Figure 4.10 (IMO, 1997c), for the three accident 
categories. Overall frequency (F) figures of 7.1 x 10-3 per vessel year for the fire 
category, 7.3 x 10-2 per vessel year for the collision and contact category and 3.0 x 10-3 
per vessel year for the loss of hull integrity (LOHI) category have been derived from the 
sorted incident database (IMO, 1997c). Injury weightings have been applied to 
determine equivalent fatalities and the PLL caused by the occurrence of these failure 
events have then been determined from FN curves. These PLL values are given as 
0.011 lives/vessel/year for the fire category, 1.15 lives/vessel/year for the collision and 
contact category and 0.00031 lives/vessel/year for the LOHI category (IMO, 1997c). 
These results provide an approximation to risk that appear to be realistic for the fire and 
LOHI events but may not be a true representation of risk for collision and contact 
events. The study also assumes that the maximum estimated PLL reduction could be 
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achieved and therefore, seven risk control options (RCOs) were finally ranked for their 
implementation in the trial application of the FSA process (IMO, 1997c). 
Although expert judgement was applied to account for areas of uncertainty, the study 
acknowledges that there remain uncertainties with regards to the numerical evaluations 
for the overall frequency and assumed maximum PLL. 
4.7.2 Trial FSA Application to Bulk Carrier Vessels 
Serious concerns have been expressed about the safety of bulk carriers since a spate of 
sinking in the early 1990's. IMO prompted an international programme of research and 
development culminating in the 1997 IMO SOLAS Conference on Bulk Carrier Safety 
(IMO, 1999). The research had shown that the ships at greatest risk comprised those of 
over 15 years of age, and 150m in length, carrying dense cargoes such as coal or iron 
ore, and built with single side skin construction. The most likely cause of loss was 
considered to be side shell failure causing flooding of cargo holds and leading to overall 
structural failure of the ship due to overloading of the structure. For trial FSA of BC 
vessels, the key hazards relate to failure of watertight integrity (IMO, 2002c), which 
thus implies LOHI. These result from failure related to: 
A: The closing devices provided. 
B: The hull envelope itself. 
C: Inappropriate operations aspects. 
Fault trees and event trees had to be developed for the failure related to A, B and C, in 
order to achieve a RCT for the trial FSA on bulk carrier vessels. These tree-type 
analyses were developed from the statistical base of events contributing potentially to 
the LOHI and their frequency of occurrence over the period 1978 to 2000 (IMO, 
2002a). In the expanded fault tree case of Figure 4.11 (see IMO, 2002c), branch B (hull 
envelope) have been clearly prevailing and suggest the most significant high-level event 
to be that of side shell failure due to fatigue/wastage with 146 identified cases, across all 
sizes of BC, resulting in 113 lives lost. While side shell failure due to collision, 
escalating to loss of structural integrity and sinking, accounts for 26 cases, but has 
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-99- 
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caused 130 fatalities, hatch cover failures account for a total of 40 incidents, which have 
resulted in 565 fatalities. The later appear to be the result of covers being dislodged 
(possibly due to failing securing devices or unsecured hatches), however, their structural 
failure is apparent and cannot be ruled out. 
Loss of hull 
integrity 
ý 
TOP 
Closing devise 
failure 
H-JI et1vel-p- 
side shell 
failure 
Operational 
failure 
I -i 
Figure 4.11: Fault tree of the first level to BC failure of watertight integrity 
Side shell failure in branch B of the LOHI event leading to rapid flooding and 
consequent loss of ship generated a PLL of 2.34 x 10-3 fatalities per ship year (i. e., 94% 
of total PLL, according to IMO (2002c), see Figure 4.12)). The predominance of PLL 
of hatch cover and side shell failure incidents is flagrant with a dramatic impact on loss 
of life from hatch cover incidents which results in approximately 1.5 times more 
fatalities than side shell incidents with 4 times less occurrence. The overall value of 
risk is 1.22 x 10-2 fatalities per ship year (IMO, 2002c). A large number of risk control 
measures (RCMs) have eventually been derived for BCs, including a total of 98 derived 
from the international community (IMO, 2002d). These assessed RCOs are divided into 
three branches given by the ETs and ETs of A, B and C, for which a screening process 
was applied to sort and review potential RCMs and RCOs. In addition to those, two 
evacuation RCOs, i. e., free-fall lifeboat and float-free accommodation, have been 
considered. 
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Water 
ingress? 
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flooding? 
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E 
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PLL =2.34 x 10-3 
Yes (94% of total PLL) 
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No 
Yes 
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Total loss? 
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No 
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No 
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No 
Side shell 
failure 
No 
Fatalities 
C 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Total PLL =2.48 x 10-3 
361 fatalities 
Figure 4.12: Event tree showing sequence of events for BC side shell failure 
Cost benefit assessment (CBA) study was applied to calculate and rank 75 of the 98 
derived RCOs for BCs of Handy (Handysize & Handymax), Panamax and Capesize 
types in terms of their cost effectiveness with respect to potential risk reduction 
available (ShipTech A/S, 2002). These have been analysed, quantified and ranked 
according to their net cost of averting a fatality (NetCAF). The criteria on which a RCO 
was selected for recommendation are generally those assessed by the trial application of 
FSA to BC vessels to have a NetCAF being <$3 million US dollar or to provide an 
estimated reduction in risk (i. e., PLL) of the order of 10-4 or better 
(ShipTech A/S, 2002). 
The estimates given above are encumbered with statistical uncertainty. Even though the 
risk contribution from the water ingress scenarios in general is a significant estimate, 
the break down on the underlying scenarios is more uncertain, e. g. the importance of the 
side shell failure scenarios may be over-estimated, whereas the importance of the hatch 
cover failure scenarios may be under-estimated (IMO, 2001b). 
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4.8 Major Hurdles in the Advancement of FSA and the Road Ahead 
After over a decade since FSA surfaced as the accepted marine risk-based approach to 
improving safety of ships, their system and in protecting the environment, the major 
trial FSA studies (IMO, 1997c; 2002a; 2002c) that have been undertaken (Sections 4.8.1 
and 4.8.2 provides a brief review of their risk analysis) still left many issues unresolved 
in the advancement of the approach. Some of the most vital issues are therefore 
outlined in the following sub-sections. 
4.8.1 Incorporation Case of the Human Element 
It is very important to take into account human error problems in FSA. Factors such as 
language, education, training, etc., that affect human error, have increased over the past 
years, especially with the introduction of multi-national crews. Such problems largely 
contribute to marine casualties. On the other hand, crew reductions have increased the 
workload of operators, which in connection with the reduced opportunities for port stay 
and recreation equally increases the probabilities for errors. 
It becomes apparent that FSA's success largely depends on two essential conditions. 
The first condition is the development of a safety culture at all levels of the industry's 
infrastructure, from company managers to vessel operators. The second one is the 
inclusion into the FSA framework itself of further guidance on how human factors 
would be integrated in a feasible manner. 
4.8.2 Availability and Reliability of Data 
The confidence of FSA greatly depends on the reliability of failure data. The 
availability and accuracy of data defines the ease and accuracy with which a project 
such as this can be carried out. The more expert judgement that is used in developing 
risk analysis studies the more subjective the results become and the more open to 
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challenge. Furthermore, the risk analysis task of the reviewed FSA studies, which has 
been briefed in Sections 4.7.1 and 4.7.2, proved to be quite a challenging and lengthy 
one due to the obvious deficiencies in casualty data. 
Nonetheless, it is rare for a study, particularly in the marine environment, to have 
comprehensive data and the approach is almost always one of using data backed up with 
expert judgement; the two approaches are complementary. The application of FSA may 
facilitate the collection of useful data on operational experience that can be used for 
effective pre-active safety assessment. However, international co-operation and co- 
ordination are required with the intention that a new global database will be established, 
controlled and updated by an international regulatory body (i. e. IMO). Such a database 
should be easily accessible by both administrations and analysts/researchers, providing 
reliable data with defined parameters upon which the incoming information has been 
processed. 
4.8.3 Risk Criteria Acceptance and Cost Effectiveness 
The acceptability of risk is a problematic question and likewise, risk communication 
may also be a problematic issue. Large variations also exist in the risk criteria that are 
set around the world, as they depend mainly on local regulators. Up to today, much 
effort is being made by administrations individually, without any co-ordination among 
them. Considering that internationally trading vessels move constantly from one 
jurisdiction to another, it becomes apparent that this lack of co-ordination is bound to 
produce further confusion to the industry, which does not seem willing to accept it. 
The establishment of universally acceptable risk criteria for ships may be achieved 
through a compromise between qualitative and quantitative figures. When quantitative 
risk assessment (QRA) is performed, it is required to use numerical risk criteria. It is 
generally noted that no quantitative criteria in FSA exist even for a particular type of 
ship although the trial applications have used QRA to a certain extent. Therefore, 
numerical risk criteria for FSA application needs to be reviewed for possibility of its 
incorporation in future studies. Nonetheless, the application of numerical risk criteria 
may not always be appropriate/suitable to use as inflexible rules because of 
Chapter 4- Formal Safety Assessment 
uncertainties in inputs. Accordingly, acceptance is unlikely to be based solely on a 
numerical risk assessment. It can therefore only assist judgements and be used as 
guidelines for decision-making. 
It is appropriate to consider the acceptability of risk, as in broad terms, there is risk 
attached to every activity. At one end of the scale, there is a risk level that would be 
considered intolerable, that is, an activity giving rise to the risk can/should not be 
justified. At the other end of the scale, a risk may be so low that the cost and trouble 
involved in further reducing it may be quite unreasonable. Indeed, it would be wrong to 
devote resource to risks that are already acceptably low, when the same investment 
would be better expended on reducing other, greater risk. 
In the decision-making process, criteria may be used to determine if risks are 
acceptable/tolerable, unacceptable/intolerable or need to be reduced to ALARP. In the 
regions between the maximum tolerable and broadly acceptable levels, risks should be 
reduced to ALARP, taking costs and benefits of any further risk reduction into account. 
4.8.4 Complexity Owing to the Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The cost-benefit approach remains controversial when applied to the safety of life and 
the environment, although its use as a platform on which a given option is finally 
selected for implementation is an appealing proposal. In practice, however, it can be 
quite complicated, especially in cases where human lives are involved. The fact that 
ships are manned with multi-national crews, usually officers from developed countries 
and crews from developing ones, and obliged to trade in all parts of the world creates a 
difficulty in selecting the proper human life value for cost benefit analysis. 
Furthermore, the use of different values on different nationalities would have an adverse 
and undesirable effect on both international relations and working conditions onboard 
ships. 
A feasible solution to this problem would involve an international agreement on a 
reliable method of estimating the current value of human life. The international 
regulatory bodies should not only be responsible for the initial deliberations, but also for 
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the constant follow up of the international economic, political and social trends that 
influence that value. 
4.8.5 Treatment of Uncertainty and Expert Judgement 
Accident and incident databases, if available, are very useful for the risk assessment 
exercise. Uncertainty problems however, do arise with older data or data concerning 
distant occurrences (THEMES, 2001). The environmental conditions, cultural habits 
and other singularities like adherence to rules, may differ quite a lot between different 
areas and cultures of the world. Some special types of accidents need an enlargement of 
the scope. 
The FSA procedure utilises expert judgements and expert sessions. The suitable experts 
must represent a broad range of knowledge, domain experience and skills. However, it 
is possible to reduce the use of expert judgement by utilising objective data based on 
engineering analysis as far as possible. 
4.9 Concluding Remarks 
The adoption of FSA by the IMO, together with other recommendations, has introduced 
a new dimension to the way that safety is considered within the shipping community, 
and it is rapidly gaining international acceptance as a solution enabling the application 
of risk based techniques to international shipping. As progress continues, it will 
represent a fundamental cultural change from the present reactive approach to one that 
is proactive and soundly based on an evaluation of risk. 
Although at an early stage and despite considerable confusion in some quarters, FSA 
offers the challenge of working in an industry that will make greater use of risk-based 
approaches. FSA differs from the safety case route recommended in that it aims to 
support the rule making process at a generic level and to provide a logical methodology 
to establishing rules, which may well be predominantly prescriptive. The approach will 
encourage inter-disciplinary approaches to safety and should produce more effective 
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rules, which address the problems identified in a holistic manner rather than in an ad 
hoc way. It will also allow for the aggravating human element to be incorporated into 
its process. 
It is necessary to establish an acceptable risk evaluation criteria based on cost 
effectiveness. It should however be noted that the acceptable cost would be a function 
of and depends on the level of risk. 
In reviewing the risk analysis carried out on the trial application of FSA to HSC and BC 
ships, it has become apparent that there is still plenty of space for improvement on FSA 
application to the maritime field. Areas on which such improvement can be achieved 
include risk criteria acceptance, cost-benefit, life-saving equipment, information 
availability and/or expert judgement, uncertainty treatment and human reliability. The 
later two areas are extremely vital for the practical use of FSA yet these were often not 
tackled in the trial studies. In the proceeding three chapters, the treatment and reasoning 
under conditions of uncertainty is embarked upon. Another chapter, which follows after 
these three, deals with both uncertainty treatment and human reliability. 
Chapter 5- Treatment of Uncertainty 
Chapter 5: Treatment of Uncertainty 
Chapter Summary 
Risk cannot be uniquely determined because of various types of uncertainty. The costs 
of ignoring uncertainty can be very high in terms of unwelcome surprises and poorly 
calculated risk-taking behaviour. Thus, it is important to reduce this uncertainty to a 
manageable level and much crucial for maritime risk assessment and decision-making 
to be conducted in the presence of uncertainty. 
There are many potential sources of uncertainty affecting risk. Available knowledge 
that needs to be utilised may be unreliable, incomplete, imprecise, vague and/or 
inconsistent. Moreover, inherent uncertainty is associated with even the most 
comprehensive and useful data for quantified risk assessment in safety-critical maritime 
domains. Various theories have been developed to accommodate the different 
characteristics of uncertainty forms for risk-based modelling. 
5.1 Introduction 
All maritime activities desire the lowest level of risk possible in order to pave way for 
the highest probability of success, profit, or some form of gain (e. g. high performance, 
safety and reliability). Therefore, even when the risk assessment result of a safety- 
critical marine and offshore application indicates the risk level is negligible, acceptable 
or as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) in criteria (HSE, 1992), such risk 
acceptance must incline towards minimal uncertainty. 
Nearly every assessment encounters situations where data are unavailable or where 
information is available on parameters that are different from those of interest for the 
assessment. The very heart of risk analysis is the responsibility to use whatever 
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information is at hand or can be generated to produce a number, a range, a probability 
distribution - whatever expresses best the present state of knowledge about the effects of 
hazards in some specified setting (NRC, 1994 and 2000). Simply to ignore the 
uncertainty in any analytical process is almost sure to leave critical parts of the process 
incompletely examined, and hence to increase the probability of generating a risk 
estimate that is incorrect, incomplete, or misleading. Therefore, uncertainty is clearly a 
key factor in risk-based modelling. By incorporating uncertainty into the risk 
assessment process, alternative-planning strategies can be viewed more realistically. 
Also, to arrive at a decision in the presence of absolute certainty with respect to all the 
relevant facts and considerations is a luxury rarely afforded to human beings. 
Assumptions must be made about data values and/or about events, which may or may 
not have occurred, and about consequences likely to flow from a given decision. In the 
real world, the consequences of any decision choice made cannot be fully known before 
that choice is made, which means that the ideas of uncertainty and risk have to be 
examined. Many of these assumptions may be made unconsciously or subconsciously. 
Some may be made explicitly, with whatever degree of justification may be adduced. 
Mathematics may be prayed in aid of some assumptions made on statistical bases. 
Otherwise, rule of thumb and accrued experiences serve as a guide (Graham & Jones, 
1988). Thus, decision-making under uncertainty (the theory of how to take those 
uncertainties into account in an optimal manner in decisions) has to also govern an 
important part of risk management. Failure to do so is likely to result in adverse 
impacts on performance, and in extreme cases, impede safety. 
5.2 Uncertainty in Risk Analysis 
The term `uncertainty' has come to encompass a multiplicity of concepts. It typically 
refers to situations in which many outcomes of a particular choice are possible but the 
likelihood (or probability) of each outcome is unknown. Risk is rather different in that 
it can only be measured accurately on the assumption that all the possible outcomes and 
the likelihood (probability) of each outcome occurring are known. Risk can be 
estimated in a variety of ways by assigning probabilities to various possible outcomes. 
In fact, in risk analysis, the uncertainty can be put across as a lack of certainty/precise 
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knowledge as to what the truth is, whether qualitative or quantitative (NRC, 1994 and 
2000), which in turn has important implications to the results of the assessment and to 
what can be achieved at the decision-making. Sometimes these implications are `risk' 
in the sense of `significant potential unwelcome effects on the safety-critical 
performance of the domain application'. Nonetheless, that lack of knowledge creates an 
intellectual problem - that one does not know what the "scientific truth" is; and a 
practical problem - one needs to determine how to assess and deal with risk in light of 
that uncertainty (NRC, 1994 and 2000). 
Scientific truth is always somewhat uncertain and is subject to revision as new 
understanding develops (NRC, 1994 and 2000). In the realistic viewpoint, uncertainty 
in maritime quantitative risk assessment (QRA) might be uniquely large, so it requires 
special attention by risk analysts - one that calls for a clear understanding of where the 
uncertainty comes from, in what form, what repercussion it possesses and how it can be 
dealt with in order to decrease its presence. Therefore, it is crucial for risk assessment 
to be conducted in the face of it. 
5.3 Sourcing and Representing Uncertainties 
It is an essential prerequisite for risk analysts and decision makers to understand the 
nature of perceived threats and opportunities in order to identify hazards, assess and 
manage the attendant risk. Thus, those uncertainties that may give rise and shape the 
risk, threat and opportunity, have to be well sourced and represented in order for them 
to be dealt with appropriately. 
5.3.1 Sources of Uncertainties 
The natural world is the ultimate source of all uncertainty. Therefore, even before the 
risk assessment commences, there are uncertainties attributable to the complexity of 
requirements or implementation (INCOSE/PMI, 2002) and that of people issues in the 
least of cases. Through the course of a risk analysis, there are many potential sources of 
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uncertainty that safety-critical maritime systems must be able to cope with, though most 
can be attributed to one of, 
" Imperfect Domain Knowledge: The theory of the domain may be vague or 
incomplete. Incompleteness necessitates the use of rules of thumb (or 
heuristics), which may not always give optimal or correct results. Even if the 
domain theory is complete, an expert may use approximations or heuristics to 
save time or simplify the problem solving. 
" Imperfect Case Data: Data is collected in the field with different levels of 
accuracy; so naturally, the knowledge accrued ends up being implicitly 
imperfect. Also, data gaps are usually bridged based on a combination of 
scientific data or analyses, expert judgement, and through the use of some 
analogous data that may be the only option available. Therefore, experts, the 
risk analysts and other professionals may disagree over which data is relevant to 
include in risk models, especially when there is conflicting data. This lack of 
consensus can increase uncertainty. Human reports may be ambiguous or 
inaccurate. Evidence from different sources may be missing or in conflict. 
Even if exact data were available, it could be too costly in time or resources to 
get it. Confidence can be increased through consensus building techniques such 
as peer reviews, workshops, and other methods to elicit expert opinion. Cost- 
effective data-acquisition strategies can be developed to achieve decision closure 
where there is adequate data or where further reduction of uncertainty is needed 
and is feasible. 
Whatever the source of uncertainty, safety-critical maritime systems need to be able to 
deal with it. Opportunities for reducing these sources of uncertainty should be noted 
and carried through to risk characterisation. 
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5.3.2 Representation of Uncertainty 
As far as knowledge representation schemes are concerned, a good mechanism for 
representing uncertainty ought to have the following properties (Graham & Jones, 
1988): 
" Consistent and natural semantics. 
" An appropriate level of granularity as required. 
" It should allow appropriate assumptions about independence. 
" An intelligent, meaningful dialogue and knowledge representation manage. 
" Easy and intelligent tracing of aggregation and propagation of uncertainty. 
" It should be store the reasons for its support for or arrival at hypotheses. 
" Second-order measures of uncertainty. 
" It must be able to resolve conflict. 
" For large or real-time knowledge-based system, heuristic control strategies 
must be possible. 
" Cognitive emulation of how experts handle uncertainty may be desirable in 
some cases and should be possible. 
" Its logic should be context dependent. 
At this point it is appropriate to remark on granularity: RULES ARE SUMMARIES. 
In other words the chunking of knowledge represents abstraction, and often this is how 
human experts reduce or eliminate uncertainty. This is very like the idea of disposition 
- implicit quantifiers (Graham & Jones, 1988). Experienced experts often insist that 
they use a rule of thumb that assigns linguistic labels to ranges of numerical inputs. 
Uncertainty expresses a measure of confidence. The three basic methods of 
representing uncertainty are numeric, graphic, and symbolic (Turban, 1992). 
Numeric: The most common method of representing uncertainty is numeric using a 
scale with two extreme numbers. For example, 0 may be used to represent complete 
uncertainty while 1 or 100 represents complete certainty. Although such representation 
seems to be easy to some people, it may be very difficult to others. For example, ship 
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speed, for a given distance and travelling time, may vary considerable depending on 
waves and weather conditions. 
Graphic: Although many experts can describe uncertainty in terms of numbers, such as 
"it is 85 percent certain that ... ", some 
have difficulties in doing so. By using 
horizontal bars, for example, it is possible to assist experts in expressing their 
confidence in certain events. Such a bar is shown in Figure 5.1. Experts are asked to 
place markers somewhere on the scale. Thus, expert A may express very little 
confidence of the likelihood of occurrence of an event, whereas expert B has much 
more confidence. 
Expert A Expert B 
a 
No (om plcte 
confidence confidence 
(a) Expert confidence on the occurrence of an event 
(b) Probability-like scale 
(c) Scale built around zero 
Figure 5.1: Confidence scales for graphic representation of uncertainty 
Even though some experts prefer graphic presentation, the graphs are not as accurate as 
numbers. Another problem is that most experts do not have experience in marking 
graphic scales (or setting numbers on the scale). Thus, many experts, especially 
managers prefer ranking over graphic or numeric methods. 
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Symbolic: There are several ways to represent uncertainty by using symbols. Most 
experts use a Likert scale approach to express their opinion. For example, an expert 
may be asked to assess the likelihood of occurrence of an event on a five-point scale: 
very unlikely, unlikely, neutral, likely, and very likely. Ranking is a very popular 
approach among experts with non-quantitative preferences. Ranking can be either 
ordinal (i. e., listing items by the order of their importance) or cardinal (ranking 
complemented by numeric values). Managers are often comfortable with ordinal 
ranking. When the number of items to be ranked is large, people may have a problem 
with ranking and also tend to be inconsistent. One method that can be used to alleviate 
this problem is a pair-wise comparison combined with a consistency checker in which 
two items at a time are ranked and checked for consistencies. A methodology for such 
ranking is called the analytical hierarchy process (see Saaty, 1980). 
5.4 A Taxonomy of Uncertainty 
Every uncertainty that present itself in risk analysis belongs to a certain type or types, 
which can further be classed based on their form or parameter. 
5.4.1 Types of Uncertainty 
In modern practice, risk analysis usually incorporates pragmatic uncertainties of both 
the aleatory and epistemic variety. These are described, using the following 
terminology (NRC, 2000): 
5.4.1.1 Aleatory uncertainty 
Aleatory uncertainty is attributed to inherent randomness, natural variation, or chance 
outcomes in the physical world; in principle, this uncertainty is irreducible as the 
knowledge of experts cannot be expected to reduce aleatory uncertainty although their 
knowledge may be useful in getting a better estimate of the magnitude of the variability. 
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This uncertainty is sometimes called, random variability, stochastic variability, natural 
variability, objective uncertainty, or external uncertainty (Parry, 1996 and NRC, 2000). 
Sources of aleatory uncertainty can commonly be singled out from other contributors to 
uncertainty by their representation as randomly distributed quantities that can take on 
values in an established or known range, but for which the exact value will vary by 
chance from unit to unit or from time to time. The mathematical analysis most 
commonly used for aleatory uncertainty is probabilistic. When substantial experimental 
data are available for estimating a distribution, there is no debate that the correct 
treatment modelling for aleatory uncertainty is by way of a probability distribution. 
5.4.1.2 Epistemic uncertainty 
Epistemic uncertainty is attributed to lack of data, lack of knowledge about events and 
processes that limits our ability to model the real world; in principle, this uncertainty is 
reducible with sufficient study and therefore, expert judgement may be useful for its 
reduction. This uncertainty is sometimes called, subjective or internal uncertainty 
(Parry, 1996 and NRC, 2000). 
Epistemic uncertainties can be divided into two major sub-categories: model 
uncertainty and parameter uncertainty (See Figure 5.2). Model uncertainty has to do 
with the degree to which a chosen mathematical model accurately mimics reality; 
parameter uncertainty has to do with the precision with which model parameters can be 
estimated. The mathematical analysis used for treating epistemic uncertainty is 
typically non-probabilistic. 
5.4.2 Sub-Categories of Uncertainty 
Uncertainties may arrive singly or in groups, whether data is collected manually or 
automatically (Graham & Jones, 1988). Policy and risk analysis community has 
classified uncertainty into quantity/parameter and model-based uncertainty (Morgan & 
Henrion, 1990). Figure 5.3 illustrates this classification. 
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Scenario abstraction 
i 
Aleatory uncertainty 1 
Figure 5.2: Processing and treatment of types of uncertainty in risk analysis 
I Model form 
y 
Epistemic uncertainty 
Probabilistic analysis k--, Possibilistic analysis 
Evidential reasoning 
IV 
Numerical results 
Uncertainty 
Statistical 
variation 
Empirical 
quantity 
ý 
Decision 
variable 
Linguistic 
imprecision 
Subjective 
judgement 
1 
i 
Value 
parameter 
I 
Randomness 
Variability 
i 
i Disagreement 
Model domain 
parameter 
I 
Z 
Outcome 
criteria 
Approximation 
i 
i 
Figure 53: Uncertainty classification in risk analysis 
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5.4.2.1 Parametric-Based 
The parametric/quantity-based group is given in Table 5.1, which briefly 
defines/explains each sub-classification in the group (Morgan & Henrion, 1990). 
Table 5.1: Quantity type uncertainty definitions in policy and risk analysis 
Uncertainty Sub-classification Definition/explanation 
Arises from random error in direct measurements of a 
Statistical variation 
quantity 
Teamed with systematic error as the difference between the 
Subjective true value of a quantity of interest and the value to which the 
judgment mean of the measurements converges as more measurements 
are taken 
Empirical quantity 
Linguistic Refers to quantities that are not well-specified and could not 
imprecision be empirically measured in principle 
Variability Refers to quantities that are variable over time and space 
Randomness Uncertainty that is irreducible even in principle 
Difference between the assumed quantity value and the real- 
Approximation 
world value 
Quantity over which the decision maker exercises direct Decision variable n/a 
control 
Parameter that represents aspects of the preferences, such as 
Value parameter n/a 
those giving benefits, of the decision maker 
Model domain 
n/a Specifies the domain or scope of the system being modelled 
parameter 
Variable used to rank or measure the desirability of possible 
Outcome criteria n/a 
outcomes 
All of the quantity-based uncertainties vary in magnitude, location, or time of 
occurrence as well as in their interactions with each other and have the ability to 
accumulate during the whole process, from data collection through all the different 
assumptions and uncertainties connected to the applied methodology and models. 
Properly designed studies will specify sample sizes that are sufficiently large to detect 
important signals. Unfortunately, many studies have sample sizes that are too small to 
detect anything but gross changes (Smith & Shugart, 1994; Peterman, 1990). 
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5.4.2.2 Model-Form 
Uncertainty associated with the model form refers to the approximations that a model 
provides to a real-world system. In other words, it represents that uncertainty about the 
degree to which a model is an adequate representation of the world for the problem at 
hand. Model form uncertainty is differentiated from (quantity form) model domain 
parameter uncertainty by referring to the actual model itself as opposed to the quantities 
assumed in the model (Morgan & Henrion, 1990). Any model is unavoidably (and by 
definition) a simplification of reality. A real-world system contains phenomena or 
behaviours that cannot be produced by even the most detailed model. The difference 
between the real-world system and such a model is "model form uncertainty". 
Opinions of experts on the appropriate conceptual model configuration may differ. 
Sources of uncertainty that arise primarily during development and application of 
models include: 
" The structure of process models due to errors introduced by oversimplified 
representations of reality (e. g., representing a three-dimensional strut and 
bracket with a two-dimensional mathematical model). 
" The description of the relationship between two or more variables in empirical 
models (e. g., incorrectly inferring the basis for correlations between offshore 
structure and ship-based activity). 
Moreover, any model can be incomplete if it excludes one or more relevant variables 
(e. g., relating ignition to fire without considering the effect of gas release on both those 
exposed to ignition and those unexposed), uses surrogate variables for ones that cannot 
be measured (e. g., using wind speed at the nearest port as a proxy for wind speed at the 
offshore facility), or fails to account for correlations that cause seemingly unrelated 
events to occur much more frequently than would be expected by chance (e. g., two 
separate components of a marine engine are both missing a particular washer because 
the same newly hired assembler carried out the assemble work on them). 
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5.5 Theoretical Methods of Handling Uncertainty 
Methods for analysing and describing uncertainty can range from simple to complex for 
which some appropriate mathematical treatments need to be explored. Selecting the 
appropriate statistics depends on the amount of data available and the degree of detail 
required. Often included are methods of combining and propagating uncertain 
information within a mathematically rigorous structure. More complicated methods 
become necessary when multiple sources of uncertainty must be combined (Phillips & 
LaPole, 2003). 
Some of the more common approaches to representing and handling uncertainty used by 
various reasoning systems today are based on (Klir, 1994; Dubois & Prade, 1988; 
Graham & Jones, 1988; Baldwin, 1996): 
" Probabilistic analysis 
o Classical set theory 
o Probability theory 
o Bayes' theory 
" Evidential reasoning 
o Dempster-Shafer theory 
o Mass assignment theory 
" Possibilistic analysis 
o Interval mathematics 
o Possibility theory 
o Fuzzy set theory 
As with the reasoning technologies they are typically associated with, each approach 
has various strengths and characteristics regarding its representational capabilities. 
Each has different representational characteristics and propagation models. When a 
modelling approach is used, sensitivity analysis can be used to evaluate how model 
output changes with changes in input variables, and uncertainty propagation can be 
analysed to examine how uncertainty in individual parameters can affect the overall 
uncertainty of the assessment. 
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5.5.1 Probabilistic Reasoning Under Uncertainty 
The calculation of one or more point estimates is one of the most common approaches 
to presenting analysis results; point estimates that reflect different aspects of uncertainty 
can have great value if appropriately developed and communicated (EPA, 1996). 
Nonetheless, one aspect that most uncertainty management schemes agree on is that 
single point values of risk are worse than representing both variability and uncertainty. 
Common ways to more adequately express uncertainty are: 
" To represent the level of uncertainty by modifying the probability for 
propositions. 
" To treat it as a separate entity that is affixed to each probability. 
" To represent it as a range of opinions. 
Opinion pooling is particularly effective at assessing the usefulness of information 
produced by human experts (Kahn, 2004). When applied in a hierarchical model, it can 
provide a natural and flexible way to incorporate dependencies among experts while 
acknowledging that they may justifiably disagree. In these models, uncertainty in a 
probabilistic value is represented by a collection of estimates of the quantity and the 
degree of certainty or uncertainty is measured by means of the distribution of values in 
the collection of estimates. 
5.5.1.1 Probability Theory 
If an event has yet to occur, and there is more than one possible outcome, then there is 
clearly some uncertainty about its outcome. Probability theory provides an ideal way of 
handling such uncertainties. Probability gives a measure of the likelihood of an event 
resulting in one possible outcome under one set of conditions. Also, the outcome itself 
is restricted to a binary state {true, false}. Given some history of previous outcomes for 
this type of event one can determine a measure of the probability of this event being true 
when it occurs. If there is no history of previous outcomes and one has no insight into 
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the event itself, then there is total uncertainty with regard to the event outcome. This 
complete uncertainty, which is represented by a uniform prior probability distribution, 
may be assigned to each of the possible outcomes. 
In almost all cases the uniform prior probabilities are unrepresentative of the actual 
outcome probabilities. A better method of obtaining these probabilities is by taking a 
frequency of occurrence approach where it is assumed that the number of times the 
event is encountered tends to infinity. Such an approach is more accurate than a 
uniform prior probability approach but requires a large history of event outcomes. 
For any event A, one can assign a number P(A), called the probability of the event A. 
This number satisfies the following three conditions that act as the axioms ofprobability 
(Papoulis, & Pillai, 2002): 
(i)P(A)>_0 
(ii) P(X) = 1, where X is the (finite) sample space. 
(iii) If AnB=0, then P(A u B) = P(A) + P(B) 
Note that probability axiom (iii) states that if A and B are mutually exclusive events, the 
probability of their union is the sum of their probabilities. 
The following conclusions follow from these axioms: 
(a) Since Auf=X, in using probability axiom (ii) one obtains P(A U Ä) = P(X) _ 
1. But AnfE0 and in using probability axiom (iii), one obtains: 
P(A u A) = P(A) + P(Ä) =1 (5.1) 
(b) Similarly, for any A, An {Q}= {0}. Hence it follows that P(A u {Q}) = P(A) 
+ P((). But Au (0) = A, and thus: 
P(O) =0 (5.2) 
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Whilst such a probability approach is useful for many simple cases, a more complicated 
problem arises when events are not mutually exclusive. (and this means that Equation 
2.7 in Section 2.5.6 of Chapter 2 applies). In these cases conditional probabilities can 
be calculated from Equation 5.3 (the rule of conditional probabilities): 
P(AIB) = 
P(Ar)B) 
P(B) 
(5.3) 
where I denotes "given", so that P(AIB) is the conditional probability that A is true given 
that B is true. 
In one way the conditional probability equation gives some elementary reasoning under 
uncertainty. There may be the uncertainty as to whether A is true, but if it is known that 
B is true, then the conditional probability rule of Equation 5.3 can at least estimate the 
probability P(AIB). 
The rule of conditional probability is extended to give the rule of total probabilities. 
This is shown in Equation 5.4. 
P(B) = P(BO). P(A) + P(Bj. 4). P(Ä) (5.4) 
The rule of total probabilities provides more power in reasoning about discrete events 
that are not mutually exclusive. 
S. S. 1.2 Bayes' Theory 
Bayes' theorem extends the rules of conditional probability and total probability. It 
provides a means of dealing with inference and belief updating in uncertainty situations. 
As can be read from Equation 5.5, the theorem defines a method of calculating the 
conditional, or posterior, probability P(IKE) from known probability P(EIH) and prior 
probabilities P(E) and P(H). 
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Basically, Bayes theorem enables the probability distribution across all independent and 
mutually exclusive H; given new evidence E to be updated. 
P(E I H, )"P(H; ) 
P(HiIE) 
k E P(E I H)P(H. ) 
n=1 
where; 
P(H, IE) = probability that hypothesis H; is true given evidence E, 
P(EIH; ) = probability of observing evidence E given hypothesis H;, 
P(H; ) =a priori probability of hypothesis H; being true, and 
k= number of hypotheses. 
(5.5) 
In practice P(EIH; ) in Equation 5.5 may be computationally expensive to calculate if all 
evidence is not independent. If the assumption is made that all evidence is independent 
this is referred to as naive Bayes. 
If on the other hand new evidence e, is encountered and E and e are not independent, 
then conditional joint probabilities needs to be taken into account in order to calculate 
P(H; 4E, e). This is shown in Equation 5.6. 
P(ME, e) = PQAE). 
P(e I E, H) 
P(e I E) 
where; 
P(HIE) = probability that hypothesis H is true given evidence E, 
P(111E, e) = probability that H is true given E and new evidence e, 
P(ejE, H) = probability of observing e given H and E, and 
P(eIE) = probability of observing e given E. 
(5.6) 
The problem with modifying simple Bayes theorem (Equation 5.5) to the conditional 
evidence case (Equation 5.6) is in calculating the joint probabilities. For n pieces of 
evidence there are 2" joint probabilities to be calculated. For reasons of computational 
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speed, storage and knowledge acquisition, the conditional evidence case of Bayes 
theorem is frequently intractable. 
5.5.2 Evidential Reasoning Under Uncertainty 
This section looks at two key uncertainty reasoning theories which use more humanistic 
terms in dealing with information. These theories, namely Dempster-Shafer theory and 
the more sophisticated mass assignment theory, use terms such as evidence, belief and 
plausibility. 
5.5.2.1 Dempster-Shafer Theory 
In a finite discrete space, Dempster-Shafer theory can be interpreted as a generalization 
of probability theory where probabilities are assigned to sets as opposed to mutually 
exclusive singletons. In traditional probability theory, evidence is associated with only 
one possible event. In Dempster-Shafer theory, evidence can be associated with 
multiple possible events, e. g., sets of events. As a result, evidence in this theory can be 
meaningful at a higher level of abstraction without having to resort to assumptions 
about the events within the evidential set. Where the evidence is sufficient enough to 
permit the assignment of probabilities to single events, the Dempster-Shafer model 
collapses to the traditional probabilistic formulation. One of the most important 
features of this theory is that the model is designed to cope with varying levels of 
precision regarding the information and no further assumptions are needed to represent 
the information. It also allows for the direct representation of uncertainty of system 
responses where an imprecise input can be characterized by a set or an interval and the 
resulting output is a set or an interval. 
Belief, Bel and Plausibility, Pl 
Dempster-Shaffer theory allows for the allocation of probability-like weights to a set of 
events to be made in a way that allows statements of ignorance about likelihood of some 
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of the events. From the allocation of weights, two numbers that represent the 
uncertainty data can be obtained: the degree to which an event is supported by evidence 
(belief), and the degree to which there is a lack of evidence to the contrary (plausibility). 
These two numbers are the basis on which any belief-based decision is made. 
For any event A, the degree of belief in A, Bel(A), and degree of plausibility in A, P1(A), 
must satisfies the following conditions that act as the axioms of evidence (Shafer, 1976): 
(i) P1(A) >_ Bel(A) >_ 0 
(ii) Bel(X) = PI(X) = 1, where Xis the (finite) sample space. 
(iii) Bel(A) + P1(Ä) =1 
(iv) Bel(A u B) ? Bel(A) + Bel(B), if A and B are mutually exclusive events 
(v) P1(A u B): 5 P1(A) + P1(B), ifA and B are mutually exclusive events 
The following conclusions follow from these axioms: 
(b) Since AUÄ=X, in using evidence axiom (ii) one obtains Bel(A u A) = Bel(X) 
= 1. But AnÄE0 and in using evidence axiom (iv), one obtains Bel(A u A) _ 
I >_ Bel(A) + Bel(Ä). Thus: 
Bel(A) + Bel(Ä) S1 (5.7) 
(c) Similarly, for any A, An {Q}= {0). Hence it follows that Bel(A u {Q}) _ 
Bel(A) + Bel(O). But Au {0} = A, and thus: 
Bel(Q1) =0 (5.8) 
(d) Since Auf=X, in using evidence (ii) one obtains PI(A U Ä) = P1(X) = 1. But 
AnÄE0 and in using evidence (iv), one obtains PI(A u Ä) =1 <_ P1(A) + 
P1(Ä). Thus: 
PI(A) + Pl(Ä) >_ 1 (5.9) 
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(e) Similarly, for any A, An {Q}= {Q}. Hence it follows that PI(A u {Q}) _ 
PI(A) + P1(0). But Au 101 = A, and thus: 
PI(AS) =0 (5.10) 
Within a belief-plausibility interval lies the precise probability of the event A (in the 
classical sense) such that: 
Bel(A) <_ P(A) 5 PI(A) (5.11) 
A belief measure (or a plausibility measure) becomes a probability measure when all 
focal elements are singletons or the evidences are disjoint. In this case: 
Bel(A) = P(A) = P1(A) (5.12) 
This corresponds to classical probability, where all the probabilities, P(A) are uniquely 
determined for all subsets A of the universal set X (Ramer, 1987). 
The definition of conditional belief is different from the definition of conditional 
probability as given by Equation 5.13 (Halpern & Fagin, 1992): 
Bel(A[B) = 
Bel(A u B) - Bel(B) 
1- Bel(B) 
The conditional plausibility of A given B is (Halpern & Fagin, 1992): 
Pl(AIB)= 
PI(AnB) 
P1(B) 
If Bel is a Bayesian belief function, then: 
Bel(A[B) = 
Bel(A n B) 
= Pl(AIB) Bel(B) 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
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which coincides exactly with the classical conditional probability P(AIB) defined in 
Equation 5.3. 
Probability Assignment, m 
Dempster-Shafer theory also adds a third measure called the basic probability 
assignment (bpa) that is often denoted by m, which attempts to relate the measures Bel 
and Pl directly to probability theory. This theory's m is unlike the basic probability 
distribution, which is defined over the universe X, in that m is defined over the power 
set of X, P(X). That is: 
m: P(X) -> [0,1] (5.16) 
such that, m(O) =0 and m(A) = 1. 
AEP(X) 
Every set for Ae P(X) for which m(O) >0 is usually called a focal element of m. As 
the name suggests, focal elements are subsets of X on which the available evidence 
focuses. When X is finite, m can be characterised by a list of its focal elements A with 
the responding values m(A). The pair (Z, m ), where 3 and m denote a focal element 
and the associated basic assignment, respectively is often called a body of evidence 
(Türksen, 2004). 
A subset of P(X) containing only the singleton sets, {x} Vx E X, is analogous to the 
basic probability density function. The basic probability density function is therefore a 
restricted case of the Dempster-Shafer theory basic probability assignment. 
It is important to note that the definition of m does not require that m(X) =1 (as the 
basic probability density function does) or that m(A) <_ m(B) when AcB. The later of 
these two cases is important because it gives us more representation power then the 
basic probability density function. Furthermore, no relationship between m(A) and m(Ä) 
is required. 
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Bel, PI and m are related by Equations 5.17 and 5.18, where A is a subset of P(X) 
Bel(A) m(B) 
BF_A 
(5.17) 
PI(A) m(B) (5.18) 
BnAsPJ 
The inverse procedure is also possible. Given, for example, a belief measure Bel, the 
corresponding basic probability assignment m is determined for all AE P(X) by the 
formula: 
m(A) _ (-1)1A-BIBel (B) (5.19) 
BQA 
Total ignorance (Türksen, 2004), is expressed in terms of the basic assignment by m(X) 
=I and m(A) =0 for all A*X. In terms of the corresponding Bel measure, it is exactly 
the same: Bel(X) =1 and Bel(A) =0 for all A#X. However, it is quite different in 
terms of the corresponding PI measure: P1(O) =0 and PI(A) =0 for all A*0. 
Dempster Evidence Combination 
Evidence obtained in the same context from two independent sources, e. g., from two 
experts in the field of inquiry, and expressed by two basic assignments m, and m2 on 
some power set P(X) must be appropriately combined to obtain a joint basic assignment 
m1,2. In general, evidence can be combined in various ways (Sentz, & Ferson, 2002), 
some of which may take into consideration the reliability of the sources and other 
relevant aspects. The standard way of combining evidence is expressed by the formula: 
E m, (A). m2 (B) 
mb2(C) - Aýa=c 
ImA. m B ý ,() 2c ) 
,C #0 (5.20) 
AnB=O 
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Equation 5.20 is known as Dempster's rule of combination. According to this rule, the 
degree of evidence mi(A) from the first source that focuses on set AE P(X) and the 
degree of evidence m2(B) from the second source that focuses on BE P(X) are 
combined by taking the product mi(A) . M2(B) , which focuses on the intersection 
AnB. This is exactly the same way in which the joint probability distribution is 
calculated from two independent marginal distributions and, consequently, it is justified 
on the same grounds (Türksen, 2004). 
In order to obtain a normalised basic assignment mI, 2, the denominator of Equation 5.20 
acts as a normalising factor. Some of the intersections of Dempster's combination rule 
may be empty and the renormalisation of the final probability assignment to redistribute 
probability assigned to the empty set is a contentious operation. The theory of mass 
assignment (Baldwin, 1992) overcomes this problem through the mass assignment 
definition and combination methods. 
5.5.2.2 Mass Assignment Theory 
Mass assignment (Baldwin, 1992 and 1996) unifies probability, possibility and fuzzy 
sets into a single theory. Since this is a large topic for just one section, only the 
underlying theory of mass assignment with respect to probability theory will be 
considered here. Mass assignment approach to fuzzy sets, and hence possibility theory, 
can be found in Section 8.4.1.1. of Chapter 8. 
The mass assignment is similar to Dempster-Shafer theory's probability assignment, but 
is extended to enable mass to be assigned to the empty set. Equation 5.21 defines the 
mass assignment m over the powerset of universe X, P(X). 
m: P(X) -a [0,1] (5.21) 
such that, m(O) z0 and m(A) 
AEP(X) 
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A mass assignment over the power set P(X) defines a family of probability distributions 
over the universe X. The most general mass assignment defines complete uncertainty 
and is shown in Equation 5.22. The most specific mass assignment defines complete 
certainty and is shown in Equation 5.33. 
m(X) =I and m(A) = 0, VA E P(X), A*X (5.22) 
m(A) =I and m(B) = 0, `dB E P(X), B#A (5.23) 
Note in Equation 5.21 the special condition m(() >_ 0 which is less restrictive than the 
m(O) =0 restriction applied to probability assignment. The probability assignment is 
therefore a special case of the mass assignment. The mass assignment is said to be 
complete when m(f) =0 and incomplete otherwise. As with probability assignment, 
incompleteness arises from inconsistency between two pieces of evidence. 
The focal elements A of P(X) are defined as those elements of P(X) which have non- 
zero mass. In contrast to probability assignment, 0 can be a focal element. 
A mass assignment across focal elements is expressed as in Equation 5.24 where Z; is 
the it' focal element and m; is the mass assignment to Z. 
m=3j: m; Ii=1,..., n (5.24) 
Given a universe X the inverse m of mass assignment m is defined by Equation 5.25. 
m=X-3j: m; I i=1,..., n (5.25) 
The properties of mass assignment also follow the basic rules of Boolean algebra (See 
Table 2.6 of Chapter 2). 
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Mass assignment and probability distributions 
A mass assignment represents a family of probability distributions. It is often useful to 
generate one specific probability distribution called the least prejudiced distribution. 
As the name suggests, this distribution is the case when there is the assumption that 
mass assigned to a set A is equally likely to belong to any element in A. As a result, 
mass assigned to A can be distributed equally across all elements in A. More formally, 
given a mass m(A): 
m({B})= 
iýý) `dBEA (5.26) 
In order to obtain a least prejudiced distribution of mass to generate a single probability 
distribution, masses assigned to singletons {B} are now summed and assigned as 
probabilities for B. A probability P(B) is therefore defined as: 
B(B) m(A) 
BEA, AeP(X) JAI 
5.5.3 Possibilistic Reasoning Under Uncertainty 
(5.27) 
This section looks at the theories of Possibility and fuzzy set for reasoning about an 
epistemic state. Both theories are associated with terms such as fuzzy, possibility and 
necessity. The rules of these theories utilises max/min or max/product calculus, which 
are not found in probability theory. 
5.5.3.1 Possibility Theory 
A special branch of evidence theory that deals with bodies of evidence whose focal 
elements are nested is referred to as possibility theory. Special counterparts of belief 
and plausibility measures in possibility theory are called necessity and possible 
measures, respectively. 
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The possibility measure, 11, is defined in the powerset P(X) or universe X and is a 
mapping from P(X) to the unit interval [0,1 ]: 
II : P(X) --+ [0,1] (5.28) 
A possibility distribution, n, on the universe X can be defined such that the following 
mapping holds: 
n: X-+ [o, 1] 
and it is defined for all x r= X as, 
(5.29) 
n(x) = II({x}) (5.30) 
The necessity measure is the dual of possibility and is defined in terms of the possibility 
measure. 
(5.31) N: P(X)-+ [0, l] 
For any set A, the possibility of A, II(A), and necessity of A, N(A), must satisfies the 
following conditions that act as the axioms ofpossibility: 
(i) f7(, 4) ? N(A) z0 
(ii) N(X) =11(X) = 1, for any collection of subsets on the universal set X 
(iii) N(A) + 11(1) =1 
(iv) 11(A) + 11(1) zI 
(v) N(A) + N(Ä) Si 
(vi) 11(A u B) = max[FI(A), FI(B)] 
(vii) N(A n B) = min[N(A), N(B)] 
The concept of conditional possibility distribution function is essential for defining 
possibilistic independence. Two marginal possibilistic body of evidence are said to be 
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independent if and only if the conditional possibilities do not defer from the 
corresponding marginal probabilities. This is expressed by the equations: 
II(A[B) = II(A) (5.32) 
A(BW) = II(B) (5.33) 
for all xE Xand ally E Y, where II(AIB) and A(BW) denote conditional possibilities on 
XxY. 
For more information on possibility theory, see Laviolette & Seaman (1994) and 
Dubois, & Prade (1988). 
5.5.3.2 Fuzzy Set Theory 
Fuzzy sets theory defines real-world concepts and deals with uncertainty that may be 
due to human interpretation or machine measurement. The linguistic term warm, for 
example, has different meanings for different people, and is an example of fuzziness 
due to human interpretation. Measurement of a physical quality, on the other hand, may 
be restricted to a low precision measure by using inexpensive measurement devices, and 
leads to fuzziness in the measured quantity. 
A classical set can be regarded as a grouping together of elements, all of which have at 
least one common characteristic. If an element possesses this characteristic, it belongs 
to the set. If an element does not possess this characteristic, it does not belong to the 
set. In fuzzy set theory, the set is no longer restricted to this binary (yes/no) definition 
of set membership, but rather allows a graduated definition of membership. This means 
that a degree of membership to a set can be specified for each element. This set is then 
referred to as a fuzzy set. 
A fuzzy set F over the universe X is characterized by its membership function A, -(x). 
The membership function µ is defined in Equation 5.34. 
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kt: X-> [0, l] (5.34) 
where xEX. 
For XEX, a number of operations have been defined for fuzzy sets including 
intersection, union and complement, as given by Equations 5.35,5.36 and 5.37, 
respectively. 
µAr, B(x) = min[µA(x), µB(x)l 
µAvB(x) = max[µA(x), PB(X)] 
(5.35) 
(5.36) 
µA-(x) =1- µA(X) (5.37) 
Zadeh's fuzzy set algebra is defined in more detail in (Kosko, 1994). 
A fuzzy set F defined on universe X also induces a possibility distribution on X such 
that, 
µF(A) _ 71(A), VA EX (5.38) 
In this way a fuzzy set and its corresponding possibility distribution are linked. 
5.6 Comparison and Selection of Theory for Inference Processing 
Inference processes generally concern a situation (see Figure 5.4), a part of reality that 
has an interest. In building an understanding of some portion of reality, models are 
created, which consist of simplified representations of situations, in terms of a limited 
number of variables, representing distinct aspects of the situation, and dependencies 
between those variables (Groen & Mosleh, 2001). 
Chapter 5- Treatment of Uncertainty 
ý -ý ýý 
Reasoning 
Figure 5.4: Idealised view of inference process 
In order to reason through a risk-based model under conditions of uncertainty, it is 
important to understand the similarities and differences between probability theory and 
possibility theory. Both theories form the basis of the more restrictive evidence theory 
that can be effectively summarised by the representative Figure 5.5. 
Measures 
on Subsets 
ý 
Probability 
z-; ý 
< 
v 
Distributions 
on Points 
Possibility 
Distributions 
Certain 
Figure 5.5: Summary of Dempster-Shafer evidence theory 
Hence, evidence theory can be used as the unified theory to handle both types of 
uncertainty satisfactorily. 
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Basic mathematical properties of all three theories (i. e., probability, possibility and 
evidential) are summarised in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Comparison of mathematical properties for finite sets 
Probability Possibili Evidence 
Measures One type: Two types: possibility, 17 
Three types: belief, Bel, 
plausibility, Pl and 
probability, P and necessity, N probability assignment, m 
When events in X are 
singletons: Bel(A) = P(A) _ 
Body of Consists of Consists of a family of nested P1(A) 
evidence singletons subsets When X contains only nested 
subsets: Bel(A) = N(A) and 
PIA= A 
p: X-+[0,1] n: X-> [0, l] m: X-º[O, 1] 
Unique via the formula via the formula via the formula 
representation P(A) = P(x) 11(A) = max 7[(x) m(A) _ m(x) 
xEA xEA xEP(A) 
Normalization P(x) =I max 7r(x) =1 
EM(X) 
=I 
x¬X x¬X xEP(X ) 
Bel(A u B) >- Bel(A) +Bel(B) 
Additivity P(A u B) = P(A) + Not applicable - 
Bel(A n B) 
P(B) - P(A n B) Pl(A u B) SPI(A) + P1(B) - 
PIAnB 
Bel(AnB)= 
maxhnin rule Not applicable 
IAA u B) = max[I7(A), 17(B)] min[Bel(A), Bel(B)] 
N(A n B) = min[N(A), N(B)] Pl(A u B) = 
maxP/A, PIB 
Bel(A) = 1- P1(A) 
Bel(A) =PI(A) 
Measures N(A) =1 -17(1) Bel(A) = m(B) 
connectivity 
Not applicable 17(A) <1 N(A) =0 BcA N(A) >O I7(A) =1 PI(A) _Z m(B) 
BnAsO 
11A) +17(Ä)z I 
Complement P(A) +P (Ä) =1 
N(A) + N(A) 51 Bel(A) + Bel(Ä) 51 
max[I1A), 11A)] =1 P1(A) + P1(Ä) >- 1 
N(A)l =0 
Bel(X) =1 and Bel(A) = 0, 
VA#X, xEX 
Total 
i p(x) = 1/IXI, `dx EX lt(x) = 1, b'x EX 
PI(0) =1 and PI(A) = 0, VA 
O X gnorance ,xE * 
m(X) =1 and m(A) = 0, VA ý 
X, xEX 
Bel(AIB) _ 
TI(AIB) = Bel(A u B) - Bel(B) 
Conditioning 
P(A n B) P(AIB) = II(A), b'II(A) < II(B) 1- Bel(B) P(B) 
[fl(B), 1, ] `d H(A) z 11(B) 
[ 
PI (A n B) 
PI(AIB) = 
PI (B) 
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5.7 Dealing with Uncertainty via Conceptualised Modelling 
The ideal situation would use a single universally capable and accepted uncertainty 
model. Unfortunately, such a model does not currently exist and is unlikely to be 
developed any time soon. 
Process model description should include key assumptions, simplifications, and 
aggregations of variables, although empirical model descriptions should include the 
rationale for selection, and statistics on model performance (e. g., goodness of fit). 
Uncertainty in process or empirical models can be quantitatively evaluated by 
comparing model results to measurements taken in the system of interest or by 
comparing the results obtained using different model alternatives. If important 
relationships are missed or specified incorrectly, risks could be seriously under- or 
overestimated in the risk characterization phase. While simplification and lack of 
knowledge may be unavoidable, risk assessors should document what is known, justify 
the model, and rank model components in terms of uncertainty (Smith & Shugart, 
1994). 
Developing alternative conceptual models for a particular assessment to explore 
possible relationships can reduce uncertainty associated with conceptual models. In 
cases where more than one conceptual model is plausible, the risk assessor must decide 
whether it is feasible to follow separate models through the analysis phase or whether 
the models can be combined into a better conceptual model. It is important to revisit, 
and if necessary revise, conceptual models during risk assessments to incorporate new 
information and recheck the rationale. It is valuable to present conceptual models to 
risk managers to ensure the models communicate well and address key concerns the 
managers have. This check for completeness and clarity provides an opportunity to 
assess the need for changes before analysis begins. 
5.8 Implications of Not Addressing Uncertainty 
Uncertainty must be handled appropriately with a good mix of strategies. If 
uncertainties are not considered, then unrealistic risk estimates are more likely to be 
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obtained. Furthermore, if such information is not provided to decision-makers, there is 
a danger that the assessments made will be considered as fully reliable. The outcome of 
such a result is often a poor/inappropriate decision being made, leading to missed goals 
and opportunities. For example, one major reason for cost overruns is the uncertainty 
inherent in various aspects of the work. This uncertainty can result in a wide range of 
outcomes that in turn may impact project cost and schedule in unfavourable ways. 
Moreover, getting it wrong, even slightly, increases likelihood of unwelcome surprises 
and can often lead to civil or even criminal liability due to negligence. 
Also, if further risk assessments are later performed, yielding different conclusions with 
apparently equal certainty, it may cause a loss of confidence in the risk assessment 
technique. 
5.9 Concluding Remarks 
Both risk and uncertainty are always present in any real-world decision among different 
courses of action. Therefore, developing different courses of action for a decision 
maker, selecting among those courses of action with different costs and benefits, and 
implementing those choices effectively require risks and uncertainties to be accurately 
and objectively recognized, estimated, incorporated, and managed. 
Situations of inherent and/or subjective uncertainties are encountered in a maritime risk 
analytical process. These uncertainties mainly arise due to some variation of the event 
occurrence parameter and the approximation of the model form. Any effective risk- 
based model should be capable of treating its inherent or subjective uncertainties via the 
inference of probabilistic (e. g., probability and Bayes') or possibilistic (e. g., possibility 
and fuzzy set) theories. Dempster-Shafer theory or the theory of mass reasoning may 
also be utilised for reasoning evidentially after either a probabilistic analysis or a 
possibilistic analysis have been conducted. Basically, a good mix of strategy should be 
applied to handle these uncertainties, otherwise there is bound to be a danger that the 
assessments made will be considered as fully reliable. This can lead to inappropriate 
decisions being made, which can result into missed goals and opportunities. 
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Chapter Summary 
A powerful practical solution is the most desired output when making decisions under 
the realm of uncertainty on any safety-critical marine or offshore units and their 
systems. A Bayesian network (BN) is shown to realistically deal with those 
encountered uncertainties whilst at the same time making risk assessments easier to 
build, check and also update with data and information typically being obtained 
incrementally. For its application, a well-matched methodology is proposed to 
formalise the reasoning in which the focal mechanism of inference processing relies on 
the sound Bayes' rule/theorem that permits the logic. In this chapter, the method is 
illustrated and its feasibility is shown in a number of applicable maritime cases of 
interest, developed via a commercial computer tool. Some influencing nodal 
parameters in BN models are also further expanded with additional nodes to output 
influence diagrams that are highly intuitive in their effects on the decision. The test 
cases, although kept easy, demonstrates how a BN can facilitate the process for a 
sounder assessment of reliability and safety. 
6.1 Introduction 
If all the information that could be known about a maritime hazardous event/situation 
were obtainable for its risk assessment, then the results of such studies that are 
accurately carried out would not be subject to uncertainty. Instead, data and 
information is typically obtained incrementally. Thus, it is necessary to model the 
assessment domain such that the probabilistic measure of each event becomes more 
reliable in light of the new information being received. In view of this, the domain that 
is represented can be put out in an intuitive visual format as a Bayesian network (BN) 
model. The BN reasoning system can be viewed as the generalisation of prepositional 
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logic and resolution theorem-proving that incorporates the treatment of uncertainty for 
the structure of the complex argument. Probability theory ensures that inferences based 
on a network are sound. 
Reasoning with incomplete knowledge is one of the fundamental features of human 
intelligence and one that is very essential to the risk-based marine community. 
Therefore, competent expert and engineering judgement (to compensate for any lack of 
mature data) incorporated in a BN can aid in providing its solid knowledge base. Also, 
it is worth evaluating the use of BNs as a means of optimisation that combines 
information from diverse sources and permits model reduction. The generic nature of 
this technique means that it can be developed further and applied widely in marine and 
offshore applications. With this philosophy in a logical framework, adopting BN to 
formalise reasoning about system dependability will make assessments easier to build, 
check and certainly update. 
The analogy of BN models can further be expanded/transformed to output influence 
diagrams that are highly intuitive in the decision-making process. Such diagrams aid 
the visibility of a large number of interacting issues and their effects on the decision. 
They can also offer the benefit of a robust practical solution that is required for achieved 
safety at an affordable cost. Hence, the final scheme of the BN can give a model in 
which reasoning is justified whilst it enables a powerful marine decision-support 
solution that is easy to use, flexible, and appropriate for the assessment task. 
6.2 Semantics of a Bayesian Network 
Fundamental to the idea of Bayesian networks (BNs) is the concept of modularity, 
whereby a complex system is built by combining simpler parts of components that are 
related in a causal manner. A BN provides factorised representation of a probability 
model that explicitly captures much of the structure typical in human-engineered 
models. More generally, a BN is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) that encodes a 
conditional probability distribution (CPD) at its nodes on the basis of arcs received. 
Therefore, by definition: 
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"BN" = "DAG" encoded with "CPD" 
The key feature of BNs is that they enable modelling and reasoning about uncertainty 
(Pearl, 1988). This uncertainty can be due to imperfect understanding of the domain, 
incomplete knowledge of the state of the domain at the time where a given task is to be 
performed, randomness in the mechanisms governing the behaviour of the domain, or a 
combination of these. 
6.2.1 Probability Directed Acyclic Graph 
In a directed graph, an edge (arc) goes from one vertex (node), the source, to another, 
the target, and hence makes connection in only one direction. Acyclic implies that such 
a graph contains no cycle. Therefore, if there is a route from one node to another node 
in the graphical structure then there is no way back. 
In a BN structure (i. e. the DAG), nodes (usually drawn as either circles or ovals) 
represent random (i. e., chance) variables, such as events, that take values from the given 
domains. Arcs (normally drawn as either curved or straight lines having a terminating 
arrowhead) are used to represent the direct probabilistic dependence relations among the 
variables. Each influence relationship is described by an arc connecting an influencing 
(parent) node to an influenced (child) node and has its terminating arrowhead pointing 
to the child node. If a node has no parents, then its probability distribution is said to be 
marginal (as lack of a link signifies conditional independence), otherwise it is 
conditional. The graphical network therefore constitutes a description of the 
probabilistic relationships among the system's variables that amount to a factorisation 
of the joint distribution of all variables into a series of marginal and conditional 
distributions. 
For example, the interest in an event A (e. g., an effect) might arise knowing that another 
event B (e. g., a cause) in the same model domain has occurred. As shown in Figure 6.1, 
the BN expresses the fact that A is directly dependent on B (i. e., A ¬13 or B-)A). This 
indicates that B influences A partially or in total, and that A and B are functionally 
related, or they are statistically correlated. 
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Influencing (i. e., parent) 
node B is a cause of A 
Influenced (i. e., child) 
node A is an effect of B 
Figure 6.1: A simple events BN structure of two nodes and an arc 
One of the best features of BNs is that one can incorporate new node(s) as the data 
becomes available. Thus, it follows that one `effect' can be a `cause' of a new/another 
node and a `cause' can also be the `effect' of a new/another node. 
Basically, the graphical structure of a BN depicts a qualitative illustration of the 
interactions among the set of variables that it models. In a task for risk assessment, 
these variables can be propositions about events or events themselves. These events 
may be causal and thus get chained together by the arcs in the network. The structure of 
such a modelled domain in this case would gives a useful, modular insight into the 
interactions among the events and allows for prediction of effects of external 
manipulation. 
6.2.2 Conditional Probability Distribution 
A BN also represents the quantitative relationships among the modelled variables. 
Numerically, it represents the joint probability distribution (JPD) among them. This 
distribution is described efficiently, exploring probabilistic independencies among the 
modelled variables. Each node is described by a probability distribution conditional on 
its direct predecessors that has its values entered into a conditional probability table 
(CPT) associated with the node. The encoded nodes with no predecessors are described 
by prior probability distributions. Those with predecessors are described by posterior 
probability distributions. 
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P(B) 
b, b2 
a, ''. hi P(allk) 
a2 l'ia 'l hl) P(ab) 
P(A IB) 
Figure 6.2: A simple BN with its nodes having a CPT containing two states 
Basically, a typical CPT is a matrix of conditional probabilities. A conditional 
probability is a probability of one event, given that another event has occurred. For 
example, the conditional probability of a parameter, 0, given an observed data, x, would 
be written as P(9 Ix), where the "I" vertical bar is read as "given that" or "given" (the 
indication of conditionality). A typical CPT in a BN associated with an event A being 
directly dependent on an event B is described by its matrix format in Figure 6.2. The 
subscripts "I" and "2" have been used to give clarity in signifying 2 states of the 
specified variable. Thus, a, and b, could say represent a "reliability" state for the 
events A and B respectively whilst a2 and b2 could represent a "failure" state. To obtain 
the quantified value with respect to these states, B is described by prior probabilities 
P(b, ) and P(b2). Since B has an effect on A, then A is conditionally described by its 
posterior probabilities P(a, I b, ), P(a, I b2), P(a2I b, ), and P(a21 b2). 
More generally, for variable A with a set of states (a!, a2,..., a) and variable B with a 
set of states (b,, b2,..., b,,, ), the conditional probability matrix P(alb) represents the 
conditional probability of A given B as follows: 
P(alb) _ 
P(a, I bl) P(a, I b2 ) ... P(a, 
I b. ) 
P(a2 I bl) P(a2 I b2 ) ... P(a2 
I bm ) 
_P(a. 
1b1) P(a. I bz ) ... P(a I b. ) 
I 
(6.1) 
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More generally, to node A is attached the conditional probability matrix 
P(A I parents(A)), where parents(A) represents the value combinations of the parents of 
A and a global JPD completely specifies the probability assignments to all such 
propositions in the domain. Therefore, a probabilistic model may consists of a set of 
variables X= (XI, X2, ..., X), which exploits conditional independence to represent the 
JPD over Xhaving the product form (Pearl, 1988): 
P(xl,..., x) = P(xf I parent(Xi))P(x2 I parent(X2))... P(x I parent(X)) 
n 
P(x; I parents(X; )) (6.2) 
ý_ý 
P(xr, x2, ..., x) gives the JPD and like the CPD, it is a table of values where one entry is 
made for each possible combination of values that its variables can jointly take. The 
JPD for a problem captures the probability information of every possible combination 
of a set of variables, and their states. Once a JPD has been defined for a problem, then 
it is possible, using it along with the axioms of probability, to answer any probabilistic 
query regarding any of the variables. This includes their value given additional 
evidence, that is, their posterior probabilities, although, the space, and consequently, 
time complexity required in representing and manipulating the JPD is exponential in the 
number of variables considered (D'Ambrosio, 1999). For example, the JPD required to 
represent a system with 20 binary values would have 220 (1,048,576) values. This 
causes a problem in the elicitation, storage and manipulation of these values, thus 
making the use of JPDs unfeasible for any practical use. Fortunately, when modelling 
most real systems, advantage is taken of any inherent structure the system has by 
modelling the system as a graph (D'Ambrosio, 1999). 
The number of dimensions and the total size of a CPT are determined by the number of 
parents, the number of states of each of these parents, and the number of states of the 
child node. Essentially, there is a probability for every state of the child node for every 
combination of the states of the parents. Nodes that have no predecessors are specified 
by a prior probability distribution table, which specifies the prior probability of every 
state of the node. 
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6.3 Bayesian Inference Mechanism 
Bayesian inference is a process by which observations of a real-world situation are used 
to update the uncertainty about one or more variables characterising aspects of that 
situation. It relies on the use of Bayes' rule/theorem as its rule of inference, defining 
the manner in which uncertainties ought to change in light of newly made observations. 
This subjective probability theory is only part of the Bayesian inference mechanism. 
Together with the applicable results of such probability concepts as the product and sum 
rules, the concept of conditional independence and the techniques of marginalization, it 
provides the basic tool for both Bayesian belief updating and in treating probability as 
logic. In order to apply these tools, the prior probabilities and the likelihood 
probabilities must be obtained. 
6.3.1 Bayes' Theorem/Rule 
The theorem of Bayes (1763) is one that has been proven to be a coherent method of 
mathematically expressing a decrease in uncertainty gained by (or proportional to) an 
increase in knowledge. As an imperative phase of the probability analysis, this is 
achieved by combining probability distributions or functions of different parameters 
(such as events or specific outcomes) and revising their probabilities when new 
information/data is obtained. The more new information is used, the smaller the 
parameter of uncertainty about those events or their outcomes becomes. 
In order to make probability statements about the model parameters the analysis must 
begin with providing an initial or prior probability estimates for specific outcomes or 
events of interest. Then from sources such as a special report, a database, a case study, 
etc., some additional information (i. e., data or evidence) about the event, or an entirely 
new event(s), is obtained. In light of this new information providing new data belief, it 
is desirable to improve the state of knowledge and thus the prior probability values are 
updated by calculating revised probabilities, referred to as the posterior probabilities 
(These probabilities provide basis for action). Bayes' theorem provides a means for 
making these probability calculations. Essentially, it is a relation among conditional 
and marginal probabilities. 
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Conditional probabilities are essential to a fundamental rule of probability calculus, the 
product rule. The product rule defines the probability of a conjunction of events (e. g., 
for two events, A and B): 
P(A I B)P(B) = P(A, B) = P(BJA)P(A) (6.3) 
Therefore, in dividing Equation 6.2 by P(B), one obtains: 
p(A I B) = 
P(B I A)P(A) 
P(B) 
which is the theorem conventionally known as Bayes' theorem. 
(6.4) 
Each term in Bayes' theorem has a conventional name. The term P(A) is called the 
prior probability of A. It is "prior" in the sense that it precedes any information about B 
and this is what causes all the arguments. P(A) is also the marginal (total) probability 
of A. The term P(A JB) is called the posterior probability of A, given B. It is "posterior" 
in the sense that it is derived from or entailed by the specified value of B. The term 
P(BIA), for a specific value of B, is called the likelihood function for A given B and can 
also be written as L(AIB). The term P(B) is the prior or marginal (total) probability of 
B but also one that provides evidence of interest for the probability update of A. Its 
inverse is usually regarded as a normalising constant. With this terminology, the 
theorem may be paraphrased as: 
likelihood x prior posterior = 
evidence 
(6.5) 
In the general case, a JPD over a set of variables, X= (Xi, X2,..., X), can be defined 
recursively using the product rule (Equation 6.6): 
P(Xi. X2, 
..., 
X, d = P(Xi [X2, ..., X, JP(X2. ..., XºJ 
= P(Xi I X2, .... X, dP(X2 
W3, 
..., 
X, JP(X3, ... , 
Xn) 
= P(XI I X2. ..., Xn)P(X2IX3, ..., X, J... P(Xn-I I X)P(XA) (6.6) 
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This factorisation property of JPDs is referred to as the chain rule of probabilities and is 
one that allows any ordering of variables in the factorisation. Such a rule is especially 
significant for BNs because it provides a means of calculating the full JPD from 
conditional probabilities, which is what a BN stores. For example, the JPD for three 
events, A, B and C, can be expressed more compactly as: 
P(AIB, C)P(B, C) = P(A, B, C) = P(BJA, C)P(A, C) (6.7) 
Then, in applying Equation 6.6, Bayes' theorem specifies for the probability of an event 
A, given the condition that an event B and an event C both occur (B 9A EC) as: 
P(AIB, C) = 
P(B I A, C)P(A I C) 
P(B I C) 
prior, p(6) 
data, x 
rl. J 
(6.8) 
Bayes' rule/theorem states that: 
"The probability distribution of a model 
parameter, 0, after observing data, x, is 
proportional to the likelihood of the data, 
x, assuming that 0 is true, times the prior 
probability distribution of B. " 
Symbolically, this is written as: 
p(6Ix)= n xI 
)PB C 
p(x) 
Bayesian 
analysis Conventionally, this is read as: 
posterior = 
likelihood x prior 
evidence 
f posterior, p(Ax) 
Inverse of the "Evidence" term is 
normalising constant, a. The "Likelihood 
term expresses a measure of confidenc, 
degree and can be written as 1(0 Ix). 
Thus, in Likelihood Principle: 
posterior =a likelihood (1(0 Ix)) x prior 
Figure 63: An illustration of probability update via Bayes' theorem 
From a statistical viewpoint, the uncertainty associated with a parameter, 0, reduces due 
to the influence of an associated incoming data, x, and Bayes' theorem depicts such a 
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fact as shown in Figure 6.3. Thus, risk assessment of events can be carried out on this 
basis to enhance reasoning that will enable reliable decision-making. 
Bayesian inference proceeds by summarizing the posterior distribution, p(9 Ix). As 
depicted in Figure 6.4, after observing the data, the wide prior distribution is converted 
into the more narrow posterior distribution using the Bayes' rule. 
Figure 6.4: Conversion of the wide prior distribution into a more narrow posterior distribution 
Generally, Bayes' rule can be considered for the problem of estimating values of k 
parameters (causes), 0= (0,, ..., 
Ok), using n observations (effects), x= {xi, ..., x}. In the 
rule then, given the observations x= {x,, ..., x}, the posterior probability 
distribution on 
0 can be computed as: 
P(Xi,..., x. 1 0)P(o) P(91xr,..., x, j = 
P(x,,..., x) 
(6.9) 
It then follows also that given the situation if event B has states (bi,..., bm), the posterior 
probability on the event A can be computed from the Bayes' rule as: 
P(A I bl, ..., bd = 
P(b,,..., b. I A)P(A) 
P(b,,..., b, 
 
) 
(6.10) 
The process of Bayes' theorem is repeated every time new or additional information 
becomes available, so that as Lindley (1970) puts it, "today's posterior probability is 
tomorrow's prior. " As the number of pieces of evidence increases, the dependence of 
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the posterior on the original estimated prior decreases. This is indeed true and the main 
task of the theorem answers the following question, "Given observations (evidence), 
what is the probability of a particular cause (or variable of interest)? " 
Bayes' theorem has been particularly useful in estimating knowledge about the 
frequency of rare events or making reliability predictions where there is sparse or no 
directly applicable data (Frank, 2000). This has remained evident in dealing with 
uncertainty in expert systems. Being such a robust and extensible method, Bayes' 
theorem can likewise aid in marine and offshore risk assessment for predictive 
reasoning under uncertainty, and therefore, to arrive at a logically justifiable prediction. 
6.3.1.1 Marginalization of Probabilities 
From a table P(A, B) of probabilities P(a;, b) the probability distribution P(A) can be 
calculated. Let a, be a state of A. There are exactly m different events for which A is in 
state a1, namely the mutually exclusive events (af, b, ), ..., 
(a;, b,,, ). Therefore: 
Im P(aý) = !, P(ar' bl )ý1: P(ar Ibl )P(bl ) 
l=l ! _j 
In other words: 
P(ai) 
P(a2) 
P(a, I b, ) P(a, I b2 ) ... P(a, I 
bm ) 
P(a2 1 bº ) P(a2 I b2) ... P(a2 
I bm ) 
P(bl) 
P(b2) 
(6. l 1) 
(6.12) 
LP(an )J P(a I b, ) P(a. I b2 ) ... P(an I b. ) I 1'(bm 
) 
This calculation is called marginalization (summing out) and expresses the fact that the 
variable B is marginalized out of the JPD, P(A, B) (resulting in P(A)) (Russell & 
Norvig, 2003). The notation is: 
P(A) _ P(A, B) _ P(A IB =bJ)P(B =bJ) (6.13) 
8J 
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Similarly, if P(B, A) is a CPT over A and B, then a CPT over the state space of just B 
can be produced by marginalizing over A, so that, for example: 
z 
P(bi)= P(a;, b, ) =P(bilad P(ai)+P(bjIa2)P(a2) (6.14) 
Marginalization is of utmost importance for all inference in Bayesian probability: 
"integrating out" all "superfluous" variables derives the information about a subset of 
the system's variables. Furthermore, the process of marginalization tackles the problem 
of decision uncertainty explicitly, by preventing overoptimistic predictions (Vellido & 
Lisboa, 2001). 
6.3.1.2 Normalization of Probabilities 
In estimating values of an event A= (a,, ..., a,, ) that 
is directly dependent on another 
event B, the denominator of the right-hand side of Bayes' theorem gives the probability 
of event B as P(B). True probabilities of an event are supposed to sum to one over its 
entire state space, hence (as from the axioms of probability): P(al) + ,..,, + P(a, ) = 1. 
This formula can be applied to conditional probabilities, as well: P(aj1B) + ,..., + 
p(a I B) = 1. Using this fact and Bayes' rule for P(411B) and P(a I B), the following 
equation can be obtained: 
P(B)=P(Blad P(ad +,..., +P(Blad P(a) (6.15) 
The inverse of Equation 6.15 is known as a normalising constant, ac, that ensures the 
posterior probability over the entire state space (i = 1,2,..., n) sums up to 1. In other 
words; 
a P(B)= P(BI ar)P(ar) 
r=i 
(6.16) 
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Given that event B= (b,..... b,,. ), the term can be computed by summing the numerator 
over all possible event values (See "marginalization" in Section 6.3.1.1) whereby: 
n 
oc' =P(bl,..., b,,, )= P(b,,..., b,  
I ar)P(ar) (6.17) 
r=i 
The process that had just been explained is called normalization since it allows the sum 
of the probabilities of all exhaustive and mutually exclusive values (i. e., marginal and 
conditional terms) to equal 1. As a result of this process, Bayes' theorem can be 
expressed as: 
P(AI B) = xP(BI A) P(A) (6.18) 
Normalization can alter conclusions with respect to probability inferences. Thus, 
without the process of normalization there would never exist a unique maximum 
likelihood (ML) (See Section 6.3.2.2). 
6.3.2 The Likelihood Principle 
The Likelihood Principle (LP) (Fisher, 1922 and Edwards, 1992) states that all the 
relevant information in the model is contained in the likelihood function (which is of 
fundamental importance in the theory of Bayesian inference). Likelihood and log- 
likelihood functions are the basis for deriving estimators for parameters, given data. 
While the shapes of these two functions are different, they have their maximum point at 
the same value. In fact, the value of a parameter that corresponds to this maximum 
point is defined as the maximum likelihood estimate. This is the value that is "mostly 
likely" relative to the other values. This is a simple, compelling concept and it has a 
host of good statistical properties. 
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6.3.2.1 The Likelihood Function 
Sometimes P(BIA) is called the likelihood of A given B, and is denoted L(AIB). The 
reason for this is that if, for example, a j, ..., an are possible states of event A with an 
effect on the event B in which b is known, then and P(bI a, ) is a measure of how likely it 
is that a; is the cause. Likewise, 1(0 Ix) denotes the likelihood of 9, given x. 
"Likelihood" as a solitary term and one of several informal synonyms for "probability" 
is actually the shorthand for "likelihood function", a measure of how well (i. e., 
confidence degree) a given parameter predicts the data. Thus, the most important 
difference between p(xlO) and 1(B I x) is that p(xIO) is the probability of x (for a given 
parameter 0), while 1(0Ix) is a function of 0 (for given observations x). It follows from 
Equation 6.18 then that: 
pie I x> = ac r(e Ix) p<el (6.19) 
As given by Equation 6.19, likelihood function is the instrument to pass from prior 
probability distribution to posterior probability distribution via Bayes' formula (See 
Figure 6.5). Therefore inference must obey the principle about such a function. LP 
essentially holds that the likelihood function, 1(9x), is the sole basis for Bayesian 
inference as the information brought by an observation x about a parameter, 0, is 
entirely represented and contained in this function. Thus the likelihood plays an 
important role in Bayes' theorem, as it is the function that expresses the degree through 
which the data, x, modifies prior knowledge of 0. 
A P(BIz) 
ý 
Figure 6.5: Updating from prior distribution to posterior distribution via likelihood function 
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Since the natural logarithm function, In, is strictly increasing, the maximum value of 
1(OIx), if it exists, will occur at the same points as the maximum value of ln[I(O fix)]. This 
latter function is called the log likelihood function and in many cases is easier to work 
with than the likelihood function (usually because the probability distribution p(xIO) has 
a product structure). 
6.3.2.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
In the method of maximum likelihood (ML), one tries to find a value 8(x) of the 
parameter 0 that maximises 1(0 x) for each x being observed. If this can be done, then 
9(x) is called a maximum likelihood estimate for 0. Thus: 
0(x) = max l(01 x) (6.20) 
The method is intuitively appealing and represents the backbone of statistical estimation 
(Fisher, 1922) in which one tries to find the values of the parameters that would have 
most likely produced the data were in fact observed. 
6.3.3 Propagation of Information Concepts 
Perhaps the most important aspect of BNs is that they are direct representations of the 
world, not of reasoning processes. The arrows in the diagram represent real causal 
connections and not the flow of information during reasoning, as in rule-based systems. 
Therefore, inferences can be derived from BNs by propagating information in any 
direction. Nonetheless, the hardness of inference follows from the fact that the size of 
the configuration space grows exponentially with the number of the variables that are 
marginalized out. 
A graphical model can greatly simplified the representation of the JPD capturing 
dependencies and independencies between variables. For any BN model, conditional 
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independencies and dependency-separation (i. e., d-separation) are key factors that are 
exploited to make inference tractable in order for evidence propagation and belief 
update to be achieved. In fact, d-separation is another method to determine conditional 
independence. However, conditional independence is defined in terms of probabilities 
and d-separation in terms of paths in a graph. On their basis, large computational 
savings in fast BN update algorithms are also achievable. 
6.3.3.1 Condidonal Independence 
Any probability of interest can be calculated from the JPD of the variables. However, a 
BN not only outputs the graphical representation of a joint probability of the variables, 
it also captures properties of conditional independence (i. e., missing arrows that imply 
no direct influence) between variables (See Section 6.2.2). It is able to take advantage 
of the conditional independencies first to represent joint probabilities more compactly 
and efficiently, before the actual conditional probability distributions are numerically 
specified. It is this combination of qualitative information with quantitative information 
of the numerical parameters that makes probability theory so expressive. In other 
words, this combination takes care of reducing the complexity of the probability to be 
computed, by simplifying probabilistic inference of the network. Conditional 
independence also reduces the size of CPTs. 
For example, given two events A and B, A is independent of B if P(AIB) = P(A). 
Independence is symmetric, and therefore it follows that P(BIA) = P(B). The 
independence of A and B can also be expressed as P(A, B) = P(A)P(B). Also, A is 
conditionally independent of B given another event C if P(AIB, C) = P(AC). 
Conditional independence is symmetric, and therefore it follows that P(BIA, C) = 
P(BIC). Now, when many variables are conditionally independent (as in the case of 
Equation 6.6), calculation of joint probabilities using the chain rule can be simplified 
significantly. As a simple example, if A is conditionally independent of B given C, then 
P(A, B, C) = P(AIB, C)P(BIC)P(C) = P(AIC)P(BIC)P(C). 
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6.3.3.2 D-Separation 
Conditional independence characteristics may also be experienced for two variables in a 
BN if evidence about one cannot influence the other. To determine conditional 
independence in this setting, one must also consider all the undirected paths between the 
two nodes. Any node on any of the paths may "block" the dependence along that path, 
and therefore if all the paths between the two variables are blocked at least once, the 
two nodes will be independent (i. e., dependency separated or d-separated). As such, 
the question as to whether two nodes in a BN can influence each other will depend on 
two issues: the type of connections used on paths between the nodes and the kind of 
evidence that has been received. The evidence transmitted will either be in a form 
considered as follows: 
" Hard evidence (i. e., instantiation) for a node Xis evidence that the state of X is 
definitely a particular value; or 
" Soft evidence (i. e., a new distribution) for a node X is any evidence that enables 
the update of the prior probability values for the states of X. 
In considering a node on a path in the network, one can distinguish three types of 
connection: serial, diverging, and converging, as shown in Figure 6.6. Each 
connection has its own propagation properties as follows: 
" In a serial (head-to-tail) connection (i. e., B -C-; M), any evidence entered at 
node A or node B can be transmitted along the directed or undirected path 
respectively (as in Figure 6.6(a)(i)) providing that no intermediate node C on the 
path is instantiated (which thereby blocks further transmission by d-separation 
as in Figure 6.6(a)(ii)). 
" In a converging (head-to-head) connection (i. e., B )CFA), entering hard 
evidence at node B will update node C but will have no effect on node A 
(Figure 6.6(b)(i)). Evidence can only be transmitted between parents, i. e, nodes 
A and B, when the child (converging) node C has received some evidence 
(which can be soft or hard. See Figure 6.6(b)(ii)). 
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" In a diverging (tail-to-tail) connection (i. e., B FC-A), evidence can be 
transmitted between child nodes, i. e, nodes A and B, of the same parent, i. e., 
node C, providing that the parent is not instantiated (Figure 6.6(c)(i)). 
Otherwise, nodes A and B are conditionally independent (i. e., due to d- 
separation) given evidence at node C (Figure 6.6(c)(ii)). 
More generally, it can be said that two variables A and B are d-separated if for all paths 
between A and B there is an intermediate variable C such that either the connection is: 
" serial or diverging and the state of C is known, or 
" converging and neither C nor its descendants have received evidence. 
(i) C unknown, path unblocked (ii) C known, path BLOCKED 
(a) Serial (head-to-tail) connection 
(i) C unknown, path BLOCKED (ii) C known, path unblocked 
(b) Converging (head-to-head) connection 
(i) C unknown, path unblocked (ii) C known, path BLOCKED 
(c) Diverging (tail-to-tail) connection 
Figure 6.6: Serial, diverging and converging connections to a node Con a path 
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The smallest set of nodes that d-separates two nodes, A and B, is called the cut-set of A 
and B (Pearl, 1988). As demonstrated also, d-separation characterises independence 
arising from lack of evidence as well as evidence. Note that any system for reasoning 
under uncertainty must capture these properties, as they are basic attributes of human 
reasoning (Jensen & Lauritzen, 2000). Thus, the notion of d-separation is crucial for 
understanding how the algorithms for probability propagation in BNs actually work. 
Two variables that are not d-separated are said to be d-connected. 
A significant benefit of the Bayesian paradigm is that additional parameters can easily 
be added to a model without seriously adding to the complexity of the statistical 
analysis, provided that those parameters fit into a conditional independence structure. 
This means that provided the dependence of the new parameters to the existing data and 
parameters can be made explicit, assessing the new parameters is often a simple matter 
of additional computing time. Some of the most common models employed in the 
engineering and sciences (such as hierarchies and networks) typically fall into the 
category of conditional independence models. 
6.3.3.3 Patterns of Inference 
How can one infer the (probabilities of) values of one or more network variables, given 
observed values of others? By mathematics, one has to find P(Q =qIE= e), where Q 
is the query variable set (i. e., those variables that are to be the `output' of the network) 
and c is the set of evidence variables (i. e., those variables that are to be the `input' of the 
network). Based on the choice of Q and c, there are four distinct kinds of inference 
patterns, as described below and shown in Figure 6.7: 
" Diagnosis inferences: From effects to causes, also called abductive inferences, 
bottom-up or backward inference. It is opposite to arc direction such that the 
evidence is an effect and the query is a cause. For example: "What is the most 
probable explanations for the given set of evidence? " 
" Causal inferences: From causes to effects, also called predictive inferences, top- 
down or forward inferences. It is same as arc direction such that the evidence is 
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a cause and the query is an effect. For example: "Having observed a parent 
node B, what is the expectation of its child node A? " 
" Inter-causal inferences: Between causes of a common effect. For example: "If 
C's parents are B,,..., B, , then what is the expectation of B, given both C and 
B? " Namely, what is the belief of the occurrence of one cause on the effect 
given that the other cause is true? The answer is that the presence of one makes 
the other less likely (This phenomenon has been termed "explaining away" 
(Wellman & Henrion, 1993)). 
" Mixed inferences: Combining two or more of the above. 
Query Evidence 
m J 
11 
XQuery 
A, 
Evidence uery Query Q 
(a) Diagnostic (effects to causes) (b) Causal (causes to effects) 
Query Evidence Evidence 
BI C. 0oB. Bt o0o Bm 
Evidence C Query 
Al C. 0o An Al o0o An 
Evidence 
(c) Inter-causal (explaining away) (d) Mixed (or combined) 
Figure 6.7: An illustration of four inference patterns in BNs 
There are basically three types of algorithms for propagating evidence: exact, 
approximate and symbolic (Lauritzen & Spiegelhalter, 1988; Pearl, 1988). By exact 
propagation, it means a method that, apart from precision or round-off errors, computes 
the probability distribution of the nodes exactly. By approximate propagation, it means 
that the answers computed are not exact but, with high probability, lie within some 
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small distance of the correct answer. Finally, symbolic propagation, which computes 
the probabilities in symbolic form, can deal not only with numerical values, but also 
with symbolic parameters. 
6.3.3.4 Belief Update 
Evidence is new information about a random variable that causes a change to its 
probability distribution. Newly available evidence is brought about when a particular 
state of an event happens. The effect of such new evidence will certainly propagate 
throughout the network and thereby cause the posterior probabilities of other events to 
iteratively be recalculated. This is achievable by message posting along the edges 
(Pearl, 1988). Therefore, introducing the notion of evidence is imperative in the 
reasoning with BN. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the real power and 
generalisation of BN is that entered evidence propagates in both directions, even though 
the graph is directed. 
Suppose there is an interest in a given event C (referred to as the query variable) having 
a joint probability P(c), over C. Before any evidence becomes available, the 
propagation process consists of calculating the marginal probabilities P(C; = cs), or 
simple P(c., for each C;. 
Now, suppose some evidence has become available to the event C. In this situation, the 
propagation process consists of calculating the conditional probabilities P(CG = c; lE = e), 
or simple P(cjle), where c is a set of evidential nodes with known values E=e. 
The newly available evidence, c, can be decomposed into two subsets: 
" El+, the subset of E that can be accessed from C, though its parents (top-down), 
i. e., propagates in the direction of the arcs. 
" c; -, the subset of c that can be accessed from C; though its children (bottom-up), 
i. e., propagates against the direction of the arcs. 
For the probability of Cj = c; given that e=e; + for a parent and e= ej for a child: 
- iss- 
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P(c; je) = P(ci 1 e;, er +)= 
P(ei- Icr, e; +)1, (c; J er+) 
P(e, 1 e; +) 
(6.21) 
Since C; d-separates c, from E; + (i. e., E; j jcj+, where 11 stands for d-separation), 
conditional independence can be used to simplify the first term in the numerator and 
then 1/P(e; -I e; +) can be treated as a normalizing constant, z, so that: 
P(c; 1 e) = oc P(e; 1 c; ) P(c; 1 e; +) (6.22) 
According to the Bayes' theorem conventional interpretation (Equation 6.3), posterior is 
prior scaled by likelihood and normalized by evidence (so E (posteriors) = 1), thus 
Equation 6.22 can be rewritten as: 
P(c; I e) = cr )y(cd x; (c; ) (6.23) 
where; 
)y(c; ) represents P(e; - Icd, a message passed onto c; as likelihood evidence; and 
ß; (c1) represents P(c; Ie; +), a message passed onto ci as prior evidence. 
To compute the functions N-(c; ) and 100, suppose a typical node C, has parents B= 
{B,,..., Bm} and children A= {A;..... Aý) (see Figure 6.8). 
4 
E, 
from 
parent 
nodes 
of C 
Ti 
message 
from 
parent 
nodes of 
C 
P(CIE) = P(Cj( PE+) 
1(' 
from 4ic' message 
child from 
nodes ý" o°o "/ ý" child 
of CE nodes of 
Figure 6.8: Evidence propagation via message posting 
C 
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The evidence E; + can be partitioned into m disjoint components, one for each parent of 
Cl: 
+++ E; _ {BBiC ,..., EB. ý 
} (6.24) 
where the evidence sB is the subset of E; + contained in the B-side of the link B; ) C;. 
Similarly, the evidence E; - can be partitioned into n disjoint components, that is: 
E; _ {E ýc ,..., E, ýC 
} (6.25) 
where the evidence g; is the subset of E; contained in the Apside of the link A1<-C,. Bic, 
Then, given an instantiation of b= {bi,..., bm} of the parents of C;, r; (cs) can be 
computed (i. e., top-down propagation) via a recursive solution (Pearl, 1986: Castillo, 
etal., 1997). Likewise, given an instantiation of a= {ai,..., a} of the children of C;, 
)Y(cd can be computed (i. e., bottom-down propagation). 
The CPTs of the events never change by entering new evidence; only the new- 
fangled/belief probability in each of its possible states is determined by the belief 
probability in the states of the nodes to which it is directly connected. The algorithm 
simultaneously updates belief for all the nodes, causing them to become posterior 
probabilities, until the network reaches equilibrium. In other words, the JPD of the 
variables changes each time new information is learnt about the observable variables. 
Such calculations for the propagation of probabilities in a BN are usually tedious 
(Jensen, et al., 1990). Therefore, Hugin is used as the robust BN programming 
environment for modelling and calculations (Jensen, 1993). This software tool allows 
for interactive creation of the network, maintenance of knowledge bases and 
incorporates new, efficient algorithms to support the execution of Bayesian probability 
calculations, thus making a complete probabilistic model. 
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A runtime system provides facilities for easy entering and propagation of information. 
This makes it easy to insert the quantitative data into the network. By running Hugin in 
the compiled mode, it is possible to interact with the network and test whether it works 
properly. In this mode, Hugin calculates prior probabilities for each state in each node 
of the network based on either the qualitative or the quantitative specification of the 
network. Evidence can be entered to the network by manually setting probabilities in 
the network. Each time an input for evidence of change is entered, all the probabilities 
are recalculated. The algorithm repeats until the network reaches equilibrium. In BN 
terminology, this is called propagation of evidence through the network. 
The notion of Bayesian propagation has been around for a long time. However, it is 
only in the last few years that efficient algorithms (Lauritzen & Spiegelhalter, 1988; 
Pearl, 1988) and tools to implement them (Jensen, 1993; SERENE, 1999) have been 
developed. Hence it is only recently that it has been possible to perform propagation in 
networks with a reasonable number of variables. The recent explosion of interest in 
BNs is due to these developments, which mean that for the first time realistic size 
problems can be solved. 
6.4 Influence Diagram 
An influence diagram (ID) was originally a compact representation of a decision tree 
for a symmetric decision scenario: One is faced with a specific sequence of decisions, 
and between each decision one observes a specific set of variables. Nowadays, an ID is 
a BN expanded with utility functions and with variables representing decisions, in order 
to provide decision-making capabilities within the model. The utilities and decisions 
are both represented using nodes of distinguishing shapes in contrast to that of BN 
variables. In fact, the subset of an ID that consists of only chance nodes is a BN. 
Therefore, by definition: 
"ID" = "BN" + {decisions & utilities} 
An ID that uses only these elements is a simple but powerful communication tool, and 
one that can also be used to perform a quantified assessment of the decision problem. It 
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provides an intuitive graphical representation of the decision problem and for it to be 
solved, a strategy (i. e., a decision preference) yielding the highest expected utility has to 
be computed. A strategy is a set of functions; to each decision variable is specified a 
function from which the relevant past returns a decision. The algorithms for probability 
updating can be modified to solving IDs. 
6.4.1 Preferences and Utilities 
Similarly to BNs, IDs are very useful in showing the structure of the domain, that is, the 
structure of the decision problem (Gämez, et al., 2004). The network must be acyclic, 
and there must exist a directed path that contains all decision nodes in the network. 
These decision nodes (usually drawn as rectangles or squares) represent variables that 
are under control of the decision maker and model the decision alternatives available to 
the decision maker. The nodes include a specification of the available decision options 
(i. e., choices). Edges into decision nodes indicate time precedence: an edge from a 
random variable to a decision variable indicates that the value of the random variable is 
known when the decision will be taken, and an edge from one decision variable to 
another indicates the chronological ordering of the corresponding decisions. 
"Utility" is a figure of merit for a decision alternative that reflects how successfully the 
decision-maker's values and preferences will be addressed by implementing that 
alternative. Since decision-makers are interested in making the best possible decisions 
(i. e., the preferences) for an application, utilities are therefore associated with the state 
configurations of the network. Utility nodes (normally drawn as diamond-shaped or 
hexagons) represent these utilities. Each utility node has a utility function that to each 
configuration of states of its parents associates a utility (Utility nodes do not have 
children). Making decisions influences the probabilities of the configurations of the 
network. One can therefore compute the expected utility of each decision alternative 
(the global utility function is the sum of all the local utility functions). The alternative 
with the highest expected utility is chosen; this is known as the maximum expected 
utility (MEU) principle. 
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Figure 6.9: A simple Bayesian decision model 
Figure 6.9 shows a simple ID in which the prior probability distribution of the 
influencing node B determines the conditional probability of the influenced node A. 
The decision D is based on the probability of A, and the utility U is a function of D, 
given the state of B. B and D are independent of each other. 
6.4.2 Maximum Expected Utility 
For an outcome state, S, the expected utility (EU) of a given alternative is that utility of 
a decision-maker facing uncertainty calculated by considering utility in each possible 
outcome state and constructing a weighted average, where the weights are the decision- 
maker's estimate of the probability of each outcome state. In theory then, one can 
imply that: 
"Decision Theory = Probability Theory + Utility Theory" 
In order to assess the decision alternatives in D, a utility table U(D, S) is needed to yield 
the utility for each configuration of decision alternative and outcome state for the 
determining variable. The expected utility (EU) of a given decision alternative d is 
calculated by: 
EU(d) = 1: P(S Id )U(d, S) (6.26) 
s 
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where U(d, S) are the entries of the utility table in the value node U. The conditional 
probability P(SId) is computed from CPT of the determining variable having outcome 
states, seS, given that the decision alternative d is fired. 
There is the presumption from utility theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1964), and 
as well from decision theory (North, 1968; French, 1988), that humankind is rational 
when inferring subjective value (or utility) from choices (or preferences). This implies 
that decision-makers maximise their utility wherever possible. Based on this, two 
principles are then used to determine the existence of the utility function: 
" Utility principle: If a decision-maker obeys the axioms of utility, then there 
exists a real-valued function, U, that operates on states such that U(X) > U(Y) if 
and only if X is preferred to Y and U(X) = U(Y) if and only if there is no 
preference between X and Y. 
" Maximum expected utility (MEU) principle: This implies that a rational 
decision-maker should choose an action that maximises expected utility of 
outcome states. Thus, given that d1, d2,..., dk are the mutually exclusive decision 
alternatives of D, the decision alternative d that gives MEU is: 
MEU(d) = max{EU(d, ), EU(d2),..., EU(dk )} (6.27) 
Evaluation of the ID is done by setting the value of the decision node to a particular 
choice of action (i. e., best risk control option (RCO)), and treating the node just as a 
nature node with a known value that can further influence the values of other nodes. 
The action's utility is calculated, first by calculating the conditional probabilities for the 
parents of the utility node using standard inference algorithm, and then feeding the 
results to the utility function. Hugin will calculate these utilities on the assumption that 
all future decisions will be made in an optimal manner (using all available evidence at 
the time of each decision). Similar considerations also apply to the remaining decisions. 
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Figure 6.10: ID showing decision alternatives and quantified utility 
Figure 6.10 shows the encoded node table for a decision node, D, and a utility node, U. 
D has two alternatives: d, and d2. If a decision is made based on dl, then the expected 
payoff (i. e., U) of outcome states s, and s2 for B is quantified with the value of U(di, s, ) 
and U(d,, s2) respectively. However, if a decision is made based on d2, then U of 
outcome states s, and s2 for B is quantified with the value of U(d2, s, ) and U(d2, s2) 
respectively. The EU (i. e., the sum of the weighted payoffs for the decision alternative) 
for both alternatives can thus be calculated as: 
EU(dj) = P(s, I d, ) U(d,, s, ) + P(sz 1d, ) U(d,, s2) 
EU(d2) = P(s, I d2) U(d2. s, ) + P(s2I d2) U(d2, s2) 
When the values of the variables that are parents of the first decision node in the ID 
have been observed, one expects to know the MEUs for the alternatives of this decision. 
The decision alternative d that provides the MEU is given by: 
MEU(d) = max{EU(d, ), EU(d2)} 
The utility figures are usually given in terms of property, health, finances, liability, 
people, environment, departmental image, public confidence, etc. as applicable to the 
analytical domain. Utility theory can be used in both decision-making under risk 
(where the probabilities are explicitly given) and in decision-making under uncertainty 
(where the probabilities are not explicitly given). The theory can be expanded to 
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application for safety-based marine and offshore decisions through cost-benefit 
evaluation, whereby utmost considerations, for cost-effectiveness, are given to both cost 
and safety (i. e., risk-reduction). In such a case, evaluation of RCOs according to its 
values of Implied Cost of Averting a Fatality (ICAF), rather than the utility figures of an 
outcome state, may enable initial comparing and ranking these options. The more 
attractive options for realisation would be those with the lower ICAFs. The ability to 
map preferences (e. g., RCOs) into a single numerical value for ranking follows from the 
axioms of utility. 
6.5 Proposed Bayesian Network Methodology 
A BN reasoning process has been developed to provide a natural framework for 
maritime risk assessment and decision support. A flow chart of the approach is shown 
in Figure 6.11, and this format ensures that the BN analysis is conducted in a 
disciplined, well managed, and consistent manner that promotes the delivery of quality 
maritime decision-making results. The depth or extent of application of the 
methodology should be commensurate with the nature and significance of the problem. 
Nonetheless, the entire methodology consists of nine key steps that have been 
encapsulated within the following three modules: 
" Module 1: Visual Bayesian Network Modelling (i. e., Steps I and 2). 
" Module 2: Inference Algorithm of Bayesian Analysis (i. e., Steps 3 to 7). 
" Module 3: Reasoning Evaluation via an Influence Diagram (i. e., Steps 8 and 9). 
In building a BN model, one can first focus on specifying the qualitative structure of the 
domain (Module 1) and then on quantifying the influences. When finished, one is 
guaranteed to have a complete specification of the probability distributions. Then 
following evidence propagation (Module 2), an intuitive evaluation for decision-making 
is enabled through added nodes of decisions and utilities (Module 3). Hugin is used as 
the robust BN programming environment for the risk modelling and its probability 
calculations. 
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Figure 6.11: Flow chart of a proposed BN reasoning framework 
It can be recognised that the development for this methodology also provides the 
platform for which ICAF values can be utilised for ranking and choosing the best RCO 
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for a safety-critical maritime system. Explanations for each of the steps in these 
underlying modules are given as follows: 
Step 1- Setting of Domain for Accident Category Information: Very important to 
the BN process is available information and failure data collected from every possible 
source, especially those from regulatory practice, databases and networks, tests, 
experiments physical models, simulations and analytical models. Expert judgement is 
utilised throughout the understanding of the domain and also in assigning valuable 
figures where data are not available. As observed data becomes available it can be used 
to update, refine, or replace the estimates provided by subject matter experts. In this 
sense then, whenever there are uncertainties, e. g. in respect of data or expert judgement, 
the significance of these uncertainties and limitations will be identified, so as to assess 
the degree of reliance which should be placed on the available data. 
Step 2- Creation of Nodes and Establishment of Probabilistic Relations: For the 
first step in constructing the BN, the development of the graphical representation, 
indicating the relevant variables (nodes) and dependencies (arcs), is important, not only 
because it determines the level of detail to be used in the subsequent functional model 
building, but also because it provides a straightforward means of analysing and 
communicating causal assumptions that are not easily expressed using standard 
mathematical notation (Pearl, 2000). 
In general, the problem under consideration is characterised by a number of functions or 
parameters (i. e., the relevant variables). These relate to, for example, a cause event, A, 
or an effect event, B, and can be mapped as labelled nodes into the network pane. 
Identified influence relationships between nodes are established such that an arc 
connection is placed between an influencing (parent) node and an influenced (child) 
node. The terminating arrowhead of the arcs is then set to point at the child nodes. 
Step 3- Formulation of CPTs and Prior Probabilities: The inference consists of 
computing the conditional probabilities with the BN, thus the next step will be to 
specify the states and to input values for a CPT (i. e., the conditional probability matrix) 
of each node. In other words, evidence can be entered to the network by manually 
setting probabilities in the network. The result of the associated tables gives the prior 
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probabilities, such as P(A) and P(B), for the nodes. However, nodes without any 
parents give probabilities that are marginal instead of the conditional ones. 
Step 4- Normalization of Probability Values in the CPT: The probability of 
marginal and conditional terms being true is non-zero and becomes 1 after 
normalization (i. e., The belief values are normalized on a scale from zero to one). Thus, 
the process in this step is to normalize the probability values in every column of CPTs. 
This normalizing (with an encoded inverse value that gives the normalizing constant, cc) 
has to be done independently for each state of each manifestation across the set of 
effects. 
Step 5- Processing of Data via Bayesian Inference Induction: The Bayesian 
inference is enabled via the formula: P(A (B) = oc L(A IB) P(A), which indicates that the 
likelihood function, L(A(B), is the instrument to pass from prior probability distribution, 
P(A), to posterior probability distribution, P(A(B), via Bayes' theory. L(AMB) is induced 
via LP. 
Step 6- Propagation of Evidence: One has to keep in mind that entered evidence 
propagates in both directions, even though the graph is directed. 
Step 7- Generation of Posterior Probabilities: The beliefs computed after evidence 
is entered to improve the state of knowledge and thus the prior probability values are 
updated by calculating revised/updated probabilities, referred to as the posterior 
probabilities, P(AIB). Posterior marginal probabilities, P(A) and P(B) can be obtained 
via the marginalization process. 
If feedback is required due to availability of new data, then the calculated posterior 
probabilities may become the new prior probabilities for future risk assessment. 
However, they proceed forward to provide basis for action. 
Step 8- Creation of Decision Node(s) for Preferred RCOs: Initialising the network 
retracts all findings entered in the risk analysis domain. An ID should be constructed so 
that one can see exactly which variables (represented by discrete chance nodes) are 
known at the point of deciding for each decision node. Where the state of a chance 
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node is known at the time of making a decision, one must add a link from the chance 
node to the decision node. Where the state of a chance node is known before some 
given decision, and this chance node has impact on another chance node which is also 
known before the decision, only the last chance node needs to have a link to the 
decision node. This means that their only need to be a directed path from a chance node 
to a decision node if the chance node is known before the decision is made. 
Evaluation of the ID is done by setting the value of the decision node to a particular 
choice of action (i. e., best RCO), and treating the node just as a nature node with a 
known value that can further influence the values of other nodes. 
Step 9- Creation of Utility Node(s) for Values of Achievable Benefits: The action's 
utility is calculated, first by calculating the conditional probabilities for the parents of 
the utility node using the standard inference algorithm, and then feeding the results to 
the utility function. The utility figures can be given in terms of property, health, 
finances, liability, people, environment, public confidence, etc. When propagating, one 
can follow the expected utility of choosing each decision in the next decision node in 
the decision sequence in the node list pane. The best of the RCOs provides the MEU or 
lowest ICAF value. Hence, the ranking of the RCOs resulting from the domain case 
study can be used by decision-makers at all levels and in a variety of contexts without a 
requirement of specialist expertise. 
6.6 Maritime Application of Reasoning in Bayesian Models 
To illustrate the universal applicability of BNs and IDs to decision problems, it is best 
to imagine trying to model a situation in which causality plays a role but where an 
understanding of what is actually going on is incomplete. Thus things need to be 
described probabilistically and by inference. Therefore, the demonstration of the 
modelling and reasoning perspective of this powerful tool is given in the following 
settings: 
9A typical ship evacuation scenario (a marine case study). 
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" Authorised vessels to floating, production, storage and offloading (FPSO) 
installation collision scenario (an offshore case study). 
6.6.1 Case Study of an Typical Evacuation Scenario 
The safety of people onboard a ship in distress is very much dependent on effective 
emergency escape, evacuation and rescue (EER) operational system (final barrier to 
avoid fatalities) being in place and being enabled in due time. As the EER system in 
place would have to be activated due to the occurrence of some major accident 
situations, a risk contribution tree (RCT) of the underlying situations may well provide 
a suitable platform for putting out a BN evacuation model. The RCT of Figure 4.10 in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.7.1 provides such a modelling platform. However, conditional 
probabilities where not deduced during the trial FSA study, which makes it difficult to 
model this RCT scenario with confidence. Besides, eliciting conditional probabilities 
can be quite problematic without expert being available to provide such inputs and 
sound logic or techniques. As such, a generic solution is being modelled to provide an 
insight of BN modelling to the marine and offshore industry. 
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Figure 6.12: Risk contribution from major hazards leading to a marine evacuation scenario 
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A generic RCT for effecting the evacuation modelling is shown in Figure 6.12. It 
comprises a contribution fault tree and an escalation event tree for the accident category 
of fire, collision and flooding events, together with an evacuation event tree relevant to 
the accident categories. Each contribution fault tree of the RCT also has the integration 
of influencing factors (e. g., technical, organisational and human factors (See Chapter 1, 
Section 1.2.2)). 
The frequency (F) and the potential loss of life (PLL) values shown in Figure 6.12 
represent some generic data that may be derived for these critical events from an 
incident database. Frequency distributions need to be converted into probability 
distributions for use in BN, while the PLLs can be applied in cost effectiveness 
calculations for use in ID. Since a failure frequency, F, in marine assessments is well 
expressed in terms of per vessel operating year, the overall F values in the RCT can be 
considered as their failure rate, A, value. If the failure were to follow an exponential 
distribution, then Equation 2.4 in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3 can be applied to obtain the 
equivalent probability values for the failure states. This distribution may be used in this 
case study RCT since it is similar to the discrete Poisson distribution when the 
occurrence of the event is zero. So for example, given that a ship has an operational life 
expectancy of 25 years, evacuation being necessary can be calculated as: 
P(evacuation) = 1- e-{1.75 x 10 
-2 x 25) = 0.355 
For some typical EER operation, a free-fall lifeboat and a rescue boat may be utilised. 
Thus, a simplified evacuation model to ensure the safety of people onboard a vessel in a 
distress situation can be represented by the BN model in Figure 6.13. Most importantly, 
the aim of this model and the proceeding analysis is to show how BN can be applied in 
marine risk assessment whilst at the same time giving a clearer picture of how a BN 
model actually works. 
Figure 6.13: Simplified BN showing a marine evacuation scenario 
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To start with, this case study setting has been modelled in a perspective such that, 
"evacuation being necessary" does not imply that free-fall lifeboat will not be launched, 
but that there is a high probability on their launch (or usage). This is modelled in the 
BN by filling in a CPT for the `free fall lifeboat" node (Figure 6.14). 
ý 
Edit Functions View 
Evacuation Unnecessary Necessary 
No launch 0.92 '0.04 
Launch 0.08 10.96 
Figure 6.14: CPT for "free-fall lifeboat" 
This CPT is actually the conditional probability of the variable `free fall lifeboat" given 
the variable "evacuation". The possible values (launch or no launch) for `free fall 
lifeboat" are shown in the first column. Note that a probability is provided for each 
combination of events (four in this case). The particular values in this table suggest that 
the use/launch of free-fall lifeboat(s) is unlikely to increase (8% chance), but once 
evacuations are necessary, their use is very likely to increase (96% chance). Now let 
the use/launch of rescue boat(s) be considered. To model the uncertainty about whether 
or not the use of rescue boat(s) will increase when evacuation is necessary, added to the 
graph is a new node "rescue boat" and an arc from "evacuation" to the new node. 
Although there might not be a great chance that the free-fall lifeboats will not be 
launched, the rescue boats may not respond quickly in this setting of the evacuation. 
Therefore, the CPT for "rescue boat" (Figure 6.15) is different from the one for `free- 
fall lifeboat". 
tI T1 
Edit Functions View 
Evacuation Unnecessary Necessary 
No launch 10.95 0.35 
Launch 10.05 0.65 
Figure 6.15: CPT for "rescue boat" 
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The CPT associated with the node "evacuation" is somewhat different in nature. This 
node has no "parent" node in this example, and consequently, only needs to be assigned 
a CPT without conditions (Figure 6.16). 
ý 
Edit Functions View 
Unnecessary! O. 645 
Necessary 0.355 
Figure 6.16: CPT for "evacuation" 
Determining the probabilities of CPTs is done in several ways. In an instance as this 
example, it might be a simple case of assigning the probabilities based on the statistical 
data obtained from a marine incident database, or from experts with good experience to 
predict the subjective probabilities. 
Having entered the probabilities, the BN can now be used to do various types of 
analysis. The most important use of BN in this case study is in revising probabilities in 
the light of actual observations of events (in BN modelling, these are called evidences 
for the maritime BN). 
The values of these conditional probabilities can be used to obtain the unconditional 
probabilities. For example, the unconditional probability that free-fall lifeboats will be 
launched can be calculated as follows: 
P(free fall lifeboat' launch) = (P(free-fall lifeboat' launch I 
no-evacuation) x P(no-evacuation)) + (P(free-fall lifeboat' launch 
evacuation) x P(evacuation)) 
= (0.08 x 0.645) + (0.96 x 0.355) = 4.322 
The rule used here to compute the unconditional probability is called marginal 
probability. Now the unconditional probability that free-fall lifeboats will be launched 
is known to be 0.392 (i. e., 39.2%). 
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By running the BN for this evacuation scenario, as can be seen in Figure 6.17, Hugin 
gives to the left its the node list pane and to the right the modelled network pane. The 
monitor window placed near corresponding node in the network pane gives exactly the 
same as those in the node list pane, thus they are not always necessary (as they can take 
up too much space). They are used mainly for nodes that have special interest. As can 
be seen from the node list pane, as well as that in the monitor window, the 
unconditional probability that rescue boats will be launched is 26.3%. 
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Figure 6.17: BN showing results for unconditional probabilities in evacuation scenario 
Here comes the reasoning exquisiteness of BNs. Suppose the launching of free-fall 
lifeboat is known to increase. In this case the evidence that `free fall lifeboat = launch" 
is entered, and then this evidence can be used to determine: 
" The updated probability of evacuation taking place. 
" The updated probability that the use of rescue boat also increases. 
Using Bayes' rule, the probability of evacuation taking place can be calculated as: 
P(evacuation I free fall lifeboat' launch) 
P(' free - fall lifeboat'launch I evacuation) x P(evacuation) 
P(' free - falllifeboat'launch) 
= 0.96 x 0.355/0.392 = 0.869 
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Using marginal probability, the probability that there will be rescue boat launch (see 
Figure 6.18) can be calculated as: 
P('rescue boat' launch) = (P('rescue boat' launch I no-evacuation) x 
P(no-evacuation)) + (P('rescue boat' launch I evacuation) x 
P(evacuation)) 
= (0.05 x 0.131) + (0.65 x 0.869) = 0,571 
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Figure 6.18: BN showing propagated results when free-fall lifeboat is launched 
fi 
Entering pieces of evidence and using them to update the probabilities in this way is 
called propagation. Figure 6.18 shows the results with "evidence" node for free-fall 
lifeboats being launched represented by an evidence bar in both the node list pane and 
in its monitor window in Hugin. As would be expected, the probability of evacuation 
taking place increases dramatically to 86.9%, when the launch of free-fall lifeboats has 
been observed. This update is due to diagnosis (i. e., bottom-up) inference from the 
`free fall lifeboats" node to the "evidence" node. Furthermore, the updated probability 
of evacuation taking place results in bringing up the probability for launching of rescue 
boats to 57.1 %, by way of causal (i. e., top-down) inference. 
Now, there lies the provision that the major marine accident of fire, collision and 
flooding, which are often variables for external factors, may lead to evacuation. The use 
of such information has to imply that a new node is created and added as parents to the 
evacuation node, for each of these accident categories (Figure 6.19). 
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Evacuation 
Flooding 
Figure 6.19: Fire, collision and flooding added as parent nodes of evacuation 
These new root nodes (i. e., nodes without parents) of evacuation require a CPT without 
conditions, as they do not have other influence acting on them (Figure 6.20). 
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Sinking 0.09 
Figure 6.20: CPT for each parent node of evacuation 
For the evacuation node, on the other hand, an expanded new CPT is used to reflect the 
fact that it is now conditional on its three parent nodes (i. e., "fire", "collision" and 
`flooding"). In other words, the evacuation CPT provides "P(evacuation I fire, 
collision, flooding)" (See Figure 6.21). 
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Figure 6.21: New evacuation CPT reflecting conditional probabilities due to parent nodes 
Given that in the event of fire or/and flooding an alarm will be triggered, a suitable 
alarm node as child node (shown as the highlighted nodes in Figure 6.22) can each be 
linked from the nodes of "fire" and `flooding" respectively. 
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Figure 6.22: A suitable alarm added as individual child node to fire and flooding 
Since each of the new alarm node acts on entirely different accident events, their 
respective CPT provides input values of different conditional probabilities (Figure 
6.23). 
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Figure 6.23: CPT for individual alarm nodes of fire and flooding 
Analysing from the fact that the JPD "P(evacuation, fire, collision, flooding)" is known, 
the unconditional probability that evacuation is necessary, "P(evacuation)" can be given 
by marginalizing out the "fire", "collision" and `flooding" variables. Hugin computes 
the marginal probability as 35.54% or 0.355 (Figure 6.24). Note that Hugin also gives 
the values of 0.304 and 0.19 as the marginal probability of the "fire alarm" and 
`flooding alarm" respectively. 
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Figure 6.24: BN showing marginalised probabilities of evacuation node and its parents 
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In this initialised situation, the root nodes are characterised by their prior probabilities. 
It is shown in Figure 6.24 that the probability of fire being in its destructive state is 
0.20, the probability of collision being in its capsize state is 0.19, and the probability of 
flooding being in its sinking state is 0.09. Suppose it is observed that, "evacuation is 
necessary", then this entered evidence increases the belief in all of the possible causes 
(namely "destructive" for fire, "capsize" for collision, and "sinking" for flooding) based 
on diagnostic inference. Specifically, applying Bayes theorem yields a revised 
probability for fire in destructive state of 0.388 (up from the prior probability of 0.20), a 
revised probability for collision in capsize state of 0.374 (up from the prior probability 
of 0.19), and a revised probability for flooding in sinking state of 0.217 (up from the 
prior probability of 0.09) (Figure 6.25). Nonetheless, these revised probabilities are 
subject to change by the provision of some additional observation(s), for example: 
" The additional evidence firmly on the vessel sinking due to flooding; or 
" The additional evidence that the fire alarm is activated. 
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Figure 6.25: BN showing propagated results of evacuation evidence to its parent nodes 
If additional evidence would be firmly on the vessel "sinking due to flooding" as the 
more likely cause, then adding this evidence and applying Bayes' rule would cause the 
increased probability of "destruction by fire" and "capsize by collision" to drop to 0.208 
and 0.20 respectively (as shown by the monitor windows of Figure 6.26), thus 
`explaining away' the "destruction by fire" and "capsize by collision" as a cause for the 
evacuation. This phenomenon is due to inter-causal inference. 
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Figure 6.26: BN showing propagated results of both evacuation and flooding evidence 
Conversely, if it is discovered that the fire alarm is activated, then entering this evidence 
and applying Bayes' rule would yield the revised probabilities of 0.83 for destruction by 
fire, 0.259 for capsize by collision and 0.144 for sinking by flooding (as shown by the 
monitor windows of Figure 6.27). Thus the odds are that the destructive fire, rather 
than capsize due to collision and sinking due to flooding, has caused the evacuation to 
be necessary. Once again, it is said that the necessary evacuation has been `explained 
away'. 
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Figure 6.27: BN showing propagated results of both evacuation and fire alarm evidence 
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Figure 6.28: BN showing evacuation evidence propagation to free-fall lifeboats and rescue boats 
Now, going back to when only evacuation being necessary is observed, the launch of 
the free-fall lifeboats and rescue boat are seen to have a probability of 0.96 and 0.65 
respectively (Figure 6.28) as induced by causal inference. However, when the 
additional evidence of `flooding by sinking" is entered, these respective probabilities 
remain unchanged (Figure 6.29). It is said that the "evacuation" node d-separates all of 
its respective parent nodes from each other. 
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Figure 6.29: Flooding and evacuation evidence propagation to lifeboats and rescue boats 
The notion of d-separation (which follows from human perception) can also be noticed 
where only evidence is given for `flooding by sinking". In this case, evacuation being 
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necessary increases from a probability of 0.355 (see Figure 6.24) to 0.856 (Figure 6.30), 
but the probability values in the nodes for "fire" and "collision" stay the same (refer to 
Figure 6.24) as they are not the cause for the increase in probability of the "evacuation" 
being necessary. Thus, the path from the "flooding" node to these other nodes is 
blocked at the evacuation node. However, the probability values for the launch of free- 
fall lifeboats being 0.393 and rescue boat being 0.263 (Figure 6.17) increase to 0.834 
and 0.564 respectively (Figure 6.30). 
From the analysis so far, although the launch of "free-fall lifeboat" and "rescue boat" 
both depend on "evacuation" being necessary, "rescue boat" launch appears to output a 
probability value that is less than that of the `free fall lifeboat" launch. The risk analyst 
has the opportunity to do something about this outcome situation. Thus, a decision 
node that depends upon the rescue boat is added into the model, thereby converting the 
network into an ID. This new type of node will permit the modelling of an effective 
decision-support solution that outputs optimal survival for those onboard the vessel. 
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Figure 630: BN showing evidence of flooding being propagated to evacuation 
Before the ID is finished, a utility function, which gathers information for the potential 
benefits that come with the different implementation options, and as well, enabling the 
risk analyst to calculate the expected utility of the optimal survival, needs to be 
specified. Given the outcome state of `free fall lifeboat', a value node of life-saving, 
based on the value of lives saved, is created for specifying these quantitative benefits as 
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a function of the decision. Figure 6.31 presents the overall view of this evacuation 
domain ID. 
Figure 631: Simplified ID showing a marine evacuation domain 
Where a formal safety assessment study has been undertaken for such an evacuation 
scenario, various RCOs can be identified as decision alternatives based on their cost 
effectiveness. For the purpose of this case study, the optimal survival node has been 
issued with four hypothetical alternatives, RCO1, RCO2, RCO3 and RCO4, for which 
the utility value of saving life for the "launch" of "free fall lifeboat" is specified as 
£0.25M, £0.26M, £0.24M and £0.23M respectively. The "no launch" case, on the other 
hand, is quantified as £0.008M, £0.007M, £0.009M and £0.008M respectively. 
Figure 6.32 shows the quantitative inputs for both the optimal survival decision node 
and the life-saving utility node (unit is in 106 GBP). As seen, the tabular format for the 
decision node for optimal survival gives just the listing of the entire decision 
alternatives. 
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Figure 632: Encoded Inputs In both the node of optimal survival and life-saving 
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Hugin can then calculate the expected utility (EU) for all of the RCOs as follows: 
EU(RCO) = P(no-launch of lifeboat I RCO) x U(RCO, no-launch of 
lifeboat) + P(launch of lifeboat I RCO) x U(RCO, launch of lifeboat) 
When no observations are made, the EU values for RCOI, RCO2, RCO3 and RCO4 are 
assigned with £O. I OM, £0.11 M, £0. l OM and £0. I OM respectively (Figure 6.33). On 
another note, if a RCO implies large economic benefits with safety implications, it 
would display a lower Net Cost of Averting a Fatality (Net CAF). Thus, Net CAF may 
be used in place of EU to identify which RCOs are justifiable from a commercial or 
combined commercial and safety point of view. 
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Figure 633: ID showing initialised values for optimal survival EU 
Flooding 
R 
Once any observation is made, it propagates the evidence by message passing and 
therefore updates the free-fall lifeboat probability. This, in turn, recalculates the EU 
values for the four decision alternatives. As the best RCOs are those that give the 
MEUs of optimal survival decision, the RCOs can be ranked accordingly for use in the 
decision-making process. The MEU is calculated as: 
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MEU(RCO) = maoc{EU(RCOI), EU(RCO2), EU(RCO3), EU(RCO4)} 
In a worst-case scenario, collision might cause damage to the structural integrity of the 
vessel. As a result, capsize and flooding might upshot into the sinking of the ship. 
Since those onboard the vessel need to survive such a disaster, the RCOs for optimal 
survival are given a ranking profile according to their MEU. The MEU order ranking is 
RCO2 (£0.23M), RCOI (£0.22M), RCO3 (£0.21M) and RCO4 (£0.20M), as shown in 
the monitor window in Figure 6.34. Thus, the recommendation is for RCO2 and RCOI 
to be given top priority with respect to implementation of the optimal survival strategy. 
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Figure 6.34: ID showing propagated results of both collision and flooding 
A number of entered evidence circumstances for this model can be investigated. For 
example, even with the accidental evidence of all root nodes entered, the calculated 
MEU emerges again with a ranking order of the RCOs as RCO2, RCOI, RCO3 and 
RCO4, although higher MEU values are reached in this setting (as displayed in the node 
list pane of Figure 6.35). 
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Figure 635: ID showing optimal survival MEU after entered evidence on all key root nodes 
In the initialised situate however, it is imperative to determine how "sensitive" the BN 
evacuation model output node results for "evacuation", "free fall lifeboat", "rescue 
boat" and "optimal survival" are to the input change in variation between the range of 
lowest and highest possible value that each key event node of "fire", "collision" or 
`flooding" (as well as any combination of these events) can take. If the model follows 
the real-world phenomena, then an increase/decrease in the rate or probability at which 
of any of its input event(s) may occur would certainly result in the effect of a relative 
increase/decrease in the rate or probability of occurrence of its output events. 
For example, a partial sensitivity analysis for ±20% change to the probability of fire 
spreading can provide a more realistic setting for which risk analysts and decision 
makers can well determine the response in terms of change in magnitude and direction 
of the resulting output events. To conduct this sensitivity analysis, the lowest 
probability value in the range, which is 0.16 (i. e., -20% of the initial probability of fire 
spreading value), replaces the initial input value of 0.20 and then using marginal 
probability, the probability of evacuation being necessary, free-fall lifeboat launch and 
rescue boat launch is calculated as 0.339 (= -4.7% change), 0.378 (= -3.7% change) 
and 0.253 (z -3.8% change) respectively (See Figure 6.36). Likewise, the MEU for 
optimal survival becomes £O. IOM for RCOI, £0.1 OM for RCO2, £0.10M for RCO3 and 
£0.09M for RCO4. 
Fire alarm )( Evacuation 
Chapter 6- Bayesian Network Modelling 
8© evacuation 
Collision 
A Evacuation 
O 66.14 Unnecessary 
33.66 Necessary 
H Fire 
84 00 Cor aln. d 
I 1600 Sprsading 
[ FWs alarm 
" Flooding 
[R Flooding Warm 
B Free-fall I*boat 
INKD 62.20 No launch 
D 37.60 Launch 
H 40 Resue boat 
74.69 No launch 
D 25.31 Launch 
H0 Optimal suMVW 
I=m 0.10 RCO I 
E 0,10 RCO 2 
I=m 0,10 RCO 3 
CIM 0.09 RCO 4 
Free-tall lifeboat 
Free-fall Iftboat 
52.20 No launch 
37.80 Launch 
Evacuation 
ý14 Unnecessar 
33.86 Necessary 
Evacuation 
Optimal survival 
Figure 636: ID showing model output values for an initialised -20% of P(flre spreading) 
In repeating the sensitivity analysis calculation after substituting the highest probability 
value in the range, which is 0.24 (i. e., +20% of the initial probability of fire spreading 
value), the probability of evacuation being necessary, free-fall lifeboat launch and 
rescue boat launch is calculated as 0.372 (Aý +4.7% change), 0.406 (z +3.7% change) 
and 0.273 (z +3.8% change) respectively (See Figure 6.37). Similarly, the MEU for 
optimal survival becomes £0.11 M for RCOI , 
£0.11 M for RCO2, £0. I OM for RCO3 and 
£0.1 OM for RCO4. 
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Figure 6.37: ID showing model output values for an initialised +20% of P(flre spreading) 
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Figure 638: Effect of varying P(rire spreading) for optimal survival ranking 
From the sensitivity study, the effects of the ±20% variation in P(fire spreading) reveal 
that this input parameter is a linear function with respect to the probability of the 
evacuation model outputs. Although the decision for optimal survival is sensitive to the 
state value of lire spreading), it does not quite reveal the ranking order in the ±20% 
variation setting. 
To well establish the best ranking order for Pyre spreading), a graphical form of the 
sensitivity analysis may be considered. Based on just varying Pyre spreading) through 
[0,1], as can be seen in Figure 6.38, it is clear that RCO2 gives the best decision 
alternative whilst RCO4 gives the worst option to implement. RCOJ appears to overlap 
with RCO3, but in the region of Pyre spreading) equals 0.0 to 0.1 and 0.9 to 1.0, RCO1 
can clearly be identified as a definite better option over RCO3. Therefore, the overall 
decision alternative ranking based on Pure spreading) is given as RCO2, RCOJ, RCO3 
and RCO4. 
6.6.2 Case Study of Authorised Vessels to FPSO Collision Scenario 
To offload oil for shipment to market, a ship-shaped FPSO vessel that is being stationed 
in one location, will typically be routinely serviced by authorised supply/standby 
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vessels and shuttle tankers moored at the stern of the FPSO. Collisions involving 
authorised shuttle tankers with that of the FPSO vessel are known to occur in the North 
Sea (Chen & Moan, 2002). FPSO vessels have a risk profile different from fixed 
platforms and commercial trading tankers and in addition, passing ships also pose a 
collision risk if an FPSO vessel is close to a sailing route. 
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Figure 639: Fault tree to estimate frequency of collisions of an FPSO by authorised vessels 
The frequency of collision between a shuttle tanker and an installation, or storage unit, 
is estimated to be 0.0046/year due to failure of the dynamic positioning system. It is 
assumed that 20 percent (i. e., 0.0009/year) of shuttle tanker collisions occur after 
loading operations are complete and the fully loaded vessel is leaving the field 
(Husky Oil, 2000). This relatively low percentage is due to the fact that the shuttle 
tanker is holding and maintaining position, in order to achieve loading, and is aware of 
the installation's location. In addition, it is usual practice to perform shuttle tanker 
loading operations at a safe distance from the facility. The remaining 80 percent (i. e., 
0.0037/year) of shuttle tanker collisions are assumed to occur while the tanker is empty 
and on approach to the facility. The failure of the dynamic positioning system on a 
maintenance support vessel, causing a collision, is estimated to be 0.0137/year 
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(Husky Oil, 2000). Figure 6.39 gives the fault tree to estimate frequency of collisions 
of an FPSO by authorised vessels. 
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Figure 6.40: BN of authorised vessels-FPSO collision scenario with conditional probability tables 
The evaluation of an FPSO's collision and contact damage risks needs some special 
technique(s), thus a BN, as shown in Figure 6.40, is created in Hugin to model this 
scenario for the FPSO not being able to take measures in avoiding a collision by the 
authorised vessels manoeuvring within close proximity of it. With the ship lifetime and 
overall production system very conservatively set to 20 years of operation for a lifetime 
probability in the Bayesian analysis, appropriate probabilities were assigned into the 
conditional probability tables (CPT) of each node in the model domain. These were 
based on the failure rates derived from WOAD Statistical Report (1998) (see Table 6.1) 
and from the assessments carried out in Husky Oil (2000). 
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Table 6.1: Probability values from failure frequency for offshore mobile units during 1980-97 
Type of Accident 
Failure frequency of 
mobile units (1000 
unit-years) 
Probability (at t= 
20yrs) 
Anchor failure 8.35 0.15 
Blowout 10.73 0.19 
Capsize 6.56 0.12 
Collision 2.78 0.05 
Contact 11.53 0.21 
Crane accident 4.07 0.08 
Explosion 2.78 0.05 
Falling load 8.05 0.15 
Fire 13.02 0.23 
Foundering 5.27 0.10 
Grounding 3.18 0.06 
Helicopter accident 0.60 0.01 
Leakage 3.28 0.06 
List 5.86 0.11 
Machinery failure 1.39 0.03 
Off position 11.53 0.21 
Spill/release 9.44 0.17 
Structural damage 17.09 0.29 
Towing accident 5.86 0.11 
Well problem 14.01 0.24 
Other 2.48 0.05 
When the net is compiled in "run" mode (Figure 6.41), the ship-FPSO collision network 
window is split into two by a vertical separation and this gives the initial situation to the 
left with the node list pane and to the right with the network pane. The probabilities of 
a node in a certain state are viewed double clicking it in the node list pane. 
Given the information that collision with the FPSO takes place, the probability of the 
shuttle tanker and the support vessel being in a loss of position failure state can be 
found. This fact is entered by double clicking the state "impact" of the Collision- 
"FPSO" node (Figure 6.42). The figure shows the probability of the shuttle tanker 
being lost while empty to be most disturbing quantity of the "Shuttle Tanker" node (i. e., 
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49.75%). Likewise, the "Support Vessel" node now indicates an increase in failure 
probability to 64.77%. 
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Figure 6.41: Initial Situation in the BN of authorised vessels-FPSO collision scenario 
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Figure 6.42: Probability of Impact for Collision-"FPSO" set to 100% 
If it is taken that the shuttle tanker completely (100%) maintains its position, then it can 
be seen as in Figure 6.43 that the support vessel would have failed drastically in 
positioning fault (i. e. 91.70%) for there to be a 100% collision impact on the FPSO. 
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Figure 6.43: Collision ~FPSO" Impact probability set to 100% in Shuttle Tank maintained position 
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On another note, where collision on the FPSO occurs at either the shuttle tanker being 
lost while empty (Figure 6.44) or whilst full (Figure 6.45), then the Support Vessel node 
indicates a 50: 50 chance of having a positioning fault or maintaining its position. 
® Authorised vessel FPSO Collision 
R Collision-'FPSO' 
100.00 Impact 
- Missed 
H 40 Shuns Tanker 
0 Loss while Full 
Maintaining Position 
B" Support Vessel 
INED 50.47 Positioning FauN 
IN= 49.53 Maintaining Position 
Figure 6.44: Collision-"FPSO" impact probability set to 100% in Shuttle Tank loss while empty 
8 to Authorised_Vessel_FPSO_Collision 
H 40 COQIBIon-'FPSO' 
100,00 Impact 
- Missed 
8 40 Shuttle Tanker 
- Lose while Empty 
Maintaining Position 
0 40 8uppwtVessel 
49.33 Positioning Fault 
50.67 Maintaining Position 
Figure 6.45: Collision-"FPSO" impact probability set to 100% in Shuttle Tank loss while full 
Evidence identified for nodes being in any state can be added as a node with the links 
attached from it to these nodes. Some resulting events known to occur due to collision 
with an FPSO have been identified herein. Some of these, as highlighted in Figure 6.46, 
include spills/release, ignition, explosion and human injury. Note that the probability 
values shown in the figure are those for the initial situation in the "run" mode. 
When the collision-to-FPSO is set at 100% impact, except that for the Ignition node, the 
failure probability value of each highlighted node is increased (as shown in 
Figure 6.47). Those that have significantly increased by a wider margin are especially 
the Spill/Release node and the Human Injury node. The Ignition node has remained the 
same in probability value, since it is only a piece of evidence for explosion and fire 
outbreak and not a resulting incident of the collision to the FPSO in this scenario. 
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Figure 6.46: Addition of evidence and resulting events from the Collision-"FPSO" situation 
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Figure 6.47: Situation for resulting events from Collision-"FPSO" impact probability set to 100% 
With the Explosion node set to a failure of 100% blast during a 100% impact on 
collision with the FPSO, the probability of 96.66% indicates a high amount in certainty 
for a structural damage to happen (Figure 6.48). The same can be said for the Human 
Injury node, which now has a probability value of 84.26% for being harmed. As such a 
great deal of attention will have to be paid to increasing safety for these represented 
nodes. Thus, the risk analyst and decision makers might find it appropriate to consider 
modelling out an ID for explosion. 
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Figure 6.48: Situation for resulting events with Collision-"FPSO" and explosion failure set to 
100% 
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Figure 6.49: Some added typical evidence for a shuttle tanker loss of position 
Other such pieces of typical evidence as the human element (with states such as "error" 
and "intervention"), weather condition (with sea states of "calm", "harsh" "adverse" and 
"severe") (see Figure 6.49), electrical/electronic aspects, etc., can be made into new 
nodes and added to diversify the range of the BN applicability in this scenario. 
The scenario settings for this case study can enable a dominant decision in a marine and 
offshore risk assessment study. Nonetheless, as extensions to the scenario network may 
Human Factor Weather Condition 
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lie in the discrepancy of the risk analyst and decision makers, the author has chosen to 
keep the network to an acceptable size. It is best however, that the risk analyst is aware, 
in tackling a scenario effectively, of being twisted in the complexities that very large 
BNs bring. 
6.7 Benefits and Limitations of Bayesian Networks 
In Bayesian networks, each representation possesses particular advantages and 
disadvantages which make it more, or less, suitable for its intended purpose. These 
have been recognised and thus outlined in Sections 6.8.1 and 6.8.2 respectively. 
6.7.1 Strengths of Bayesian Networks 
The Bayesian framework offers several advantages over alternative modelling 
approaches. The most important of these advantages are: 
" It provides intuitive visual representation with a sound mathematical basis in 
Bayesian probability that translates genuine cause and effect relationship. 
" Being probabilistic in its approach, it facilitates a meaningful communication of 
uncertainty. It is consistent with the risk assessment paradigm, and allows 
decisions to be made based on expected values. 
" It is capable of combining diverse data, expert judgement and empirical data. 
By incorporating expert judgment, the method is not paralysed by a lack of 
observational data. 
" It allows easy updating of prediction and inference in a statistically rigorous 
manner when observations of model variables are made. Deleting or adding 
new information does not also require the whole network to be revised. 
" The assessment endpoints are chosen so that they are of vital interest to 
stakeholders and decision-makers and can be easily conceived in terms of utility 
for use in formal decision analysis. 
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These particular advantages offered by BNs make it very useful in situations where 
uncertainty is unavoidable - Bayesian methods provide a mechanism to model the 
uncertainty. Thus, such methods can also be used where normal optimisation and 
decision-making techniques are difficult to apply. 
6.7.2 Difficulties of Using Bayesian Networks 
In spite of their remarkable power and potential to address inferential processes, there 
are some inherent limitations and liabilities to BNs. These drawbacks include the 
following: 
" They cannot easily incorporate unobserved variables, owing to the fact that the 
size of the internal CPT for a child node can very quickly become quite large. 
" There is computational complexity/difficulty (filling in of details of numerical 
recipe, computer time, convergence monitoring), which is exponential in the 
number of nodes. These complex models with large numbers of parameters, 
which are often referred to as non parametric (NP), become NP-hard in 
complexity as they approach general multiply-connected networks. 
" Likelihood functions are not always solvable analytically (Rather, heuristics are 
extensively used in practice). 
The complexity of inference is usually associated with large probabilistic dependencies 
recorded during inference. However, a large model is preferable to a smaller one only if 
it provides a sufficiently large improvement of fit to offset the penalty for its additional 
complexity. 
6.8 Concluding Remarks 
A BN could be used to model the components that affect risk and how they interact. 
Besides, its graphical nature makes the assessment model intuitive for users to 
understand. The process of performing Bayesian updating involves selecting a prior 
probability distribution, calculating the normalizing constant, formulating the likelihood 
function, and then calculating the posterior probability distribution. The likelihood 
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function incorporates the objective information whilst the prior distribution can include 
subjective information known about the distributions of the model parameters. 
Therefore, the posterior distribution incorporates both the objective and subjective 
information into the distributions of the model parameters. Hence, BNs are well suited 
for modelling maritime safety-critical systems prediction and risk analysis. 
The proposed BN methodology has been used to combine evidence from different 
information sources for the quantitative assessment of a generic ship evacuation 
scenario and that of authorised vessels to FPSO installation collision via the Hugin 
program tool. This program software allowed for the probabilities of states of nodes 
based on observed information to be adjusted and it propagated such changes through 
the network to update the conditional probabilities at each node. It was also possible to 
show all the implications and results of a complex Bayesian argument based on the 
underlying Bayes' theorem. This theorem is the fundamental principle governing the 
process of logical Bayesian inference that determined what conclusions can be made 
with a degree of confidence based on the totality of relevant evidence available. The 
probabilistic predictions of the case studies can be used to give stakeholders and 
decision-makers a realistic appraisal of the chances of achieving desired outcomes. The 
results also indicate that BNs give a sound and transparent approach modelling marine 
operational risk. Thus, BN is an integrative model that can be used effectively within 
the existing decision-making process. The evacuation study BN was further expanded 
with life-saving utility and optimal survival decision nodes that permitted the rapid 
development of a practical maritime decision model, and one in which the value of IDs 
as a highly intuitive communication tool has been confirmed. IDs provide a compact 
alternative to decision trees such that, during review, persons who are not risk analysts 
are able to interpret the diagrams and propose improvements to the decision model. 
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Chapter Summary 
In dealing with complex and ill-defined systems of a maritime application, modelling to 
support human reasoning for the purpose of risk assessment requires the effectiveness 
of a systematic logic-based approach. Floating production, storage and offloading 
(FPSO) installations, for example, combine traditional process technology with marine 
technology, and thus are quite dependent on technical design and operational safety 
control. Such safety-critical dependencies require novel approaches to properly analyse 
the risk involved. Hence, a proposed framework utilising fuzzy logic, as the 
mathematical tool for approximate reasoning, and evidential reasoning approaches is 
provided for modelling the assessment task. 
As based on fuzzy set theory, the model enables subjective uncertainties to be described 
mathematically and further processed in the analysis of the structures. The forms of 
membership functions that could be used in representing fuzzy linguistic variables to 
quantify risk levels are presented. A case study of collision risk between FPSO and 
shuttle tanker due to technical failure during tandem offloading operation is used in this 
chapter to illustrate the application of the proposed model. Furthermore, the obtained 
results from the case study provide confirmation that at various stages of offshore 
engineering systems design process, the framework of incorporated approximate 
reasoning is a well-suited and convenient tool for attaining reliable risk analysis. 
7.1 Introduction 
The safety of a large maritime engineering system is relatively affected by the growing 
technical complexity regarding its design to operation phase, and even in its 
maintenance. Thus, an ample amount of reliable data needs to be provided in order to 
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determine a probabilistic value of all the failure mode variables that are necessary for 
conducting its safety analysis. Realistically, not all the variables may have the 
necessary numerical data and those available may be somewhat imprecise that there 
may be no simple mathematical model to implement them. Such variables might have 
to be supported immensely by the knowledge of experts (such as marine engineers and 
safety analysts), which means that the obscure nature in their knowledge representation 
will have to be analytically taken into account. For example, the field experts may 
precisely describe the occurrence of a specified failure mode for the system as 
`reasonable frequent' or `highly unlikely', for which the possible value falls within an 
accepted interval of a scale. 
The incorporation of subjective terms leads to both the uncertainty that can be attributed 
to vagueness of the system's ill-defined boundaries and that of ambiguity where there 
are several choices associated with a given condition. The employment of fuzzy logic 
(FL) is a powerful and versatile tool tolerant of imprecise, ambiguous and vague 
data/information, and one for which its reasoning builds this understanding into the 
process rather than just tacking it onto the end. It utilises the concept of a linguistic 
variable, that is a variable whose values are not numbers but words or sentences in a 
natural or synthetic language (as built from the system's qualitative assessment), and 
provides a framework for dealing with such variables in a systematic way. Its rule-base 
would naturally allow for the linguistic attributes to be specifically guided towards a 
justified output result. Thus, FL opens the door to the application of the linguistic 
approach in a wide variety of problem areas, which do not lend themselves to precise 
analysis in the classical spirit. 
In FL, one can apply the input parameters from a hazard identification worksheet. In 
the typical case, a defuzzification process is used to obtain a crisp output result brought 
about my aggregating the degree to which all the rules are activated. For example, a 
risk priority number or a criticality number could be the defuzzied result of a fuzzified 
input that combines failure mode occurrence, severity and detectability (as taken from a 
failure mode, effect and criticality analysis (FMECA) worksheet) in its rule-base. As 
weighted ranking may better be utilised from analysis having multiple experts and 
attributes, instead of a crisp output, an evidential reasoning process may be used to 
synthesis the aggregation. A multiple experts and attributes scenario of the collision 
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risk between an FPSO and a shuttle tanker due to technical failure during tandem 
offloading operation can utilise this approach for its maritime safety analysis. 
7.2 Logic Approach of Approximate Reasoning 
Approximate reasoning (AR) uses fuzzy sets and FL to model human reasoning (Zadeh, 
1975). It lacks the precision of the exact reasoning in classical logic but it may be more 
effective in dealing with complex and ill-defined systems. Its max-min composition 
(Mamdani, 1974) plays an important role in inferential rules based on generalised 
modus ponens. 
7.2.1 Basis of Fuzzy Set Theory 
Fuzzy theory holds that all things are matters of degree, and also reduces black-white 
logic and mathematics to special limiting cases of grey relationships. Mathematically 
fuzziness means multivalence so that multivalued fuzziness corresponds to degrees of 
indeterminacy or ambiguity, partial occurrence of events or relations. Introduced by 
Zadeh (1965), as a modest extension of the classical notion of set, the notion of fuzzy 
set proved to have far-reaching, unexpected impact. The idea is that unlike crisp set, 
which is completely determined by an indicator function taking values in (0,1), a fuzzy 
set is characterised by a membership function taking values in [0,1] - 
7.2.1.1 Fuzzy Set 
A fuzzy set is represented by a membership function defined on the universe of 
discourse. The universe of discourse is the space where the fuzzy variables are defined. 
Formally, a fuzzy set A in a universe of discourse U is expressed as a set of ordered 
pairs: 
A= {(x, flA(x) Ix in U} (7.1) 
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where pA(x) is the membership function that gives the degree of membership of x in the 
fuzzy set A. This indicates the degree to which x belongs in set A. 
A fuzzy set A is said to be normal if there exists xeX such that PA(x) =1 (It is said to 
be subnormal otherwise). 
7.2.1.2 Membership Function 
A membership function (MF) is a curve/shape that defines how each point within the set 
of any element in the universe of discourse is mapped to a value between 0 and 1. This 
value is called membership value or grade/degree of membership. A MF value of zero 
implies that the corresponding element is definitely not an element of the fuzzy set, 
while a value of unity means that the element fully belongs to the set. A fuzzy set 
whose MF only takes on the values zero or one is called crisp. 
n-function Z-function I S-function 
(i) Single-valued, or singleton (ii) Triangular 
(iii) Rectangular (iv) Trapezoidal 
u(x) 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 
(b) Membership functions on a 
fuzzy scale 
(v) Z-function NO n-function (vii) S-function 
(a) he various shapes of a membership fimction 
Figure 7.1: Various forms of fuzzy membership function 
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MFs can provide graphical representation of the magnitude of participation for each 
expert knowledge input. It can associate a weighting with each of the inputs that are 
processed, define functional overlap between inputs, and ultimately determines an 
output response. The feasible shapes of the parameters' membership functions are 
defined only in the application context and as perceived by expert. Figure 7.1(a) shows 
the various forms in which a typical MF may take. In safety modelling, those of Figure 
7.1(a) (i) to (iv) (i. e., singleton, triangular, rectangular and trapezoidal MFs) are 
perceived to be appropriate in the representation of expert knowledge. As used on a 
fuzzy scale (Figure 7.1(b)), these are described as follows: 
" Singleton MF: A single deterministic value, x3, with 100 % certainty. 
" Triangular MF: A triangular distribution defined by a most likely value, x3, 
with a lower least likely value, x1, and an upper least likely value, x5. 
" Rectangular MF: A closed interval defined by an equally likely range between 
x2 and x4. 
" Trapezoidal MF: A trapezoidal distribution defined by a most likely range 
between x2 and x4, with a lower least likely value, x1, and upper least likely 
value, x5. 
The idea of using fuzzy membership function is to map the parameter constraint to 
membership grade between the scaled intervals. The closer the membership is to one 
the better the solution is for that constraint. The rules use the input membership values 
as weighting factors to determine their influence on the fuzzy output sets of the final 
output conclusion. 
7.2.1.3 Operations With Fuzzy Sets 
The basic connectivity operations in fuzzy set theory include union, intersection, 
complement, Cartesian product and composition. These operations are given for two 
fuzzy sets A and B with membership value at x, denoted by µA(x) and µB(x) respectively 
as follows: 
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" Union of A and B: uA, B = max{AA(x), AB(x)}. The union of A and B produces 
fuzzy set C with membership values that are the maximum of the component 
values. 
" Intersection of A and B: AAnB = min {µA(x), µB(x)}. The intersection of A and B 
produces fuzzy set C with membership values that are the minimum of the 
component values. 
" Complementation of A: LA(x) =1- AA(x). The membership values of the 
complementary set f are just I- the corresponding membership values of A. 
" Cartesian product of A and B: µA x B(x) = (/L x e(x))m where 
eA x B(x) 
min [µ', 4(x), ft'B(x)) for the Cartesian space i =1,2, ..., in and j=1,2, ..., n. 
" Composition: µo eAx B(X) = max(min {µc(x), µ`'A x B(x)) ). The composition of the 
membership functions for the fuzzy subset C and the Cartesian product of the 
subsets A and B, is the maximum membership value obtained from the minimum 
membership values of all subset. 
Furthermore, Boolean algebra rules, which are common in classical set theory, also 
apply to fuzzy set theory. 
7.2.2 Composition of a Fuzzy Variable 
A fuzzy number is a quantity whose value is imprecise, rather than exact as is the case 
with "ordinary" (single-valued) numbers. The concept of a fuzzy number plays a 
fundamental role in formulating quantitative fuzzy variables. These are variables whose 
states are fuzzy numbers. When, in addition, the fuzzy numbers represent linguistic 
terms that are interpreted for a particular context, the resulting constructs are usually 
called linguistic variables. 
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7.2.2.1 Linguistic Variable 
A linguistic variable differs from a numerical one in that its values are not numbers, but 
words or sentences in a natural or artificial language. Since words, in general, are less 
precise than numbers, the concept of a linguistic variable serves the purpose of 
providing a means of approximated characterization of phenomena, which are too 
complex, or too ill-defined, to be amenable to their description in conventional 
quantitative terms (Zadeh, 1975). 
PERFORMANCE 
Very small 
10 22.5 32.5 45 55 67.5 77.5 90 100 
v (perf)rmance scores) ý----- Base variable 
Figure 7.2: An example of a linguistic variable 
Every linguistic variable is characterised by the name of the variable, the set of names 
of linguistic terms that refer to a base variable ranging across a universe of discourse, U, 
a syntactic rule (which usually takes the form of a grammar) for generating the 
linguistic terms and a semantic rule that assigns each linguistic term its meaning, which 
is a fuzzy set on U. Figure 7.2 shows an example of a linguistic variable that represents 
a system performance (Klir & Yuan, 1995). The fuzzy numbers, whose MFs have the 
usual trapezoidal shapes, are defined on the interval [0,100], which is the range of the 
base variable. Each of them expresses a fuzzy restriction on this range. 
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7.2.2.2 Linguistic Terms 
A linguistic term is characterized by its term set. The linguistic term for system 
performance in Figure 7.2 can be defined by the term set T, the set of names of 
linguistic values of performance, in the following way: T(performance) = {very small, 
small, medium, large, very large). 
Three to seven terms are often appropriate to cover a linguistic term. Rarely, one uses 
less than three terms, since most concepts in human language consider at least the two 
extremes and the middle in between them. On the other side, one rarely uses more than 
seven terms because humans interpret technical figures using their short-term memory. 
The human short-term memory can only compute up to seven symbols at a time 
(Broadbent, 1975 and Miller, 1956). Another observation is that most (definitely not 
all) linguistic variables have an odd number of terms. This is due to the fact that most 
linguistic terms are defined symmetrically, and one term describes the middle between 
the extremes. Hence, most fuzzy logic systems use 3,5, or 7 terms. 
Fuzzy linguistic terms can be of several types (Turksen, 1992): 
" Fuzzy predicates, such as heavy, large, old, small, medium, normal, expensive, 
near, smart, and the like. 
" Fuzzy truth-values, such as true, false, fairly true, or somewhat true. 
" Fuzzy probabilities, such as likely, unlikely, very likely, or extremely unlikely. 
" Fuzzy quantifiers, such as many, few, most, or all. 
Usually, depending on the problem domain, an appropriate linguistic term set is chosen 
and used to describe the vague or imprecise knowledge. The elements in the term set 
will determine the granularity of the uncertainty, that is the level of distinction among 
different sizes of uncertainty (Delgado, et. al, 1998). 
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7.2.3 Background of a Fuzzy Logic System 
FL systems are knowledge/rule-based systems constructed from human knowledge in 
the form of fuzzy IF-THEN rules (Wang, 1997). The rules output an IF-THEN 
statement in which some words are characterised by continuous membership functions. 
For example, the following is a fuzzy IF-THEN rule: 
IF likelihood of a hazard is frequent AND severity of 
occurrence is catastrophic, THEN risk level is high. 
The frequent, catastrophic and high are characterised by the membership functions. 
The starting point of constructing a fuzzy logic system (FLS) is to obtain a collection of 
fuzzy IF-THEN rules from human experts or based on the domain knowledge. As a 
fuzzy system is constructed from a collection of fuzzy IF-THEN rules, the next step is 
to combine these rules into a single system. Different fuzzy systems use different 
principles for this combination. An important contribution of fuzzy system theory is 
that it provides a systematic procedure for transforming a knowledge base into a non- 
linear mapping. 
7.2.4 Components of a Fuzzy Logic System 
A FLS consists of four components: fuzzifier, fuzzy rule base, fuzzy inference engine, 
and defuzzifier. Since a multi-output system can always be decomposed into a 
collection of single-output systems, a FLS is considered for a multi-input-single output 
(MISO) case, where U=U, x U2 x ... x Up c RP 
is the input space and VcR is the 
output space. A fizzy relation R(U, V) is a set in the product space UxV and is 
characterized by the membership function µR (x, y), where xeU, and yeV, and 
AR(x, y) E[O, 11. 
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7.2.4.1 Fuuifier 
The fuzzifier converts each piece of input data to degrees of membership by using one 
or several membership functions. It is defined as a mapping from a crisp (real-valued) 
point x* EUc RP to a fuzzy set A' in U. The fuzzifier thus matches the input data with 
the conditions of the rules to determine how well the condition of each rule matches that 
particular input instance. There is a degree of membership for each linguistic term that 
applies to that input variable. 
7.2.4.2 Fuzzy knowledge/Rule Base 
A fizzy knowledge/rule base consists of a set of fuzzy IF-THEN rules. It is the core of a 
FLS in the sense that all other components are used to implement these rules in a 
reasonable and efficient manner. Basically, the representation of imprecise knowledge 
can be collected and delivered by a human expert (e. g., decision-maker, designer, 
process planner, machine operator). This knowledge, expressed by (k = 1,2, ..., K) 
finite heuristic fuzzy rules of the type MISO, may be written in the form: 
RMiso : IF xi is Ai and x2 is AZ and ... and xN is 
Aýk, , THENy is Bk (7.2) 
where 
{A; }" (fuzzy sets in U, c R) denotes the values of input linguistic variables 
{x, }", (conditions) and B* (fuzzy sets in Vc R) stands for the value of the independent 
output variable linguistic variable y (conclusion). 
In a FLS framework, there are three major properties of fuzzy rules (Wang, 1997). 
These are outlined as follows: 
I. A set of fuzzy IF-THEN rules is complete if for any xcU, there exists at least 
one rule in the fuzzy rule base, say rule Rk in the form of Equation 7.2, such that 
N4 (XI) *0 for all i= 1,2, ..., n (7.3) 
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where Ný (x, ) is the membership value associated with x; is Aý . 
Intuitively, the completeness of a set of rules means that at any point in the input 
space there is at least one rule that "fires", that is, the membership value of the 
IF part of the rule at this point is non-zero. 
2. A set of fuzzy IF-THEN rules is consistent if there are no rules with the same 
IF parts but different THEN parts. 
3. A set of fuzzy IF-THEN rules is continuous if there do not exist such 
neighbouring rules whose THEN part fuzzy sets have empty intersection. 
7.2.4.3 Fuzzy Inference Engine 
In fuzzy inference, all rules are fired. It carries out a mapping from fuzzy set A' in U to 
fuzzy set B' in V and consequently determines how the system interprets the fuzzy 
linguistics. It stores the rules as fuzzy associations in a matrix that maps fuzzy set A to 
fuzzy set B. Such a matrix forms the fuzzy associative memory (FAM) for the system 
(Kosko, 1992). 
To arrive at conclusions for inference systems, the FAM matrix has to be computed 
such that the ký' IF-THEN rule is interpreted as an implication R: A -4 B or R=AxB 
and when a set of fuzzy inputs 
{A, }", (or observations) are given to the inference 
system, the fuzzy output B' (or conclusion) may be symbolically expressed as: 
B'=(A,, A2,..., AN)°R (7.4) 
where symbol `°' denotes the composition rule of inference (CRI), e. g., the sup-^ or 
sup prod (sup-. ) of fuzzy relations. Alternatively, the CRI of Equation 7.4 is easily 
computed as: 
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B'=(AN 0 ... °(AZ'(A, ýR)) (7.5) 
Thus, given fuzzy set A' (which represents the premise x in A') and fuzzy relation A -* 
B in UxV (which represents the IF x is A THEN y is B), a fuzzy set B' in V (which 
represents the conclusion y is B') is inferred as (Wang, 1997): 
fUs'(Y)=sup rt1JA'(4µA-ºa(x, Y)] (7.6) 
x¬u 
where the sup represents the sup-" composition. 
The inference mechanism that produces the output from a collection of rules is 
determined by two factors (Mamdani, 1974 and Larsen, 1980): 
1. `min' or `algebraic product' implication operators, and 
2. `max-min' or `max product' composition operators. 
The global relation aggregating all rules from k=1 to K is given as: 
R= alsoIK , (Rk , so ) 
(7.7) 
where the sentence connective also denotes any t- or s-norm, e. g., min (A) or max (v) 
operators) or averages. 
Since any practical fuzzy rule base constitutes more than one rule, the key question here 
is how to infer with a set of rules. In composition-based inference, all rules in the fuzzy 
rule base are combined into a single fuzzy relation in UxV, which is then viewed as a 
single fuzzy IF-THEN rule. There are two views for what a set of rules should mean. 
The first one views the rules as independent conditional statements and the reasonable 
operator for combining the rules is union. The second one views rules as strongly 
coupled conditional statements such that the conditions of all rules must be satisfied in 
Chapter 7- Fuzzy Logic Modelling 
order for the whole set of rules to have an impact. In this case the operator intersection 
should be used to combine the rules. 
7.2.4.4 Defuzzification 
At the defuzzifer, the input is a fuzzy set (i. e., the aggregated output fuzzy set), and the 
output is a crisp value obtained by using some defuzzification method such as the 
centroid, height, or maximum. 
In maritime assessment work, this processing is a computational simplicity that can be 
used when to the output required is a risk priority number, a criticality number or to 
automate a controller. It is however unsuitable to derive the risk control measures or 
options for which the level of risk or safety has to be known. Therefore, the aggregated 
fuzzy conclusion for a risk modelling output is best processed by synthesis. 
7.3 Evidential Reasoning Synthesising Approach 
The evidential reasoning (ER) approach provides a more versatile way in which a 
multiple criteria decision analysis (MCDA) problem with uncertainties can be modelled. 
It uses evidence-based reasoning processes to reach a decision and its evaluation 
process is based on the Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory, which is well suited for handling 
incomplete assessment of uncertainty. The DS theory can model the narrowing of the 
hypothesis set with the accumulation of evidence. In other words, it will become more 
likely that a given hypothesis is true if more pieces of evidence support that hypothesis. 
The ER criteria aggregation process is in general a non-linear process and, compared to 
the traditional weighting MCDA methods, the non-linearity is decided by the weights of 
criteria and the way each criterion is assessed (Yang and Xu, 2002a). Furthermore, the 
ER framework not only provides flexibility in describing a MCDA problem, it also 
prevents any loss of information due to the conversion from a distribution to a single 
value in the modelling process. 
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7.3.1 Safety Analysis Synthesis 
To express the subjective safety more explicitly, linguistic variables such as "poor", 
"average", `fair" and "good" can be used. For instance, it may be quite clear to state 
that the safety of a failure mode is to a large extent "good". Such linguistic variables 
("poor", "average", `fair" and "good") are referred to as safety expressions. The safety 
expressions may also be characterized by membership degrees to each element in U. 
The fuzzy safety description of an event can then be mapped back onto the defined 
safety expressions. The safety, S, can then be obtained as follows: 
S(S) = ((ßl, 'poor'), (ß2, `fair'), (ß3, `average'), (04, `good')} 
where ß. (m = 1,2,3 or 4) represents the extent to which the safety of the event belongs 
to the mth safety expression. 
A safety model or an operation process is usually a hierarchical structure with multiple 
layers where: 
" Judgments on an event at the bottom level of the hierarchy made by multiple 
experts need to be synthesized. 
" Safety synthesis needs to be carried out at the next level. 
" Safety synthesis is progressed up to the top level where the safety estimation of 
the system can be obtained. 
The hierarchical structure of a safety model can be formulated by studying the system 
under investigation. The system is composed of its constituent subsystems, which can 
be further broken down to the component level. Each component is associated with 
certain failure modes. The subsystems, components and failure modes may carry 
different weights when synthesizing the safety of the system in such a hierarchy. 
The weight of an element in a synthesis level may be judged on a subjective basis in 
terms of its contribution to the safety of the associated element in the upper level. The 
technique that is used to carry out the synthesis is the evidential reasoning approach, 
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which is based on the principle that if more pieces of evidence (each may carry different 
weight) support a hypothesis then it is more likely that the hypothesis is true (Yang & 
Sen, 1994; Yang & Singh, 1994; Yang, 2001; Yang & Xu, 2002b). The evidential 
reasoning approach has the advantage of synthesizing safety estimates without loss of 
any data and also that uncertainties in safety estimates are handled in a rational manner. 
Suppose M,, (m = 1,2,3 or 4; n=1, ..., or N 
is a degree to which S(S) (safety judged 
by expert n) supports the hypothesis that the safety evaluation associated with a failure 
event is Hm (Hi = "poor"; ; H2 ý= `fair"; H3 = "average"; e"; or 
H4 = "good"). Then, M' 
can be obtained as follows: 
M'=), xß  (7.8) 
where )`, is the normalized relative weight of expert n in the safety estimation process. 
Suppose M, (n = 1, ..., or N) 
is the remaining belief unassigned after commitment of 
belief to all H. (m = 1,2,3 and 4) for S(S ). M, N can be obtained as follows: 
4 
M. H =1-1: M. Iff M_1 
(7.9) 
Suppose MME (m = 1,2,3 or 4; n=1, ..., or N) represents the degree to which the 
safety associated with the event belongs to H. as a result of the synthesis of the 
judgments produced by safety analysts 1, ... , and n. 
Suppose MM, " represents the 
remaining belief unassigned after commitment of belief to all H. (m = 1,2,3 and 4) as a 
result of the synthesis of the judgments produced bysafety analysts 1, ... , and n. The 
algorithm for synthesizing the analysts' judgments to obtain the safety evaluation 
associated with the event can be stated as follows (Yang & Singh, 1994; Yang & Sen, 
1994): 
Initial conditions: MM; = M; MMIH = M; 
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{H, } MMý , =K+, (MM Mý , +MMn Mn , +MMH Mý ,) 
m=1,2,3,4 
{H} MMý ,= K+l MM, Mn l 
44 -1 
K+1= 1-E y MMTM, 
T=I R=1RsT 
n=1,..., N-1 
N- 1 iterations of the above algorithm are required to obtain the degree (i. e., MMn ) to 
which the safety evaluation associated with the event belongs to H,  (m = 1,2,3 and 4). 
The safety evaluation associated with the failure event can then be presented in the 
following form: 
S(Sthe 
event) = 
{(NI 
, 
"poor"), (132, `fair"), (03, "average"), (ß4, "good')) 
(7.10) 
whereto (m = 1,2,3 and 4) is equal to MMN . 
It is worth mentioning that the order in which safety estimates are combined does not 
make any difference in terms of the final synthesis using the above algorithm. It is also 
worth mentioning that the sum of 0" (m = 1,2,3 and 4) may not be equal to I at the end 
of synthesis using the above algorithm. This is because there may be still some 
unassigned belief to S(S, *e event) due to the incompleteness of the safety estimates that are 
combined. The evidential reasoning algorithm has the advantage that in theory the total 
unassigned belief decreases as more safety estimates are synthesized. 
In a hierarchical structure with multiple layers, the above synthesis can be used to 
obtain the safety estimate for an event at the bottom level. Then the evidential 
reasoning algorithm can be used again to obtain safety synthesis at the next level in the 
hierarchy. Such a synthesis can be eventually progressed up to the top level where the 
safety associated with the system can be obtained as follows: 
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S(S) =1 (ß1, "poor"), (ß2, `fair"), (ß', "average"), (ß4, "good")} (7.11) 
where ß'" (m = 1,2,3 or 4) represents the extent to which the safety of the system 
belongs to the mth safety expression. 
7.3.2 Utility Based Synthesis 
Cost can also be modeled in a similar manner. Given the relative importance of cost 
against safety, the safety and cost estimates can be synthesized, using the evidential 
reasoning approach, to obtain the preference estimate U(i) associated with 
design/operation option i as follows: 
U(i) _ {(µt,, , "slightly preferred'), 
(µý, , "moderately preferred"), (µý',; , 
`preferred"), (µü, , "greatly preferred") 
(7.12) 
where each pu; (m = 1,2,3,4) represents an extent to which the utility associated with 
design/operation option i belongs to the mth utility expression ("slightly preferred, " 
"moderately preferred, " "preferred, " or "greatly preferred'). 
7.3.3 Decision Preference Synthesis 
Preference degree P; associated with design/operation option i is obtained by (Wang et 
al., 1996): 
444 
Pr= j>ü, xKJ+ 1-, Nür x '/. x ýKJ (7.13) 
J=I J=t J=l 
where K1, K2, K3, K4 are the utility degrees associated with the four utility expressions, 
respectively; (1 - ý_, per) describes the remaining belief unassigned after 
commitment of belief in the synthesis of cost and safety descriptions; and %x 
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jsI Kj is the average value of the Kß. It is worth mentioning that K1, K2, K3, K4 may 
not be fixed for different applications and they may be determined by appropriate expert 
judgments. 
Obviously, the larger P; is the more desirable design/operation option i. The best 
design/operation option with the largest preference degree can be selected on the basis 
of the magnitudes of P; (i = 1,2, ..., D) 
if there are several design options available in 
the design process. Furthermore, If more design objectives such as reliability are dealt 
with, this method can be easily extended to carry multiple objective decision-making. 
This method may be more appropriate for use in situations where a design of a maritime 
engineering product is at the initial stages or there is a lack of adequate data for use in 
quantitative risk assessment. 
7.4 Proposed Fuzzy Logic Safety Modelling Methodology 
A generic framework for modelling system safety using an integrated approximate 
reasoning (AR) and evidential reasoning (ER) approach as depicted in Figure 7.3, 
consists of seven major steps. It emulates the reasoning process for synthesising human 
expert judgements within a specific domain of knowledge, codes and standards based 
on the guidelines and company policy using an AR approach, which is FL-based. In 
addition, an ER approach is used in the later stage of the framework to handle the safety 
synthesis of the system with complexity involving multi-experts, or multi-attributes, or 
a combination of both. 
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Figure 73: Flowchart of proposed FL-based safety modelling methodology 
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The proposed framework for modelling system safety for risk analysis, as shown in 
Figure 7.3, consists of seven major steps as follows: 
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Step 1- Establishment of Experts Real-Valued Hazard Data: Anticipated and 
identified causes or factors to technical failure of an engineering system are collected 
for multiple attribute and experts knowledge. As related to the experts' linguistic 
interpretation, their crisp values are then entered from database knowledge for the 
obtained failure parameters. 
The inputs are now directed into a process that determines the degree to which they 
belong to each of the appropriate fuzzy sets via MFs. The algorithm uses either 
symmetric singleton, rectangular, triangular or trapezoidal MFs (see Figure 7.1) 
uniformly distributed by each universe of discourse. 
Step 2- Fuzzified Input Set to Extract Rules: The next step is to take inputs and 
determine the degree to which they belong to each of the appropriate fuzzy sets via 
membership functions. Based on 
{A, k }N, (fuzzy sets in U, cR), which denotes the 
values of input linguistic variables {x, }N, (conditions), rules can be extracted for the 
antecedent such as "xl is A; and x2 is AZ and ... and xN 
is AN ". Thus, µ (x, ) gives 
the membership value associated with the input x; is A, k . 
Step 3- Extraction of Rules from Input Fuzzy Set: Based on the input fuzzy 
variables, rules can be extracted for the antecedent/premise, which is denoted as "x is 
A". Moreover, since each given rule has more than one part in a MISO system, fuzzy 
logical operators of "AND" or/and "OR" are applied to evaluate the composite firing 
strength of the rule. 
Step 4- Formulation of IF-THEN Rule-Base: Once the inputs have been fuzzified, 
the degree to which each part of the antecedent has been satisfied for each rule is 
recognised. If a given rule has more than one part, the fuzzy logical operators are 
applied to evaluate the composite firing strength of the rule. 
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A fuzzy relation R(U, V) is a set in the product space UxV and is characterized by the 
membership function µR (x, y), where xEU, and y off V, and µR (x, y) E [0,1]. Fuzzy 
relations play an important role in fuzzy inference systems. FL uses notions from crisp 
logic. Concepts in crisp logic can be extended to FL by replacing 0 or I values with 
fuzzy membership values. A singleton fuzzy rule assumes the form "if x is A, then y is 
B, " where xEU and YEV, and has a membership function µR (x, y), where /AAB(x, y) 
E [0,1]. The IF part of the rule, "x is A" is called the antecedent or premise, while the 
THEN part of the rule, "y is B", is called the consequent or conclusion. Interpreting an 
IF-THEN rule involves two distinct steps. The first step is to evaluate the antecedent, 
which involves fuzzifying the input and applying any necessary fuzzy operators. The 
second step is implication, or applying the result of the antecedent to the consequent, 
which essentially evaluates the membership function IhA , B(x, y). 
Step 5- Evaluation of Rules for Output Fuzzy Set: To produce safety evaluation for 
each cause to a technical failure at the bottom level of a hierarchical system, the 
consequent/conclusion as denoted by `3 is B" is formed for the output fuzzy variable of 
the MISO system. Its output set can be defined using fuzzy safety estimate sets in the 
same way as the fuzzy inputs. The implication method of the minimum or the product 
then shapes the output MFs on the basis of the firing strength of the rule. This input for 
the implication process is a single number given by the antecedent, and its output is a 
fuzzy set. 
Step 6- Aggregation and Normalisation: Aggregation is a process whereby the 
outputs of each rule are unified. Aggregation occurs only once for each output variable. 
The input to the aggregation process is the truncated output fuzzy sets returned by the 
implication process for each rule. The output of the aggregation process is the 
combined output fuzzy set. 
The input of the aggregation process is the list of truncated output functions returned by 
the implication process for each rule. The output of the aggregation process is one 
fuzzy set for each output variable. As this method is always commutative, the order in 
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which the rules are executed is not important. The max (maximum) method is applied 
to the aggregation of consequent, `y is B", across the rules. 
The normalization is required to make the sum of weights equal to 1. This is achieved 
by dividing each membership value in the fuzzy conclusion set by the sum total of all 
membership values in the set. 
Where defuzzification is used for obtaining a single number output, the input for the 
process is a fuzzy set (the aggregated output fuzzy set), and the output of the 
defuzzification process is a crisp value obtained by using some defuzzification method 
such as the centroid, height, or maximum. 
Step 7- ER Synthesis of Weighted Indices for Ranking: For the ER synthesis, it is 
highly unlikely for selected experts to have the same importance, as the weights of 
importance need to be utilised. The assessment of weight for each expert is an 
important decision for the analyst to make in view of the safety of the system under 
scrutiny. Each expert is assigned with a weight to indicate the relative importance of 
his or her judgment in contributing towards the overall safety evaluation process. The 
analyst must decide which experts are more authoritative. Weights are then assigned 
accordingly. 
The final component describes the calculation of overall risk level ranking index. Then 
the identified potential causes are ranked on the basis of their ranking index values, or 
multi-attribute-multi-expert safety synthesis as performed. 
7.5 Case Study of Collision Risk for Shuttle Tanker to FPSO Unit 
The collision cases that have occurred between FPSO and shuttle tanker in tandem 
offloading operation has caused agrowing concern in the North Sea as well as the rest 
of the world. Several recent incidents between FPSO and shuttle tanker have clearly 
witnessed a high likelihood of contact between vessels in tandem offloading. The large 
masses involved make the collision risk significance. 
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Tandem offloading from a spread moored FPSO is a high-risk operation, especially as 
the DP shuttle tanker can pose a threat of collision to the FPSO with potential serious 
consequences. Moreover, several recent collisions have caused a growing concern that 
leaves the operation deserving proactive safety scrutiny. Therefore, a novel safety 
model for collision risk analysis of FPSO and tanker offloading operation is being 
presented in this case study. The collision risk caused by various technical 
malfunctions is modelled by using an approximate reasoning approach. This model 
further provides guides to identify and assess the failure prone situations where man 
machine interaction happened and resulted in most collision incidents. 
7.5.1 FPSO/Shuttle Tanker in Tandem Operation 
FPSO (Floating production, storage and offloading) vessels are the state-of-the-art 
platforms utilised in the process for production, treatment and delivery of crude oil at 
offshore oil and gas fields worldwide. These vessels tend to be of ship-shape hulls, and 
therefore they are maintained on station by anchors and mooring lines. Shuttle tankers 
can be used to export processed oil from these vessels via `tandem' mooring 
configuration and this is very popular in the North Sea. 
A shuttle tanker in its tandem operational phases (i. e. approach, connection, off-loading, 
disconnection and departure) off-takes the processed oil from the FPSO with utmost 
safety precautions. During tandem offloading, the shuttle tanker must stay connected 
and keep on maintaining its separation proximity to the FPSO, e. g. 80m behind, by use 
of a DP system. The frequency of offloading operation may range from once every 3 to 
5 days, depending on the production likelihood, storage capacity of FPSO, and shuttle 
tanker size. Normal duration of operation is in the order of 20 hours based on FPSO 
storage and oil transfer likelihood, though suitable environmental conditions are 
required. The FPSO is continuously weathering around its turret located either 
internally or externally. In harsh environments, due to waves and wind, it is also 
subject to significant low frequency motions in horizontal plane (surge, sway and yaw) 
(Chen & Moan, 2002). Since tankers with a DP system have greater uptime in harsh 
environments and are also more practical, they have become widely applied. 
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7.5.2 Collision Risk Experiences 
Before the turn of the millennium, some 500 ships were reported to have collided with 
offshore installations in the UK sector for the last 25 years duration (HSE, 1999). Over 
96% of the collisions have involved attendant vessels such as shuttle tankers other 
authorised vessels. Among these have been recent impact cases in the North Sea 
involving FPSO and shuttle tanker incidents (Leonhardsen et. al, 2001) as follows: 
" Shuttle tanker Futura collided with Gryphon FPSO on 260' July 1997. 
" Shuttle tanker Aberdeen collided with Captain FPSO on 120i August 1997. 
" Shuttle tanker Nordic Savonita collided with Schiehallion FPSO on 250i 
September 1998. 
" Shuttle tanker Knock Sallie collided with Norne FPSO on 50i March 2000. 
The later of these FPSO-shuttle tanker collision cases, a 154,000 dwt shuttle tanker at 
0.6 m/s impact velocity, had its impact energy as high as 31 MJ (Helgoy, 2002). 
Recognising the large masses and subsequently the large impact energy involved in 
such incidents, the damaging potential can relatively be intensified and thus the risk 
associated is significant. In the worst-case scenario, catastrophic consequences in terms 
of loss of life, environmental impact and business risk are reasonably foreseeable. 
Furthermore, stern damage on the FPSO may cause penetration and flooding in the 
machine room. Moreover, with the widely adopted FPSO design, e. g. Gryphon, 
Captain, Norne, Asgard and etc. (Kerr-McGee Oil, 1995 and Statoil, 1995), the living 
quarters are located in the bow area, thus the flare towers, which have to be located in 
the stern area, are vulnerable to tanker impact. The worst scenario could therefore be a 
major tanker collision that topples down FPSO's flare tower on stern. This can initiate 
a chain of events with severe fire and explosion on both vessels. The majority of 
reported incidents are caused by station-keeping related technical failure such as 
propulsion (thrusters, propeller, engine, generator, pitch-control device), DP, position 
reference sensor, and operation or maintenance of these systems. 
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7.5.3 A Fuzzy Rule-Based Evidential Reasoning Safety Modelling 
In this section, safety assessment is carried out on risk introduced by the collision of 
FPSO and shuttle tanker during tandem offloading operation. It is based on risk caused 
by technical failures, although it should be noted that operational failures are recognised 
as one of the major causes of collision. 
7.5.3.1 Linguistic Expression of Collision Risk Input Parameters 
One realistic way to deal with imprecision is to use linguistic assessments. The main 
artificial intelligence mechanism behind a typical fuzzy safety model is its fuzzy 
inference engine. A fuzzy inference engine comprises the selection or development of 
the typeltypes of fuzzy membership function used to represent risk levels and fuzzy rule 
bases to generate fuzzy safety estimates. The linguistic variables are employed in the 
development of fuzzy membership function for each input parameter. The goal of fuzzy 
linguistic variables is to represent the condition of an attribute/parameter at a given 
interval. 
Based on experience and judgment combined with grading evaluation guidelines, the 
assessment team assigns numeric values to each attribute/parameter for fuzzy set input. 
These numeric values are based on a ten-point scale as anchored by linguistic variable 
and descriptors provided by evaluation. The ten-point scale is indicative of performance 
in regards to industry standard, minimum Code requirements, and good marine practice. 
The three attributes/parameters for fuzzy set input, which can be considered for 
modelling failure modes, are failure likelihood, consequence severity and failure 
consequence probability (Sii, et. al, 2005). These can be combined via a rule-base to 
find degree of failure, or degree to which safety level can be achieved. 
Failure likelihood, L, describes the failure frequencies in a certain time, which directly 
represents the numbers of failures anticipated during the design life span of a particular 
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system or an item. Table 7.1 describes the range of the frequencies of the failure 
occurrence and defines the fuzzy set of L. To estimate L, one may choose to use such 
linguistic variables as "very low (L, )", "low (L2)", "Reasonably low (L3)", "average 
(L4)", "Reasonably Frequent (LS)", 'frequent (L6)" and "hiS'hlY. f re4uent (L7)" 
It is noted that the evaluation criteria for failure likelihood can be modified according to 
different requirements in codes and standards and different aspects of platforms such as 
fire, explosions, structure, safety system, etc. 
Table 7.1: Failure likelihood 
Failure likelihood 
Rank Failure likelihood, L Meaning (general interpretation) 
(1/year) 
2 1 2 3 3 
is unlikely but possible during 
< 10_S , , , , Very low, L1 lifetime 
4 Low, L2 Likely to happen once during lifetime 0.25 x 10- 
5 Reasonably low, L3 Between low and average 0.25 x 10 
6 Average, LK Occasional failure 10 
7 Reasonably Frequent, LS Likely to occur from time to time 0.25 x 10- 
8,8,9 Frequent, L6 Repeated failure 0.125 x 10-' 
9,10 Highly frequent, L7 
Failure is almost inevitable or likely to 
> 0.25 x 10' 
exist repeatedly 
Consequence severity, C, describes the magnitude of possible consequences, which is 
ranked according to the severity of the failure effects. One may choose to use such 
linguistic variables as "negligible (Cl)", "marginal (C2)", "moderate (C3)", "critical 
(C4)" and "catastrophic (Cs)". Table 7.2 shows the criteria used to rank the 
consequence severity of failure effects. 
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Table 7.2: Consequence severity 
Meaning (generic marine and offshore Rank Consequence severity, C 
structure/system interpretation) 
At most a single minor injury or unscheduled 
1 Negligible, C, maintenance required (service and operations can 
continue). 
Possible single or multiple minor injuries or/and minor 
system damage. Operations interrupted slightly, and 2,3 Marginal, CZ 
resumed to its normal operational mode within a short 
period of time (say less than 2 hours). 
Possible multiple minor injuries or a single severe injury, 
moderate system damage. Operations and production 4,5,6 Moderate, C3 
interrupted marginally, and resumed to its normal 
operational mode within, say no more than 4 hours. 
Possible single death, probable multiple severe injuries or 
major system damage. Operations stopped, platform 
closed, shuttle tanker's failure to function. High degree of 
7,8 Critical, C4 operational interruption due to the nature of the failure 
such as an inoperable platform (e. g. drilling engine fails to 
start, power system failure, turret mooring system failure) 
or an inoperable convenience subsystem (e. g. DP, PRS). 
Possible multiple deaths, probable single death or total 
system loss. Very high severity ranking when a potential 
failure mode (e. g. collision between FPSO and shuttle 9,10 Catastrophic, Cs 
tanker, blow-out, fire and explosion) affects safe platform 
operation and/or involves non-compliance with 
government regulations. 
Failure consequence probability, E, defines the probability that ensued consequences 
gives the occurrence of the event. For E, one may choose to use such linguistic terms as 
"highly unlikely (E1)", "unlikely (E2)", "reasonably unlikely (E3)", "likely (E4)", 
"reasonably likely (E5)", "highly likely (E6)" and "definite (E7)". Table 7.3 shows the 
possible criteria used to definite the linguistic terms for describing and ranking E of 
failure effects. 
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Table 7.3: Failure consequence probability 
Failure consequence Rank Meaning 
probability, E 
The occurrence likelihood of possible consequence is highly 
1 Highly unlikely, El unlikely given the occurrence of the failure event (extremely 
unlikely to exist on the system or during operations). 
The occurrence likelihood of possible consequences is 
unlikely but possible given that the failure event happens 2,3 Unlikely, , E2 (improbable to exist even on rare occasions on the system or 
during operations). 
The occurrence likelihood of possible consequences is 
reasonably unlikely given the occurrence of the failure event 4 Reasonably unlikely, , E3 (likely to exist on rare occasions on the system or during 
operations). 
It is likely that consequences happen given that the failure 
5 Likely, E4 event occurs (a programme is not likely to detect a potential 
design or operations procedural weakness). 
It is reasonably likely that consequences occur given the 
of the failure event (i. e. exist from time to time on 
,7 6,7 Reasonably likely, ES the system or during operations, possibly caused by a 
potential design or operations procedural weakness). 
It is highly likely that consequences occur given the 
occurrence of the failure event (i. e. often exist somewhere on 
8 Highly likely, E6 the system or during operations due to a highly likely 
potential hazardous situation or design and/or operations 
procedural drawback). 
Possible consequences happen given the occurrence of a 
failure event (i. e. likely to exist repeatedly during operations 9,10 Definite , E7 due to a anticipated potential design and operations 
procedural drawback). 
With reference to the above fuzzy descriptions of L, C and E, it may be observed that 
the linguistic variables are not exclusive, as there are intersections among the defined 
linguistic variables describing L, C and E. Inclusive expressions may make it more 
convenient for the safety analysts to judge a safety level. 
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7.5.3.2 Input Fuzzy Variable Semantics for Collision Risk 
In taking the form of the defined MFs, the three attributes/parameters for fuzzy set input 
are expresses by the following sets: 
L= {L1, L2, L3, L4, L5, L6, L7} 
C= {C1, C29 C3, C49 Cs} 
E ={EI, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7} 
l. o 
L, L2 L3 L4 LS La 1-7 
EZ 
ý 
2468 10 L 
(a) Fuzzy set definition for failure likelihood, L 
C3 C4 C5 
Yxxx 
1.0 
2468 10 C 
(b) Fuzzy set definition for consequence severity, C 
E3 E4 
X>OOK 
lV\ 
1.0 
t 
02468 10 ý 
(c) Fuzzy set definition for failure consequence probability, E 
Figure 7.4: Fuzzy input set definition for risk-based analytical modelling 
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Overlapping functions, as shown in Figure 7.4, are used to represent various linguistic 
variables for all attributes because the experts and the literature concurred that in the 
analysis of the risks associated with a failure event/mode, the risk levels may have 
"gray" or ill-defined boundaries (Bell & Badiru, 1996). 
7.5.3.3 Fuzzy Associative Matrix of Collision Risk Fuzzy Conclusion 
Safety estimate, S, is the only output fuzzy variable used in this study to produce safety 
evaluation for each cause to a technical failure at the bottom level of a hierarchical 
system. It is described linguistically by the variables "poor", `fair", "average", and 
"good". 
For an independent fuzzy variable, such as S, the rule size grows geometrically 
according to: 
RMlso = 7c x 5c x 7E = 2455 (7.14) 
The relationship between fuzzy sets and rules is normally shown in a fuzzy associative 
memory/matrix (FAM) (i. e., the overall risk matrix for the variables). A FAM encodes 
the fuzzy rules. Each dimension of the matrix represents the fuzzy sets assigned to an 
independent variable. The cubic FAM of Figure 7.5 shows the 245 rules in its Cartesian 
product space format as obtained from the 7L x 5C x 7E input combinations. 
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(b) Assembled unit of all the Cartesian granule 
space in the safety expression rule-base. 
F-M- 
(c) Rule-base of all Cartesian granule space indicated 
on each level of the failure likelihood (L) axis. 
Safety expression, S: 
Good, 
S, 
J Average, Fair, Poor, 
S2 S3 S4 
i 
Figure 7.5: Cube FAM matrix for safety expression rule-base 
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By first varying {E, }ý through each of its linguistic variable steps, whilst keeping 
{C; }; 
, constant, on each level of 
{Lj 1,7=1 
, then going next through each linguistic 
variable step in {C; }5 , and 
keeping it constant whilst varying {E, },, all rules and their 
respective rule number, Rk, labels can be obtained for k=I to k= 245 (see Figure 7.5(a 
& b)) from their respective Cartesian granule in the safety expression rule-base. In 
other words, the k`h rule is given by the expression: 
24 
Rk }k=51 = IF: Lis {L; }, 
7_, 
Therefore: 
AND C is {C; }j AND E is {E; }ý ; THEN: S is {S . 
}' 
l j=1 
(7.15) 
R, = IF: L is L, AND C is Cl AND E is E,; THEN: S is S, 
R2=IF: LisL, AND Cis Cl AND E is E2; THEN: SisS, 
R245 = IF: L is L7 AND C is C5 AND E is E7; THEN: S is S4 
All 245 rules in the safety expression rule base have been assembled as given in Figure 
7.5(c) and as detailed in Tables 7.4(i)-(vii). 
Table 7.4(i): All IF-THEN rules for when "failure likelihood" is "very low" 
Ri L; C; E; S; Rk 1.; C, E; S; R* I,; C; E; S; R4 L; C; S; Rk L; C; E; S; 
1 E, S, 8 E, S, 15 E, S, 22 E, S2 29 E, S2 
2 E2 S, 9 E2 S, 16 E2 S, 23 E2 S2 30 E2 S2 
3 E3 Si 10 E3 S, 17 E3 S, 24 E3 S3 31 E3 S3 
4 L, C, E4 S2 11 L, C2 E4 S2 18 L, C3 E4 S2 25 L, C4 E4 S3 32 L, C5 E4 S3 
5 E5 S2 12 E5 S, 19 E5 S2 26 E5 S3 33 E5 S3 
6 E6 S2 13 E6 S2 20 E6 S3 27 E6 S4 34 6 S4 
7 
1 
F., S2 14 E7 S2 21 E7 S3 28 E7 S4 35 Eý S4 
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R, t L; Ci E; S; Rk Lj Ci Ei Si Rk L, CJ El Sj Rk L; CJ Er Sj Rk L; Cl Ei Sj 
36 E, S, 43 E, S, 50 E, S, 57 E, S2 64 E, S2 
37 E2 S, 44 E2 S, 51 E2 S, 58 E2 S2 65 E2 S2 
38 E3 S, 45 E3 S, 52 E3 S, 59 E3 S3 66 E3 S3 
39 L2 C, E4 S2 46 l-2 C2 E4 S, 53 L2 C3 E4 S2 60 L2 C4 E4 S3 67 L2 C5 E4 S3 
40 E5 S2 47 E5 S, 54 E5 S2 61 E5 S3 68 E5 S3 
41 E6 S2 48 E6 S2 55 E6 S3 62 E6 S4 9 E6 S4 
42 E, S2 49 E7 S, 1 1 56 E S 63 E7 S4 
H 
0 77 
1S4 
Rk Lj C, E; Sj Rk L; Cf Et Sj Rk Lt CJ E; Si Rk L, CJ Ei Sj Rk L; C; E1 Sj 
71 E, S, 78 E, S, 85 E, S, 92 E, S2 99 E, S2 
72 E2 S, 79 E2 S, 86 E2 Si 93 E2 S2 10 E2 S2 
73 E3 S, 80 E3 S, 87 E3 S, 94 E3 S3 101 E3 S3 
74 L3 Cl E4 S, 81 L3 C2 E4 S2 88 L3 C3 E4 S1 95 L3 C4 E4 S3 102 L3 C5 E4 S3 
75 E5 S2 82 E5 SZ 89 E5 
S2 96 E5 S3 103 E5 S3 
[ 
E6 S, 83 E6 SZ 90 E6 S3 97 E6 S4 104 E6 S4 
77 E7 SZ 84 E7 SZ 91 E, S3 98 E, S4 105 Eý S4 
R, t Li Ci Ei Sj Rk Li Ci E! Sj Rk L1 CJ Ei Si Rk Li C1 Ei Sj Rk L; Ct E1 Sl 
106 E, S, 113 Ei S2 12 E, S, 127 Ei S2 13 Ei S2 
107 E2 S2 11 E2 S2 121 E2 S2 128 E2 S2 135 E2 S2 
108 E3 S, 11 E, S2 122 E3 SZ 12 E3 S3 13 E3 S3 
109 L4 Ci E4 S3 11 L4 C2 E4 S3 123 L4 C3 E4 S3 13 L4 C4 E4 S3 137 L4 CS E4 S3 
110 E5 S3 11 ES S 12 E5 S3 131 E5 S3 138 E5 S4 
111 E6 S, 11 E6 S3 125 E6 S3 132 E6 S4 139 E6 S4 
112 E7 S3 11 E7 S3 12 E7 S3 133 E7 S4 14 Eý S4 
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Table 7.4(v): All IF-THEN rules for when "failure likelihood" is "reasonably frequent" 
Rx L1 Cr Ei Si Rý Li Ci Ei Sj Rä L; Ci Ei Sj Rk L, C; Ej Sj Rt L, Ci Ei Sj 
141 E, S2 14 155 E, S2 162 E, S2 169 Ei S2 
142 E2 SZ 14 15 E2 S2 163 E2 S2 17 E2 S; 
143 E, S2 15 157 E3 S, 164 E3 S3 171 E; S3 
144 L5 Ci E4 Si 151 L5 C2 
J 
158 L5 C, E4 Sý 165 L5 C4 E4 S3 172 L5 C5 E4 S4 
145 E5 S, 15 15 E5 S3 16 E5 S4 173 E5 S4 
146 E6 Sj 153 16 E6 S, 167 E6 S4 17 E6 S4 
147 Eý Sa 1 E7 S, 161 Eý S, 168 Eý S4 175 Eý S4 
Table 7.4(vi): All IF-THEN rules for when "failure likelihood" is "frequent" 
R, t Li Ci Ei Sj Rk Li C, Ei Sj Rk Li Ci Er Sj Rk Lr Cr Ei Sj Rk L; Cj Ei Sj 
176 E, SZ 183 Ei S2 19 Ei S2 197 Ei S2 0 Ei S2 
177 E2 S2 18 E2 S2 191 E2 S2 198 E2 S3 05 E2 S3 
178 E3 S2 18 E3 S2 192 E3 S2 199 E3 S3 0 E3 S3 
179 L6 Cl E4 S3 18 Ld C2 E4 S3 193 L6 C3 E4 Si 0 L6 C4 E4 S3 07 L6 C5 E4 S4 
180 E5 S3 18 E5 S3 19 E5 S3 01 E5 S4 08 E5 S4 
181 E6 S3 E6 S3 195 E6 S3 E6 S4 09 E6 S4 
182 Eý S3 
MI8 
E7 S3 19 E, 7 S4 
E03 
E, S4 1 Eý S4 
Table 7.4(vii): All IF-THEN rules for when "failure likelihood" is "highly frequent" 
Rk L; C; E; S; Rk L; C; S; Rk L; C; E; S; Rk L; C; E; S; Rk Li C; E; S; 
211 E, S, 1 Ei S2 25 Ei S2 32 Ei S2 39 Ei S2 
12 E2 S_ 1 E2 S2 i26 
- 
E2 S2 33 E2 S3 4 E2 S3 
13 E, S: 2 E3 S2 27 E3 S2 3 E3 S3 41 E3 S3 
14 L7 Cl E4 S, Ti L7 C2 E4 S3 28 L7 Cl E4 S3 35 L7 C4 E4 S3 42 L7 C5 E4 S4 
215 E5 S, 2 E5 S3 2 E5 S3 3 E5 S4 43 E5 S4 
216 E6 S3 23 E6 S3 3 E6 S3 37 E6 S4 E6 S4 
17 E, S3 E7 S3 E7 54 38 E7 S4 45 E7 S4 
7.5.4 Potential Causes of Collision Risk Technical Failures 
Collision of an FPSO and a shuttle tanker scenario can largely be initiated by technical 
failures and escalated through operational failures (or visa versa). These technical 
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failures, such as in malfunction of propulsion system, can occur owing to the following 
four major causes (Chen & Moan, 2002): 
" Cause 1 (ai): Controllable pitch propeller (CPP) failure. 
" Cause 2 (a2): Thruster failure. 
" Cause 3 (a3): Position reference system (PRS) failure. 
" Cause 4 (a4): Dynamic positioning system (DPS) failure. 
These causes can be modelled for risk analysis to be performed through the proposed 
integrated AR and ER methodology in Section 7.5. There are five experts (i. e., el, e2, e3, 
e4, e5, ) taking part in the safety assessment. For the purpose of safety modelling, the 
input parameters of L, C and E, will be fed to the proposed safety model in terms of 
µj(x) in any one of the four forms in Figure 7.1(a) (i) to (iv). Pertaining to the level of 
ambiguity and uncertainty associated with the case as perceived by a particular expert, 
the selection of forms of membership function by each expert is dependent upon 
subjective judgment made. 
7.5.5 Expert Judgment Input Membership for Potential Causes 
On the basis of the qualitative assessment made by each expert, the safety estimate, S, of 
each technical failure for each cause can be assessed. Therefore, upon their subjective 
judgment, the assessment made by each expert, {e, }r due to each potential cause, 
{a, }1 
, is as provided in Table 7.5. 
All of these subjective judgment made can be expressed diagrammatically. For 
example, the input membership judgement made for potential cause a, by expert el is as 
shown diagrammatically in Figure 7.6. 
Expert #1 used triangular form of membership function to address the inherent 
uncertainty associated with the data and information available while carrying out 
assessment on the three input parameters. L is described triangularly as (6.5,8.0,9.5) 
on the fuzzy scale as shown in Figure 7.6(a). The most likely value is 8.0,6.5 and 9.5 
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are the lower and upper least likely values, respectively. It has membership degrees of 
0.2 in the "Average", 0.7 in the "Reasonably frequent", 0.7 in the "Frequent ", and 0.25 
in the "Highly frequent", respectively. As for C (see Figure 7.6(b)), it is described 
triangularly as (7.5,8.5,9.5). 8.5 is the most likely value, 7.5 and 9.5 are the lower and 
upper least likely values used to represent C. It has membership degree of 0.75 in the 
"Critical" and 0.78 in the "Catastrophic". E is triangularly represented as (5.5,7.0, 
8.5), with 7.0 as its most likely value, 5.5 and 8.5 as its lower and upper least likely 
values (see Figure 7.6(c)). It has its membership degrees of 0.2 in the "Likely", 1.0 in 
the "Reasonably likely". 0.6 in the "Highly likely" and 0.2 in the "Definite", 
respectively. 
Table 7.5: Expert judgment input membership values for each potential malfunctioned cause 
ar ej Mx) L C E 
1 Triangular 16.5,8,9.5) 17.5,8.5,9.5) (5.5,7,8.5} 
2 Triangular {5.5,7.5,9) {7,8.5,10} 15,7.5,9.5) 
1 3 Closed interval (6,8) (7,9) {6.5,9} 
4 Trapezoidal {5.5,6.5,9,10) 15.5,7,8,10) 15,7,8,8.5) 
5 Single deterministic {7.75} (8.25) {7.6} 
1 Triangular (6,7,7.5) {6.5,7,8) (4.5,5.5,6) 
2 Triangular 16,6.5,8) (7,8,9) (6,7.5,8) 
2 3 Closed interval (5.5,5.5,7.5,7.5) (6,6,8,8) {6,6,8,8} 
4 Trapezoidal (5,6,7,8) (5,7,8,9) 15,6,7,9) 
5 Single deterministic (7.15) {7.95) {7.25} 
1 Triangular {6.5,7,7.51 {8,8.5,9) (5-5,7,8) 
2 Triangular (6,7.5,8) (7.5,8,9.5) 15,6,7) 
3 3 Closed interval (6.5,6.5,8,8) 17,7,7.5,7.51 (6.5,6.5,7.5,7.5) 
Trapezoidal (6,7,8,9) {5,7,8,8.5) (6,7,8,9) L [±5 
Single deterministic (7.5) {7.2) {7.1) 
1 Triangular (7,7.5,8) (7.5,8.5,9) 16,7,7.5) 
2 Triangular (6.5,7,8) (6.5,7,8.5) (5.5,6,7} 
4 3 Closed interval 17,7,9,9) (7.5,7.5,9.5,9.5) 17,7,8,8) 
4 Trapezoidal 16.5,7,7.5,8) (6,6.5,7,8) 16.5,7,7.5,91 
5 Single deterministic {7.95) {8.25) {7.9} 
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Figure 7.6: Expert #1 fuzzy input set definition for CPP failure 
7.5.6 Risk assessment of the Input Membership for Potential Causes 
The risk assessment carried out by each expert on each collision risk potential cause is 
depicted in Table 7.6, as given for each {L; }, I, {C; }; , and 17 . 
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Table 7.6: Risk assessment made by each expert for each potential malfunctioned cause 
al ei 
L, C1 Er 
Li 7 L2 L3 L4 L5 L, 6 L7 Cl C2 C3 C4 Cs Ei E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 Eý 
ei - - - 0.20 0.70 0.70 0.25 - - - 0.75 0.78 - - - 0.20 1.00 0.60 0.2 
e2 - - 0.17 0.50 
65 
0.85 
0.58 - - - - 0.80 0.80 - - - 0.28 0.8 
0.85 
0.50 
0.50 
al 
e3 - - - 1.00 
1.00 
0.25 
0.75 - - - - 1.0 1.0 - - - - 1.00 1.00 1.00 
e4 0.30 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.65 - - 0.60 1. 0.68 - - - 0.34 1.00 1.00 0.30 
es - - - - 0.62 0.37 - - - - 0.75 0.25 - - - - 0.45 0.60 - 
ei - - - 0.50 1.00 0.20 - - - 0.35 1.00 - - - . 25 0.75 0.65 - - 
e2 - 0.70 0.75 0.30 - - - - 1.00 0.5 - - - - 0.80 0.70 - 
a2 e3 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.25 - - - 1.00 1.0 - - - - 1.00 1.00 - 
e4 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.35 - - - 0.65 1.0 0.50 - - - 0.50 1.00 0.65 0.32 
es - - - - 0.95 0.05 - - - - 1.01 - - - - - 0.8 0.20 - 
ei - - - 0.35 1.00 0.20 - - - - 0.7 0.70 - - - 0.20 1.00 0.50 - 
e2 - - - 0.40 0.85 0.40 - - - - 1.00 0.6( - - - 0.50 1.0 - - 
a3 e3 - - - 0.50 1.00 0.50 - - - - 1.00 - - - - - 1.0 0.50 - 
e4 - - - 0.50 1.00 0.65 - - - 0.65 1.00 0.35 - - - - 1.0 1.00 0.50 
es - - - - 0.75 0.25 - - - - 1.00 - - - - - 0.90 0-10 - 
ei - - - - 0.80 0.40 - - - - 0.75 0.65 - - - - 1.00 0.35 - 
e2 - - - 0.30 1.00 0.35 - - - 0.35 1. 0.2 - - - 0.35 1.00 - - 
a4 e3 - - - - 1.00 1.00 - - - - 1.01 1.00 - - - - 1.00 1.00 - 
e4 - - - 0.35 1.00 0.40 - - - 0.70 1.00 - - - - - 1.00 0.80 0.40 
1 es - - - - 0.52 0.48 - - - - 0.75 0.25 - - - - 0.15 0.85 - 
An example is used to demonstrate the rule evaluation processes in the fuzzy inference 
engine of the proposed safety model for risk analysis. The evaluation made by 
expert #1, ei, on collision risk caused by the CPP failure, al, is used here to demonstrate 
the procedure involved in fuzzy inference engine. The "truth value" of a rule is 
determined from the conjunction of the rule antecedents. With conjunction defined as 
`minimum', rule evaluation then consists of determining the smallest (minimum) rule 
antecedent, which is taken to be the truth value of the rule. This truth value is then 
applied to all consequents of the rule. If any fuzzy output is a consequent of more than 
one rule corresponding to a particular safety expression, then that output is set to the 
highest (maximum) truth value of all the rules. 
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The 245 rules in the rule base that are used in this study are listed in Table 7.4(i)-(vii) of 
this report. The risk matrix for this study is given Figure 7.5(b) and provided in an 
exploded format as shown in Figure 7.5(c). 
7.5.7 Approximate Reasoning Evaluation of Safety Estimate 
The evaluation of S made by five experts, {e; }J for collision risk between FPSO and 
shuttle tanker due to CCP caused technical failure, at, are performed separately 
according to the general safety modelling framework using the approximate reasoning 
approach. The evaluation of S made by expert #1, el, with the following parameters is 
performed as shown in Table 7.7. 
7.5.7.1 Fuzzify Inputs 
In this evaluation, 245 rules are considered; however, only 32 rules are fired 
contributing to the actual evaluation process in this particular case. These 32 rules are 
rule numbers 130,131,132,133,137,138,139,140,165,166,167,168,172,173,174, 
175,200,201,202,203,207,208,209,210,235,236,237,238,242,243,244,245. 
The fuzzification process results are given in Table 7.6. 
In this manner, each input variable is fuzzified over all the qualifying membership 
functions required by the rules. 
7.5.7.2 Apply Fuzzy Operator 
The antecedents of the 32 rules are evaluated. For example, in applying rule #130 the 
three different pieces of the antecedent (L is "average (L4) ", C is "critical (C4)" and E 
is "likely (E4)") yield the fuzzy membership values (NL, 130, , UC, 130, PE. 13o) = (0.20,0.75, 
0.20) respectively. The fuzzy AND operator it = min(, uL,, Pc,, /4E, ) simply selects the 
minimum of the three values, that is, 0.20. The application of the fuzzy operator 
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generates the results as shown in columns 2-4 of Table 7.7 for each rule involved in the 
evaluation process. 
Table 7.7: Safety expression results of analysis membership values from rule evaluation process 
Rk NL Ac µe Si l; r (min) 
130 0.20 0.75 0.20 Fair 0.20 
131 0.20 0.75 1.00 Fair 0.20 
132 0.20 0.75 0.60 Poor 0.20 
133 0.20 0.75 0.20 Poor 0.20 
137 0.20 0.78 0.20 Fair 0.20 
138 0.20 0.78 1.00 Poor 0.20 
139 0.20 0.78 0.60 Poor 0.20 
140 0.20 0.78 0.20 Poor 0.20 
165 0.70 0.75 0.20 Fair 0.20 
166 0.70 0.75 1.00 Poor 0.70 
167 0.70 0.75 0.60 Poor 0.60 
168 0.70 0.75 0.20 Poor 0.20 
172 0.70 0.78 0.20 Poor 0.20 
173 0.70 0.78 1.00 Poor 0.70 
174 0.70 0.78 0.60 Poor 0.60 
175 0.70 0.78 0.20 Poor 0.20 
200 0.70 0.75 0.20 Fair 0.20 
201 0.70 0.75 1.00 Poor 0.70 
202 0.70 0.75 0.60 Poor 0.60 
203 0.70 0.75 0.20 Poor 0.20 
207 0.70 0.78 0.20 Poor 0.20 
208 0.70 0.78 1.00 Poor 0.70 
209 0.70 0.78 0.60 Poor 0.60 
210 0.70 0.78 0.20 Poor 0.20 
235 0.25 0.75 0.20 Fair 0.20 
236 0.25 0.75 1.00 Poor 0.25 
237 0.25 0.75 0.60 Poor 0.25 
238 0.25 0.75 0.20 Poor 0.20 
242 0.25 0.78 0.20 Poor 0.20 
243 0.25 0.78 1.00 Poor 0.25 
244 0.25 0.78 0.60 Poor 0.25 
245 0.25 0.78 0.20 Poor 0.20 
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7.5.7.3 Apply Implication Method 
Implication is implemented for each rule. A consequent is a fuzzy set represented by a 
membership function, p,,, which weights appropriately the linguistic characteristics that 
are attributed to it. The consequent is reshaped using a function associated with the 
antecedent, which is a single value. The input for the implication process is a single 
value given by the antecedent, p and the output is a fuzzy set. The following 
expression is used to generate the membership value of the consequent S for rth rule: 
p(H,,; n=1,2,3,4)=pr 
For rule #130,4u(H2; `fair (S3)')130 = µ130 = 0.20 (i. e., membership value for the 
particular safety expression "Fair (S3) " is 0.20 for rule #130). This result is given in 
column 6 of Table 7.7. 
7.5.7.4 Aggregate All Outputs 
In this step, the fuzzy sets that represent the outputs of each rule are combined into a 
single fuzzy set and this only occurs once for each output variable prior to 
normalisation. All 32 rules have been placed together to demonstrate how the output of 
each rule is combined, or aggregated, into a single fuzzy set (whose membership 
function assigns a weighting for every output value (S)). 
The aggregation of consequents, i. e. S across the rules is expressed as follows for 1th 
expert of the f* potential cause to a technical failure: 
S(e, {aj)) = {max(ßi, SI); max(ß1r, S2); maz(03,., S3); maz(ß4, r, sa)} 
(7.16) 
where r=],..., R = number of rules fired in the evaluation. 
- 239 - 
Chapter 7- Fuzzy Logic Modelling 
S assessed by Expert #1, el, for potential cause #1, a,, to a technical failure has the 
result as follows: 
S(el(ai)) = {max(0, Si); max(O, SZ); max(O. 2, S3); max(O. 2,0.25,0.6,0.7, S4)} 
Therefore; 
S(el(ai)) = {0, Si; 0, S2; 0.2, S3; 0.7, S4)} 
The output can be interpreted in such a way that S of the system is S3 (i. e., Fair) with a 
belief degree of 0.20 and S4 (i. e., Poor) with a belief degree of 0.70. 
7.5.7.5 Normalise Safety Estimate 
Since the aggregation of a fuzzy set encompasses a range of output values represented 
in different linguistic variables associated with varied memberships, it must be 
normalised before feeding S to the evidential reasoning framework for further 
evaluation in a hierarchical manner. It is worth noting that defuzzification is not 
required here in this study. 
Then the safety estimate is normalised according to the expression given as follows: 
rr 
/ 
ýI, 
t 
ý2d ý3r, 
1 /'4, t S(et (ar ))- 
Dr ' D, ' D, ' Dr rrt1 
4 
where Al = ZQý Z (i. e., the degree of safety level for the i expert). 
R=I 
(7.17) 
Note that the fuzzy aggregation function is ß-anonymous as this gives the same 
importance to the opinion of all experts. However, assessment for weight of importance 
is necessary for an overall safety result to be achieved. 
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The normalisation gives S= {0.0, Si; 0.0, S2; 0.2223, S3; 0.7777, S4}. It is obvious that 
the derived S belongs to S3 (i. e., Fair)" and S4 (i. e., Poor) with a belief of 22.23 % and 
77.77%, respectively. 
The similar computation is performed for safety assessment performed by the other four 
experts using the proposed approach for the CCP caused technical failure and the other 
three potential causes to technical failure. The results attained for all the caused 
technical failure, {a, }ý_,, by five experts, {e, Y, =,, are shown 
in Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8: Safety estimate by each expert for each potential malfunctioned cause 
a L C E 
S normaLsed ,ß ý eý S, S2 S3 S4 
ei 
(6.5,8.0, {7.5,8.5, {5.5,7.0, 0 0 0.2223 0.7777 9.5) 9.5) 8.5) 
e2 
(5.5,7.5, {7.0,8.5, {5.0,7.5, 0 0 0.4348 0.5652 9.01 10) 9.5) 
al 
e3 6.0,8.0) 7.0,9.0 6.5,9.0 0 0 0.5 0.5 
e4 
{5.5,6.5, {5.5,7.0, {5.0,7.0, 0 0 0.4286 0.5714 9.0,10.0} 8.0,10.0} 8.0,8.5} 
es 7.75 8.25 7.6 0 0 0 1.00 
ei 
(6.0,7.0, {6.5,7.0, {4.5,5.5, 0 0.1515 0.4545 0.3939 7.5) 8.0) 6.0) 
e2 
(6.0,6.5, {7.0,8.0, (6.0,7.5, 0 0 0.4828 0.5172 8.0) 9.0) 8.0 
a2 
e3 
(5.5,5.5, {6.0,6.0, {6.0,6.0, 0 0.20 0.40 0.40 7.5,7.5} 8.0,8.0 8.0,8.0} 
e4 
(5.0,6.0, (5.0,7.0, 15.096.09 0 0.20 0.40 0.40 7.0,8.0 8.0,9.0 7.0,9.0 
es {7.15} (7.95) {7.25} 0 0 0 1.00 
e' 
(6.5,7.0, {8.0,8.5, {5.5,7.0, 0 0 0.3333 0.6667 7.5) 9.0} 8.0) 
e2 
{6.0,7.5, (7.5,8.0, {5.0,6.0, 0 0 0.3703 0.6297 8.0) 9.5) 7.0) 
a3 e3 (6.5,6.5, (7,7,7.5, {6.5,6.5, 0 0 0.3333 0.6667 8.0,8.0 7.5) 7.5,7.5 
e4 
{6.0,7.0, (5.0,7.0, (6.0,7.0, 0 0 0.3939 0.6061 8.0,9) 8.0,8.5) 8.0,9.0) 
es (7.5) 7.2 7.1 0 0 0 1.00 
ei 
{7.0,7.5.0, {7.5,8.5, {6.0,7.0, 0 0 0 1.00 8.0) 9.0) 7.5) 
e2 
{6.5,7.0, (6.5,7.0, {5.5,6.0, 0 0 0.7407 0.2593 8.0) 8.5) 7.0) 
a4 
e3 
{7.0,7.0, {7.5,7.5, {7.0,7.0, 0 0 0 1.00 9.0,9.0 9.5,9.5 8.0,8.0 
e4 
(6.5,7.0, (6.0,6.5, {6.5,7.0, 0 0 0.4444 0.5556 7.5,8.0 7.0,8v 7.5,9.0 
es (7.95) (8.25) (7.9) 0 0 0.3750 0.6250 
Chapter 7- Fuzzy Logic Modelling 
7.5.8 Evidential Reasoning Synthesis of Safety Estimate 
According to the generic framework for modelling system safety shown in Figure 7.3, 
the modified ER algorithm is used to synthesise the information thus produced to assess 
the safety of the whole system. This step is concerned with safety synthesis of a system 
at various configurations such as: 
" Multi-attribute safety synthesis - The synthesis of safety estimates of various 
causes to a technical failure done by an expert, or 
" Multi-expert safety synthesis - The synthesis of safety estimates of a specific 
cause to a technical failure done by a panel of experts, or 
" Multi-attribute-multi-expert synthesis -A combination of the above two. 
A window-based and graphically designed intelligent decision system (IDS) based on 
an ER approach is used to synthesise safety estimates. 
7.5. &1 Multi-Expert Safety Synthesis 
Table 7.9 show the results of multi-expert safety synthesis on collision risk between 
FPSO & shutter tanker due to the CPP, thrusters, PRS and DP caused technical failure, 
obtained using the evidential reasoning approach. The synthesis is carried out using 
different relative weights of importance configurations among experts (experts with 
different weights). 
To calculate risk ranking index values associated with various causes to technical 
failure, it is required to describe the four safety expressions, i. e., IS,, S2, S3, S4} using 
numerical values. Experts can designate the numerical values associated with the 
defined safety expressions. Suppose K1, K2, K3, K4 represent the unscaled numerical 
values associated with S1, S2, S3, S4, respectively. Then K1, K2, K3, K4 can be 
represented as follows: 
(K1, K2iK3, K4)= {1,0.8,0.6,0.2) 
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Table 7.9: Safety synthesis for the different relative weights of importance among experts 
at 
Weight, k of each expert, el Synthesised Sj 
el e2 e3 e4 es S, S2 S3 S4 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.2776 0.7224 
5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0.3124 0.6876 
a, 1 2 3 4 5 0 0 0.2342 0.7658 
4 5 1 2 3 0 0 0.2557 0.7442 
3 4 5 1 2 0 0 0.3311 0.6689 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0.0942 0.3333 0.5725 
5 4 3 2 1 0 0.1009 0.4205 0.4786 
a2 1 2 3 4 5 0 0.0848 0.2433 0.6719 
4 5 1 2 3 0 0.0626 0.3520 0.5854 
3 4 5 1 2 0 0.0968 0.3772 0.5260 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.2438 0.7562 
5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0.2960 0.7040 
a3 1 2 3 4 5 0 0 0.1896 0.8140 
4 5 1 2 3 0 0 0.2486 0.7514 
3 4 5 1 2 0 0 0.3334 0.6666 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.2699 0.7301 
5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0.2283 0.7717 
a4 1 2 3 4 5 0 0 0.3095 0.6905 
4 5 1 2 3 0 0 0.3595 0.6405 
3 4 5 1 2 0 0 0.2235 0.7765 
The risk ranking index value Ri associated with cause i to technical failure can be 
defined as follows: 
4 
x Kr for i=1,2, ..., d (7.18) 
I=ý 
where d is the number of causes to technical failure. 
Obviously, the R; values obtained using the above expression can only show the relative 
risk level among all potential causes identified under study. The smallest R; is ranked 
first as it deserves more attention to reduce its potential risk to ALARP. The largest R; 
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is ranked last to draw least attention and minimum effort for risk reduction measure 
consideration. A smaller R; means that cause i is having relatively higher risk level and 
deserves more attention at the early design stages/or the early stages of designing 
operational strategies. The R; value for each potential cause to technical failure by a 
panel of experts carrying different relative weights is calculated and shown in 
Table 7.10 (raw results) and Table 7.11 (ranking). 
Table 7.10: Raw safety ranking (multi-attribute: expert with different weights) 
Weight, Ranking of a, 
e, e2 e3 e4 es a, a2 a3 a4 
I 1 1 1 1 0.33040 0.38984 0.29752 0.30796 
5 4 3 2 1 0.32496 0.42874 0.31840 0.29132 
1 2 3 4 5 0.29368 0.34830 0.27584 0.32380 
4 5 1 2 3 0.30226 0.37649 0.29944 0.34470 
3 4 5 1 2 0.33244 0.40896 0.33336 0.28940 
From Table 7.11 it can be noted that regardless of the weight difference between each 
expert allocated, the potential risk caused by thruster failure, a2, is always the lowest. 
As the relative weights, > of the panel experts change as {)y; k; X3; )14; X5} = {5,4,3,2, 
1), DPS caused technical failure is ranked first, whereas the potential risk induced by 
PSR and DPS are ranked second and third, respectively. As the relative weights change 
to {1,2,3,4,5), then PSR, a3, is ranked first, CPP, al, second, DPS, a4, third and 
thrusters, a2, last. The results of other weight configurations are depicted in Table 7.10. 
Table 7.11: Safety ranking (experts with different weights) 
Weight, k Ranking of a, 
el e2 e3 e4 es a, a2 a3 a4 
I I I 1 1 3 4 1 2 
5 4 3 2 1 3 4 2 1 
1 2 3 4 5 2 4 1 3 
4 5 1 2 3 2 4 1 3 
3 4 5 1 2 2 4 3 1 
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The ranking results for risks due to various potential causes as assessed by a panel of 
experts may help designers understand the anticipated technical problem in question so 
that an improved risk reduction measure is to be incorporated in the new design or a 
more innovative design is to be carried out to reduce the potential risk as estimated. 
7.5.8.2 Multi-Attribute Safety Synthesis 
Table 7.12 shows the results of multi-attribute safety synthesis by each expert, {e, }5 , 
on the four anticipated causes to the technical failure, {a, }; ,, which result 
in collision 
between FPSO and shuttle tanker. The result produced by expert #1, el, is as follows: 
multi-attribute safety synthesis (e, ) = {0, Si; 0.02891, S2; 0.21430, S3; 0.75674, S4} 
The results produced by other experts are also shown in Table 7.12. 
Table 7.12: Multi-attribute safety synthesis by each expert 
ei 
Synthesised Sj 
st S2 S3 S4 
ei 0 0.02891 0.21430 0.75674 
e2 0 0 0.50900 0.49099 
e, 0 0.03943 0.27750 0.68304 
e4 0 0.03989 0.40832 0.55178 
e5 0 0 0.06283 0.93716 
Suppose a unity of relative weight of importance is given to the panel of experts, i. e., 
{X1; )g; X3; X4; 1 }= (1,1,1,1,1). Based on the general framework, the multi-attribute- 
multi-expert safety synthesis = {0, Si; 0.01660, S2; 0.25640, S3; 0.72697, S4}. 
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7.5.8.3 Multi Attribute Multi-Expert Safety Synthesis 
The multi-attribute-multi-expert safety synthesis = {0, S1; 0.01776, S2; 0.28779, S3; 
0.69440, S4} with a variance in weights among experts as {X1; Aei X3; )4; N} = (5,4,3, 
2,1). The results of multi-attribute-multi-expert safety synthesis for other weight 
variance configurations are depicted in Table 7.13. 
Table 7.13: Multi-attribute-multi-expert safety synthesis by experts carrying different weights 
Weight, k Sj (Synthesised) 
el e2 e3 e4 es S, S2 S3 S4 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0.02891 0.21430 0.75674 
5 4 3 2 1 0 0.01776 0.28779 0.69440 
1 2 3 4 5 0 0.01517 0.22057 0.76423 
4 5 1 2 3 0 0.01125 0.28106 0.70766 
3 4 5 1 2 0 0.01721 0.27383 0.70892 
Such results clearly give the estimate of the four causes leading to the technical failure 
in an FPSO-shuttle tanker collision risk scenario. Thus, appropriate design action can 
be taken accordingly. 
7.6 Pros and Cons of Using Fuzzy Logic for Risk Analysis 
Although such FL technique is possibility rather than probability based, it operates over 
the same numeric range. It possesses several potential benefits and limitations as have 
been recognised and thus outlined in Sections 7.7.1 and 7.7.2 respectively. 
7.6.1 Advantages of Fuzzy Logic Risk Modelling 
The main features and advantages that the proposed FL based framework offers over 
other alternative modelling approaches are that: 
" It is conceptually easy to understand with "natural" mathematics. 
Chapter 7- Fuzzy Logic Modelling 
" It is tolerant to vague or imprecise data. Its use of fuzzy set theory is 
particularly adapted to the representation and manipulation of imprecision and 
uncertainty of the linguistic labels that define the criteria of the classes. 
" It presents a flexible way of dealing with different forms of uncertainty. For 
example, there is a lot of freedom in choosing the membership functions of 
fuzzy sets. 
" It is more intuitive than differential equations, and enables analysts and 
decision-makers to capture knowledge of how the system behaves in everyday 
linguistic terms (i. e., based on natural language). 
" Though, making use of heuristics, it still offer a convenient way to express and 
make the most of the experience of experts' common sense knowledge. 
" It has the ability to model any very complex or highly non-linear function to any 
arbitrary degree of accuracy. 
" It is based on rules (i. e., rule-based logic) that can be specified with a natural 
language. Basically, the laws are naturally broken down into individual IF- 
THEN statements that lend themselves to parallel processing. 
When basic probability or the Bayesian concept is not considered suitable for tacking a 
risk-based assessment, FL techniques can be used to complement the probability 
concept. Nonetheless, it can also be mixed with this conventional technique, as well as 
others, e. g., evidential reasoning approach (as verified in the undertaken study of the 
framework). 
7.6.2 Disadvantages of Fuzzy Logic Risk Modelling 
Despite their sensational and potential ability to address risk assessment, certain 
drawbacks can be attributable to the FL approach. These limitations include the fact 
that the approach: 
" Needs system/process expert to design solution. 
" Needs to select balance of inputs and membership functions. 
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" May give combinatorial explosion as the number of fuzzy variables or fuzzy sets 
increase, the number of rules increases exponentially. This can quickly make 
the fuzzy system(s) slow, confusing, and difficult to maintain. 
" Needs to choose best rule evaluation process from quite a number of 
possibilities. 
" Is leading to relative values for comparing options at a design stage and not 
absolute values. 
Compared to other classical risk-based techniques, FL requires higher computational 
effort due to the complex inference mechanisms needed. Nonetheless, utilising Fuzzy 
Logic Toolbox in Matlab6.5 (The MathWorks, 2005) can result in reasonable run times. 
Finally, FL is certainly not optimal, nor recommendable, for risk analysis when there 
are a lot of data that could be used to inform a probabilistic approach that can yield a 
satisfying result. 
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
The use of interval mathematics and possibility distribution such as approximate 
reasoning method is a departure from conventional probability-based techniques which 
rely rather heavily on randomness and frequency to quantify risks on engineering 
systems. The framework proposed in this study outlines and explains a philosophy for 
subjective safety modelling for offshore risk analysis using approximate reasoning and 
evidential reasoning approaches. Various forms of membership functions that could be 
used in representing fuzzy linguistic variables to qualify risk levels have been discussed. 
The background of approximate reasoning based on fuzzy-logic-techniques and 
evidential reasoning approach is outlined. 
Fuzzy set theory enables uncertainties to be described mathematically and possessed in 
the analysis of a system. The safety assessment of systems described takes into account 
non-stochastic uncertainties and subjective estimates of objective values by expert 
judgements based on fuzzy set theory. It is possible by this means to obtain reliable 
safety related descriptions of the system under scrutiny for further processing with 
confidence. 
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The proposed framework offers a great potential in safety assessment and decision 
support of maritime systems, especially in the initial concept design stages where the 
related safety information is scanty or with great uncertainty involved. Safety 
assessment using approximate reasoning approach can formulate domain human 
experts' experience and safety engineering knowledge; at the same time information of 
difference properties from various sources can be transformed to become the knowledge 
base, used in the FL inference process. The results obtained from the case study on 
collision risk between FPSO and shuttle tanker have demonstrated that such a 
framework provides safety analysts and designers with a convenient tool that can be 
used at various stages of the design process of offshore engineering systems in 
performing risk analysis. The method described forms a supplement to concepts and 
methodologies already in use for offshore safety assessment. 
The safety culture in many industries including the maritime sector in the UK has been 
changing over the last several years. In general, many industries are moving towards a 
"goal setting" risk-based regime. This gives more flexibility to safety engineers to 
employ the latest risk modelling techniques and decision making/optimisation tools. It 
may be very beneficial that many advances that have been developed and are being 
developed in general engineering and technology are further explored, exploited and 
also applied in order to facilitate risk modelling and decision-making. 
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Chapter Summary 
The incorporation of the human element into a probabilistic risk-based model is one that 
requires a possibilistic integration of appropriate techniques and/or that of vital inputs of 
linguistic nature. Whilst fuzzy logic is an excellent tool for such integration, it tends not 
to cross its boundaries of possibility theory, except via an evidential reasoning 
supposition. Therefore, a fuzzy-Bayesian network (FBN) is proposed to enable a bridge 
to be made into a probabilistic setting of the domain. This bridge is formalised by way 
of the mass assignment theory. A framework is also proposed for its use in maritime 
safety assessment. Its implementation has been demonstrated in a maritime human 
performance case study that utilises performance-shaping factors as the input variables 
of this groundbreaking FBN risk model. 
8.1 Introduction 
In risk analysis, cause-effect relationships are vital for achieving the modelling process. 
Thus, modelling in a network format becomes useful as it also gives an intuitive vital 
representation that mimics the domain of the real-world. The most useful form of such 
a model is a casual diagram or network usual termed a directed acyclic graph (see 
Chapter 6), which uses nodes for representing distribution knowledge of variables and 
arcs for representing casual influences between nodes. If the data for a nodal variable is 
sufficient enough to enable the quantitative reasoning, then the form of the data (e. g. 
given as frequency of occurrence of the event) can be converted into a probability 
distribution for the analysis. The inherent uncertainty due to randomness then makes 
this a random node that can typically be applied in a Bayesian network (BN) 
(Pearl, 1988 and as given in Chapter 6). On the other hand, if information associated 
with a node exhibits uncertainty that is vague, ambiguous or fuzzy, then it cannot be 
Chapter 8- Fuzzy-Bayesian Network 
represented precisely by a probability distribution. Thus, fuzzy logic (FL) 
(Zadeh, 1975) may have to be utilised to achieve some a possibility distribution via a 
rule-base inference engine that permits the subjective reasoning (See Chapter 7). 
When, for example, two nodes are both defined by possibilistic values, they exhibit 
conditional possibility and fuzzy set theory features. If they are both defined by 
probabilistic values, they exhibit conditional probability and Bayes' theory features. 
The obvious problem within the casual network arises when a fuzzy event node has a 
casual influence connection with that of a random event node. In this case, Bayes' 
theorem cannot be applied for the casual influence due to the fuzzy event present in the 
conditional connection. Therefore, a method of converting from possibility-to- 
probability distributions is most desirable. If such a method can provide bi-directional 
characteristics, then the fuzzy nature of variable can always be recouped. The theory of 
mass assignment (Baldwin, et al., 1996) has been proven to offer one such feature. 
Hence, the causal formalism of using a combined fuzzy and Bayesian approach can be 
made possible. The resulting proposed route is given by the model name - "fuzzy 
Bayesian network". In recent research, developments and applications, FL and BN 
have both emerged as powerful and effective tools for reasoning under conditions of 
uncertainty. Thus, it is certainly quite appropriate to investigate the amalgamation of 
both techniques. 
The amalgamation of FL and BN may well prove to provide the pioneering means of 
incorporating human factors/elements in a probabilistic risk analysis model domain. 
Obviously, such an accomplishment is bound to be a key improvement to the safety in 
the marine and offshore industry especially as human error has a substantial impact on 
the reliability of complex systems. While much attention has been placed on improving 
the design, construction, and operations of maritime operating equipment based on 
casualties, the human factor element remains the predominate contributing cause of 
accidents (The Nautical Institute, 2003) within each phase. Certainly, the marine and 
offshore industry cannot afford to simply accept that this situation is inevitable. 
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8.2 Fuzziness and Probability 
Probability and fuzziness are related but different concepts. Fuzziness is a type of 
deterministic uncertainty, which describes the event class ambiguity. Fuzziness 
measures the degree to which an event occurs, not whether it occurs. An issue is 
whether the event class can be unambiguously distinguished from its opposite. 
Probability arouses from the question of whether or not an event occurs. Moreover, it 
assumes that the event class is crisply defined and that the law of non-contradiction (i. e., 
AnÄ=0, where A is a set in the finite space) holds. Kosko (1990) shows that 
fuzziness occurs when the law of non-contradiction (and equivalently the law of 
excluded middle, i. e., Aui=X, where X is the universe of discourse) is violated. 
However, it seems more appropriate to investigate the fuzzy probability for the latter 
case (Dubois & Prade, 1993), than to completely dismiss probability as a special case of 
fuzziness (Kosko, 1990). 
A fuzzy probability extends the traditional notion of a probability when there are the 
outcomes that belong to several event classes at the same time but to different degrees. 
It is important to note that neither fuzziness nor probability governs the physical 
processes in nature, though they are orthogonal concepts that characterize different 
aspects of human experience (Dubois & Prade, 1993). 
8.3 Comparison of Axioms of Probabilistic and Possibility-Based Methods 
The objective of this section is to identify the differences in the axioms of probability 
and possibility and the impact of these differences on how probabilistic and fuzzy set 
methods model uncertainties and assess the reliability of a system. 
Fuzzy set methods use possibility, which measures the degree to which an event is 
feasible, to quantify the likelihood this event will occur. One can think of possibility as 
complementary to the degree of surprise if an event occurs (Chen, et al., 1999). 
Possibility ranges from zero to one, like probability. 
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A key axiomatic difference between possibility and probability is that the possibility of 
a union of events (disjoint or overlapping) is equal to the maximum of the possibilities 
of the individual events, whereas the probability of a union of disjoint events is equal to 
the sum of the probabilities of these events. This leads to the following observations 
(Chen, et al., 1999): 
1. The possibilities of an event and its complement may add up to more than one, 
whereas the probabilities of an event and its complement must add up to one. 
2. The possibility of failure of a system, consisting of identical, independent 
components connected in series, is equal to the possibility of failure of one 
component, whereas the probability of failure of the system increases with the 
number of components. 
3. The possibility of failure of a system, consisting of identical, independent 
components connected in parallel, is equal to the possibility of failure of a single 
component. 
4. From observation 2, it is concluded that the possibility of an event can be 
smaller than its probability. For example, even if the possibility of failure of 
each component is greater than the corresponding probability, a system with 
enough components will have a possibility of failure smaller than its probability 
of failure. This result is counterintuitive - since one may reason that the 
possibility of an event should be greater or equal to its probability because if an 
event is probable it should also be possible. 
According to observation 2, a fuzzy set method is likely to underestimate the chance of 
failure of a system with a large number of independent failure modes. On the other 
hand, it can be too conservative in systems for which the failure region is very small 
compared to the range of the uncertain variables. Therefore, compared to fuzzy set 
methods, probabilistic methods may provide a more accurate estimate of the chance of 
failure if there is enough data to model random uncertainties accurately and modelling 
errors are small. 
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On the other hand, it is easier to determine the most conservative fuzzy set model than 
to determine the most conservative probabilistic model that is consistent with given 
information about a problem. A primary reason is that, although the area below the 
probability density function of a random variable must be equal to one, there is no such 
constraint on the possibility density function. 
8.4 Proposed Semantics for a Fuzzy-Bayesian Network 
The key feature of the proposed Fuzzy-Bayesian networks (FBNs) is that they enable 
modelling and reasoning about uncertainty that can be due to a combination of inherent 
vagueness and randomness. Hence, essential to their formalism is the idea of relating, 
combining and converting possibilitistic values into their probabilistic counterpart for 
use within the same model framework. As such, it is quite possible that the proposed 
FBN modelling may realise anything FL can do and also inherit the entire rigor, 
flexibility and other superior properties of probabilistic approaches. 
8.4.1 Possibility-Probability Directed Acyclic Graph 
A FBN provides factorised representation of a possibility-probability model that 
explicitly captures both a logical and network structure typical in human-engineered 
models. More generally, a FBN is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of a BN nature that 
allows for the encoded probability distribution of a node to be derived from its fuzzy 
derivation. The fuzzy-to-probability distribution conversion is normally induced via a 
suitable algorithm, e. g., by mass assignment (MA) formalism. 
(a) A fuzzy (i. e., possibilistic) 
event chance node 
(b) A Bayesian (i. e., 
probabilistic) event chance node 
Figure 8.1: Proposed nodal representation for fuzzy and Bayesian chance events 
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Figure 8.1(a) gives a proposed nodal representation for a fuzzy event, A. Such a node 
basically obtains its prior probability input from a fuzzy set output. In order to enable 
this conversion of probability distribution, a conversion inference via MA is utilised. 
The typical representation of a random event, B, in a BN is as shown in Figure 8.1(b). 
To understand how they are utilised in a FBN, it is worth having the most basic formats 
of their representation within the network. These are as given in Figure 8.2(a)-(d). 
Figure 8.2: Representations of proposed FBN structure for two nodal events 
As expected, from a Bayesian viewpoint, a direct probabilistic inference linking from 
Event G to Event F is represented by a line of its terminating arrowhead resting on the 
later. An optional direct possibilistic inference (not shown in Figure 8.2) may be 
represented as a dashed terminating arrowhead line between fuzzy events. Such an 
optional possibilistic inference can enable a means to which a comparison study can be 
effected between conditional possibility and conditional probability of the fuzzy events. 
8.4.2 Conditional Probability of Fuzzy Events 
For a probability distribution P(. ) on a finite universe X, the conditional probability off 
given g can now be defined as the expected value of the conditional probability of the 
focal elements for mass assignment of f, mf, given the focal elements for mass 
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assignment off, mg, relative to P(. ) and assuming that the joint MA generated by f and g 
is given by mf x mg (Baldwin et al., 1996). The idea behind this is that since the 
definitions for f and g are uncertain there is also uncertainty regarding to which 
(classical) conditional probability P(f I g) refers. If the assumption is made that the two 
definitions come from different and independent sources, then mf x mg gives us a 
probability distribution across possible conditional probability values. In this case a 
natural estimate for P(f g) is to take the expected value of this distribution. 
For P(. ), a probability distribution on a finite universe X, and f and g fuzzy subsets ofX 
such that g is normalized, the conditional probability off given g is defined by: 
P(f l 8) _ Ey 
P(F, n Gj) 
P(Gj) t(F, 
)mg(G, ) (8.1) 
Fc 
where ml, {F; };, and mg, {G; }; are the MAs and focal elements for f and g, respectively. 
Now for any normalized fuzzy set g, a posterior distribution result from conditioning on 
g can be clearly defined, according to Equation 8.1. This is referred to as the least 
prejudiced distribution (lpd) of g with respect to the prior P(x). 
More formally: 
b'x E X; lpds (x) = P(xIg) = P(x) Y. 
m 
((G 
j) (8.2) 
c,: xcc, PGj) 
Indeed it can be shown (Baldwin et al., 1996) that the probability off given g as defined 
in Equation 8.1 is equivalent to the probability off relative to the distribution lpdg on X 
(Zadeh, 1968), that is: 
I'(f 18) _ 2: Juf(x)IPdB(x) 
xýn 
(8.3) 
where Ni(x) is the membership function of the fuzzy subset f on X. 
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The notion of lpd provides a mechanism by which a fuzzy set can be converted into a 
probability distribution. In the absence of any prior knowledge, the lpd might be 
relative to the uniform prior on knowing that g naturally infers the distribution lpdg. If, 
however, fuzzy sets are to serve as descriptions of probability distributions, the 
converse must also hold. In other words, given a probability distribution, it will be 
required to hold that there is a unique fuzzy set conditioning on which this distribution 
yields. 
8.5 Mechanism for Fuzzy-Bayesian Conversion 
Fuzzy-Bayesian inference is not quite direct as one would like to imagine. Instead, it 
relies on the use of the theory of MAs to play the central role. Therefore, the inferential 
pattern goes from a fuzzy set into MAs, and then from MAs into the prior probabilities. 
With Bayesian inference being enabled, the likelihood probabilities must be provided 
by the likes of this similar means. Likewise, the concept of conditional independence is 
applied to simplify the joint probability distribution of the modelling domain. 
8.5.1 Basics of Mass Assignment 
MA unifies probability, possibility and fuzzy sets into a single theory termed mass 
assignment theory (MAT). If two or more groups of MAs are necessary to provide a 
single MA, then operations of MAT would have to be applied. 
8.5.1.1 Mass Assignment Theory 
The theory of MAs has been developed by Baldwin (see Baldwin, 1992; Baldwin et al., 
1995) to provide a formal framework for manipulating both probabilistic and fuzzy 
uncertainties. Without such a theory, the construction of systems capable of handling 
uncertainty in a unified manner may be difficult. 
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The motivation for considering MAs (Baldwin, 1991; 1992; Baldwin, et al., 1995) is to 
provide semantics for membership functions of fuzzy sets. Essentially, the idea is that a 
fuzzy (or vague) concept is simply a concept for which the definition is uncertain or 
variable (across, say, a population of voters (Williamson, 1994)). Each possible 
definition corresponds to a subset of the universe of discourse and a probability 
distribution MA across these definitions can then be defined. Given such a distribution, 
the focal sets are taken to be those with nonzero mass. In fact, for the above definition 
the added assumption is made that the uncertainty is only regarding the degree of 
generality or specificity of the definition so that the focal sets form a nested hierarchy. 
The membership value of an element is then defined as the sum of the masses for the 
focal sets containing that element. Given these constraints, there is a unique MA 
corresponding to any fuzzy set. Note that a slightly different perspective on the above 
is to view the definition of a vague concept as a random set into the power set of the 
universe and the MA as its distribution (Goodman, 1985; Kreinovich, 1997). 
A MA on a finite set Xis a function m: P(X) -+ [0,1] such that Es'ý7x m(S) = 1. Note 
that mf has the property that it is nonzero only on some sequence of subsets of X{Sj} 
such that Sj c S; + j. Such MAs are strongly related to consonant basic probability 
assignments, which in actual fact represent a family of probability distributions. 
Furthermore, mfsatisfies Zs, ýx m(S) = µß(x). Now this is a fundamental requirement of 
any MA corresponding to f. 
8.5.1.2 Operations of Mass Assignment 
One of the most attractive features of MA theory is that operations of MA are defined in 
a way compatible to set operations. They include the complement (), meet (n), and 
join (v). Given two MAs, m(A) = {M;: ml} and m(B) = {MM: mj}, on universal set X, 
the general definitions of these operations are stated as follows: 
" Meet of m(A) and m(B) is the intersection: m(A) n m(B) = {xk : yk}, where the 
new focal elements are given by xk = Mi n M; and yk =Zy, , respectively. l, l ; x(I=xk 
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" Join of m(A) and m(B) is the union: m(A) u m(B) = {xk : yk), where the new 
focal elements are given by xk = M; u Mj and yk = yj , respectively. 
Q; xi =xk 
" Complement of m(A) is the complementation: m(A) = m(fl =X- A), VA E 
P(X). Also, the focal elements of m(A) are the complements of the focal 
elements of m(A). 
y,, = m; Vi and yU = mj Vi are referred to as the row and column constraints 
respectively. It can be noted that the complement is determined uniquely. However, 
the meet and the join operations are not determined uniquely because of possible 
combinations of redistribution of mass over new focal elements as determined by taking 
either intersection (meet) or union (join) of original focal elements. 
8.5.2 Inferential Relationship 
In order to enable inference via MA from a fuzzy set (FS) weights have to be assigned 
by a population of voters or a panel of experts to every fuzzy subset, p1, /p2, ..., p, on 
the universe of discourse. In this layer, each weight, w;, by members can be either 0 or 
1. This can then be transformed to the corresponding MA, i. e., ml, m2, ..., m,,, at the 
MA layer on each focal element, x,. In contract to the basic probability assignment in 
Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory, 0 can be a focal element. At the probability distribution 
(PD) level, w; -a [0,1 ] and Ew, =1. 
Chapter 8- Fuzzy-Bayesian Network 
Fuzzy set 
Fuzzy set layer 
ýC 
0 . ýy 
.5 b 
ä1 
Probability distribution 
w; =0or1 
Mass assignment layer 
w; = 11Ix, l or 0 
Probability distribution layer 
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Figure 8.3: Illustrative overview of a FS-MA-PD inferential relationship 
Figure 8.3 gives a mapping overview of the FS-MA-PD inferential relationship. 
Sections 8.5.2.1 to 8.5.2.3 provide the breakdown of this inferential process. Note that 
the entire inferential process is bi-directional. The key advantage offered by the bi- 
directional nature is that the originally normalised output fuzzy set values can be 
obtained from the achieved probability distribution values and vice-versa. 
8.5.2.1 Fuzzy Set-Mass Assignment Relation 
Let S be a sample space. Then, a mass assignment ms associated with S is a function 
from the power set, P(X), to an interval of real numbers such that ms : P(X) -> [0,1] and 
EAcS m. s(A) = 1. A subset AcS is referred to the focal element for mass assignment ms 
if ms(A) > 0. Given a normalized discrete fuzzy subset F= x1/p + ... + x/µ over S, it 
can be denoted that µ= pf(x; ). Without loss of generality for the normalised fuzzy 
subset, one can assume that: 
Then a MA with nested focal elements {xi,..., xi} for i=1, ..., n can 
be derived as: 
mss(A) = pa - p; + i, if A= {x1, ..., x; 
} (8.4) 
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In effect then the definition of MA is a weakening of the definition of DS basic 
probability assignments to allow for the possibility of allocating nonzero mass to the 
empty set. Besides the fact that the calculus beyond the verification role is enhanced, 
the MA theory furnishes the calculus to handle imprecision, whereas the theory, due to 
DS, deals mainly with uncertainty caused by lack of information from probability point 
of view. 
8.5.2.2 Mass Assignment-Probabilities Relation 
In MA theory, there exists the relation between a discrete probability distribution, e. g., a 
normalized histogram, associated to elements of a sample space, S, on the power set, 
P(X), and a least prejudiced probability distribution, lpdA, (i. e., a selection rule) for each 
AE P(X). Basically, lpd4 is the case for which the assumption is made that mass 
assigned to a set A is equally likely to belong to any element in A. As a result mass 
assigned to A is distributed equally across all elements in A. More formally, given a 
mass m(A); 
MA W) = isAA) 
b'x EA (8.5) 
where 1 /IAA is the lpd of A. IAA denotes the magnitude (modulus) of A, which refers to 
its size. 
Masses assigned to singletons {x) are now summed and assigned as probabilities for X. 
A probability P5(x) is therefore defined as, 
Ps(z) = 1: 
m, (A)_ j: lpd A (z)m, (A) 
ACS, xc. A 
JAI 
Aq. S, xc. A 
(8.6) 
The main role of the selection rules is in maintaining consistency between a fuzzy set 
and different probability distributions that satisfy Equation 8.6. 
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8.5.2.3 Mapping Between Fuzzy Set and Probability 
Using the relation of fuzzy set-MA and MA-probability, one can now obtain the 
mapping between a fuzzy set and a probability distribution as shown in Figure 8.4. Let 
PS(xk) be a probability of a sample space S, and 1pdA; (xk) be a selection rule for xk from 
the focal element A; = x1, ..., x;, i=1,..., 
k of a MA. Then: 
n 
Ps(xk) = 2: lPd ei (xk )"(Pr - /dill ) 
i=k 
(8.7) 
It is noted that all focal elements are nested as they correspond to the level sets (a-cuts) 
for pi Vi =1,..., n. 
Selection 
rules 
x* 
rII 
MAT 
Nested 
focal 
elements 
4- - -º r\ Probability Feature distribution fuzzy set 
Figure 8.4: Mapping consistency between a fuzzy set and a probability distribution 
The selection rules 1pd4, can be tuned if the fuzzy set (i. e., the membership values pi's) 
is always manually changed in order for PS to remain the same. This feature is 
important to determine the valid range of data for a given fuzzy set. Inconsistency in 
the data set is detected by obtaining some invalid probability in Equation 8.7. Such 
results are obtained when the order of membership values is not maintained. From a 
different angle, this can be used to determine what is lacking in order to keep the 
consistency. 
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The selection rules can also be used to establish a many-to-many relationship between 
probability distributions of data and its fuzzy set definition. Selection rules can also be 
one way of implementing experts' perception. In this case, selection rules are given 
arbitrarily. Then either a fuzzy set for a given data set or an ideal data set biased by 
experts' perception (i. e., a selection rules) for a fuzzy set representing a concept can be 
obtained by Equation 8.7. 
8.6 Proposed Fuzzy-Bayesian Network Methodology 
A FBN reasoning process has been developed to provide a natural framework for 
maritime risk assessment and decision support. A flow chart of the approach is shown 
in Figure 8.5, and this format ensures that the FBN analysis are conducted in a 
disciplined, well managed, and consistent manner that promotes the delivery of quality 
maritime decision-making results. The depth or extent of application of the 
methodology should be commensurate with the nature and significance of the problem. 
Nonetheless, the entire methodology is made up of three key modules: 
" Module 1: Normalized fuzzy set from output values of FL module. 
" Module 2: MA module. 
" Module 3: Input values as prior probabilities of BN module. 
In building a FBN model, one can first focus on specifying the qualitative structure of 
the domain and then focus on quantifying the influences. When finished, one is 
guaranteed to have a complete specification of the possibility and probability 
distributions. Then following evidence propagation, an intuitive evaluation for 
decision-making can be enabled through added nodes of decisions and utilities as in a 
BN. Hugin (Jensen, 1993) can thus be is used as the robust BN programming 
environment for the risk modelling and its probability calculations. Explanations for 
each of the underlying modules are given as follows: 
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Figure 8.5: Flow chart of a proposed FBN framework of analysis 
Module I- Normalized fuzzy set from output values of FL module: The 
aggregation procedure acting on fuzzy sets means that fuzzy sets are generated from 
data sets, and aggregated by fuzzy set operations. Therefore, the aggregated fuzzy 
conclusion for a risk modelling output may be processed via the assignment of weights 
from a panel of experts. 
Module 2- MA module: The aggregation procedure acting on MAs means applying 
MA theory operations such as meet and join on MA's generated least prejudiced 
distributions. Only then can the aggregated MA (as in Equation 8.5) be suited for its 
transformation into the probability distributions of its essential focal elements. 
Considering the original motivation of MA theory as a treatment of evidences, it is 
natural to treat each data set as evidence, and thus, to treat features extracted from a 
single text as a focal element and sizes of features are aggregated directly as selected 
rules of aggregated MAs using MA theory. 
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Module 3- Input values as prior probabilities of BN module: The aggregation 
procedure acting on least prejudiced distributions means that it can be generated from 
the MAs, and transformed into a probability distributions using Equation 8.6. 
8.7 Fuzzy-Bayesian Analysis Model in a Maritime Domain 
The fuzzy-Bayesian approach possesses great potential across many domains of marine 
and offshore applications. To provide a brief insight into some potential areas that 
could quite easily use fuzzy-Bayesian modelling, the following case is sited: 
" Incorporation of human element in a risk analysis. 
To illustrate the universal applicability of FBNs to a modelling domain, it is best to 
imagine a situation in which causality plays a role but where an understanding of what 
is actually going on exhibits both vague and random features. Thus, things need to be 
described possibilistically, probabilistically and by inference. 
8.7.1 Incorporation of Human Element into Risk Analysis 
Human reliability analysis (HRA) endeavours to predict the probability of human error 
(typically uncorrected error) against a specified base rate. Whilst it is concerned with 
causal analysis, it relies heavily on factors (in the operator, the environment, the 
equipment or the task) that affect the likelihood of error. These factors which are 
termed `performance-shaping factors' are not models in their own right, but rather, they 
are input attributes that have an effect on the output of human performance. In the 
maritime industry, the quantification of such attributes exhibits a vast amount of 
vagueness for which their direct input into a probabilistic model needs to allow for this 
uncertainty. Hence, FBN is offered as the assessment platform. 
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8.7.1.1 Human Errors in Maritime Operations 
Human errors include (HSE, 2002): 
" Slips - making an unintended action through lack of attention or skill. 
" Lapses - unintended action through memory failures. 
" Mistakes - an intended but incorrect action. 
" Violations -a deliberate deviation from standard practice. 
Human errors in marine operations, such as towing or ballast system operation, tend to 
have immediate effects. They may be recovered with no harm done, or they may have 
some direct harmful impact. This may then require some form of emergency response 
to mitigate the impacts. Similarly, errors may occur during evacuation, with a direct 
effect, e. g. incorrect release of a lifeboat. 
Sam: UKP&ipct 
Figure 8.6: A typical UK P&l Club analysis of major claims 
Errors can also occur during maintenance, and may then remain undiscovered (latent) 
until the equipment is required. These errors in effect cause equipment unavailability, 
and the significance of this depends on the system design. For example, this type of 
error may result in a ballast pump being unavailable when required. In fact, human 
error is human misery; of careers blighted, lives lost, seafarers injured and the 
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environment despoiled. As continually stressed by the UK P&I Club, equipment, 
mechanical and structural failure together is far outstripped by human error as the sole 
or major cause of incidents giving rise to claims. In looking at major claims, a current 
report (The Nautical Institute, 2003) finds that more than 62% (See Figure 8.6) are 
directly attributable to error by one or more individuals. 
8.7.1.2 Human Factors in Maritime Risk Assessments 
Wherever there is a human interacting with a system there is a human element issue. 
Modern technology has revolutionised the way in which a ship is operated, but lack of 
attention to the human-system interface, in terms of the design, layout, and integration 
of systems, and training in their use, is a major root cause of many accidents today. The 
maritime industry recognises that such accidents are the direct consequence of human 
failings and that in reality many of the disregarded incidents and errors have a strong 
element of human involvement. 
Since it is rightly the crew and the shipboard management that will always be working 
in an increasingly demanding, technically complex system, the maritime industry needs 
to grasp human element issues at a higher, more integrated level to make a real 
difference to safety. A FBN may well prove to be adequate in an integrated task of 
reducing the risk due to human factor. Obviously, the key to improvement is in the 
close involvement of all stakeholders to ensure that a ship is `fit for purpose', and that 
the master and his crew are provided with the proper tools and adequately training to be 
able to conduct their business in a safe and efficient manner. 
8 7.1.3 Performance-shaping Factors as Model Variables 
Performance-shaping factors (PSFs) are those factors that can have positive or negative 
influence/effect on the effectiveness of human performance and the likelihood of errors 
(HSE, 1999). It is essential that the proper PSFs be identified to determine the effect 
external influences have on the basic human error probabilities (HEPs). Examples of 
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PSFs in the marine and offshore industry, as well as with most other industries, include 
(Boring & Gertman, 2004; Brown & Amrozowicz, 1996): 
" Available time. 
" Stress and stressors. 
" Experience and training. 
" Complexity and workload. 
" Ergonomics (including human-machine interaction). 
" Environmental effects. 
" The quality of operating procedures. 
" Language and culture. 
" Morale and motivation. 
" Operator fitness for duty. 
" Work processes. 
anmew Mman. rtor 
ti In 1.0 
Lcý Irn+an. rtor 
w-babdRr 
1E-8 
Figure 8.7: Mean human error probability as a function of PSF influence 
These factors, which are "human process variables" in the operator, the environment, 
the equipment or the task, may be linked directly to human error through quantification. 
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Despite their clear importance in human error likely situations, they have been hard to 
implement in quantitative risk assessment. The reason for this is more or less obvious; 
how is it possible to estimate for example culture or self-confidence that actually does 
influence the safety of a system? PSFs are therefore important to take into account, but 
the integrating strategy is more indistinct (Kjestveit, et al., 2003). Seaver & Stillwell 
(1983) addressed the need for approaches that explicates paired comparisons, ranking 
and rating, direct numerical estimation, and indirect numerical estimation techniques 
applied to error estimation, with a particular emphasis on aggregating the estimates 
from multiple experts to arrive at error probabilities. Thus, due to the qualitative 
characteristics of PSFs, FL approach can be utilised to allow for their input via expert 
judgement process. 
PSFs work to increase or decrease the error rate due to situational characteristics. If, for 
example, the person is experiencing considerable stress, his or her task performance will 
decrease proportionate to the level of stress. Conversely, if a person has extensive 
training and practice doing a task, that person's proficiency may mitigate the chance of 
human error. Figure 8.7 shows the influence of the PSF (x- axis) on mean HEP values 
(y- axis) (Boring & Gertman, 20(4). 
8.7.1.4 Developing Degree of Relationship Rule-Base 
Individual performance is degraded when the body's circadian rhythms are disrupted. 
For example, when loading and unloading cargo is coupled with scheduling pressures, 
time stress can occur. In addition to the stress that can be induced from long work 
hours, fatigue/non-fitness for duty becomes a critical factor. Studies have shown that as 
fatigue increases, the detection of visual signals deteriorates and individuals exhibit 
more errors (Swain & Guttmann, 1983). Table 8.1 (Boring & Gertman, 2004) gives the 
relationship on how available time as a PSF (PSFI) is influenced by the other PSFs 
(PSF! ) and as well, how it affects them. 
The parametric relationship between one PSF and another for a marine vessel or an 
offshore installation is determined by simulation and expert opinion. Figure 8.8 depicts 
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the interrelationship between the PSFs as well as their direct or indirect contribution to 
human performance. 
Table 8.1: Influence of and effects on other PSFs on time availability 
Available time, PSF1 
PSF (PSF, ) 
Influence Effect 
Amount of stress does not Less time may increase stress. 
Stress and stressors, PSF2 
change the available time. 
Greater experience means that Available time has little or no 
Experience and training, PSF3 less time is required for actions effect on experience and 
and decisions. training. 
Too much complexity and Little time makes the task more 
Task complexity, PSF4 workload can make the time complex for which the workload 
available insufficient. may require more hands on. 
Poor layout can result in Available time has little or no 
Ergonomics (including human- increased reaction time, effect on ergonomics and 
machine interaction), PSF5 lessening the available time to human-machine interaction. 
respond. 
The likes of room temperature, Available time has no effect on 
vibration and sea motion can environmental state/condition. Environmental effects, PSF6 
make the time available 
insufficient. 
Complex or poorly conceived Available time has little or no 
The quality of operating 
procedures increase how much effect on the quality of 
procedures, PSF7 
time one needs to act. operating procedures. 
Misunderstanding can result in In some cases, time may lead to 
increased reaction time, misunderstanding in language 
Language and culture, PSFS lessening the available time to and culture. 
respond. 
Greater motivation means that In some cases, time may have a 
Moral and Motivation, PSF9 less time is required for actions significant effect on moral and 
and decisions. motivation. 
Illness or drug abuse may Available time has little or no 
Operator faness for duty, PSF10 require increased time to decide effect on the operator's fitness 
or act. for duty. 
Poor shift turnover of In some cases, time may 
Work processes, PSF information can reduce time enhance or compromise work 
available. processes. 
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Note that PSFs can be combined for specific rules in a FL rule-base. In the case where 
more than one PSF is being considered, absolute HEP values can be computed by 
adding individual PSF multipliers. This would be the case, for example, if available 
time and stress contributed to a human error (Boring & Gertman, 2004). 
Relationships status: solid lines denote high degree of relationship; 
dashed lines denote medium degree of relationship 
Figure 8.8: Path diagram of relationship amongst generic PSFs 
In the event of multiple concurrent tasks, as is common in most real-world scenarios, 
Boring & German (2004) state that the HEP values may also be combined. If two 
events must occur together for an error to occur, the HEP values are multiplied together 
to create a logical `AND' relationship. For example, loosing a fresh program file that is 
important to the shipboard system requires the user both to fail to save the program file 
and to quit the program. If, however, errors are not in any way related to one another, 
the two task HEP values are added together to create a logical `OR' relationship. For 
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example, a person may not be able to log in to an authorising computer either by 
forgetting his or her computer password or by failing to type the password in the correct 
CapsLock case. Thus, using the generic PSFs as fuzzy linguistic variables, specific IF- 
THEN rules can be created via such logical `OR' and `AND' operators for a FL rule- 
base. 
8.7.1.5 Categorisation of Performance-shaping Factors 
PSFs are characterised according to whether the task is cognitively engaging (i. e., a 
diagnosis task) or routinised (i. e., an action task). Operational research suggests that for 
cognitively engaging tasks such as diagnosis, people tend to exhibit a base human error 
rate equal to 1.0 x 10-2 (Boring & Gertman, 2004). This means that people have about 
1 in 100 chance of making a diagnosis error. For tasks that are more action oriented, the 
base human error rate is equal to about 1.0 x 10-3, suggesting about 1 in 1000 chance of 
making an error (Boring & Gertman, 2004). Base error rates for the two task types 
associated with the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability Analysis 
(SPAR-H) method were calibrated against other HRA methods. The calibration 
revealed that the SPAR-H human error rates fall within the range of rates predicted by 
other methods (Gertman, et al., 2004). 
The PSFs are further classified according to whether they occur in a fault tolerant 
situation or a fault intolerant condition (Boring & Gertman, 2004). Table 8.2 (Boring & 
Gertman, 2004) exhibits how PSFs shape human error by using available time in a fault 
intolerant condition, which is the condition of occurrence during critical operation. 
Now, given PSF; as a fuzzy input of an it' PSF having subset PSF;,; as its /h category, 
the rule-base for a fuzzy output of human performance, Hp, with subset Hp, k for its k`h 
category, can be represented for the 1`h rule as: 
R, rule = IF PSF1 is PSF1,! AND/OR PSF2 is PSF2, j AND/OR, ..., AND/OR 
PSF11 is PSFI 1, j, THEN Hp is Hpk 
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Owing to the number of input PSFs in rule, RI, a software program, such as Fuzzy Logic 
Toolbox 2.2.1 of Matlab 6.5 (The MathWorks, 2005), may be most essential to 
minimise complexity of the fuzzy mathematics. 
Table 8.2: Available time in a fault intolerant condition 
Available time 
Diagnosis HEP Action HEP 
variable, PSF11 
If the operator cannot If the operator cannot 
perform the task in the execute the appropriate 
Inadequate time, amount of time available, action in the amount of 1.0 1.0 
PSF1 
.1 no matter what s/he 
does, time available, no 
then failure is certain. matter what s/he does, 
then failure is certain. 
Two-thirds of the average There is just enough Barely adequate 
time required to complete 0.1 time to execute the 0.01 
time, PSFia 
the task is available. appropriate action. 
On average, there is There is some extra 
sufficient time to diagnose time above what is 
Nominal time, 
the problem. 0.01 minimally required to 0.001 PSF1 3 , execute the appropriate 
action. 
The time available is There is an extra 
between one to two times amount of time to 
greater than the nominal execute the appropriate 
Extra time, PSF1 4 0.001 0.0001 time required. action (i. e., the 
approximate ratio of 
5: 1). 
The time available is There is an expansive 
greater than two times the amount of time to 
Expansive time, nominal time required. execute the appropriate 0.0001 0.00001 
PSF1,5 action (i. e., the 
approximate ratio of 
50: 1). 
If you do not have If you do not have 
sufficient information to sufficient information 
Insufficient 
choose among the other 0.01 to choose among the 0.001 
information, PSF1,6 
alternatives, assign this other alternatives, 
PSF level. assign this PSF level. 
- 273 - 
Chapter 8- Fuzzy-Bayesian Network 
8.7.1.6 Determination of Human Performance Output 
PSFs determine whether individual performance will be very poor, excellent, or at some 
level in between. For this performance output, the assessment team assigns numeric 
values based on a 0% - 100%-fuzzy scale (Figure 8.9) as anchored by linguistic 
variables and descriptors provided in the evaluation layer of instrument. 
Hoy Very Poor, does not m 
standards or requiren 
Hp2 Poor 
HF, 3 Below Average 
Hoj 
Hp2 Poor 
yp4 Average, meets the minimum 
standards or requirements 
HP5 Good 
\° e 8 
H,, O Very Good 
Excellent, exceeds all Hný 
standards or requirements 
Figure 8.9: Human performance grading scale for fuzzy set definition 
This process of measuring the output attribute is in a similar fashion as those undertaken 
for all 11 PSFs in the antecedent of the FL rule-base. The fuzzy set definition for the 
output attribute (i. e., human performance, Hp) is given in Figure 8.10. 
15 25 
Human performance score, Hp 
Figure 8.10: Fuzzy set definition for human performance output 
Very Poor, does not meet any 
standards or requirements 
ý 
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In utilising expert judgment whilst executing the rule-base of the generic PSF via the FL 
module of the FBN methodology that has been presented in Section 8.6, the fuzzy Hp 
set is obtained as the fuzzy output result of the study. A hypothetical example of a 
normalised fuzzy set, as shown in Figure 8.11, is employed herein as the yielded 
discrete result for Hp to demonstrate the applicability of the FBN framework. 
µHp 
I 
o. s-ý 
0.6 --ý 
0.4 -ý 
0.2-ý 
0 
I 
HoI Ho2 Ho3 Hn4 Ho5 Ho6 Hn7 
Figure 8.11: An example of a normalised fuzzy set utilised as human performance output, Ho 
Membership values for each element in the Hp fuzzy set are PHpý = 0, PHp2 = 0, NH 
p3 
= 
0, NHp4 = 1, JUHps = 0.7, NH, = 0.5 and JUHp7 = 0.1. Since focal elements of Hp have to 
be only those elements of P(Hp) that have non-zero probability assignment, then clearly 
PHpi PHp2 and are are not required for further analysis into their probability 
conversion. Therefore, the normalised fuzzy set of Hp may be represented as: 
Hp = {Hp5/1 + Hp5/0.7 + Hp5/0.5 + Hp5/0.1 } 
The mass assignment, m(Hp), is derived from Hp by weighting the combined mass of 
each element in Hp. As assigned in Figure 8.12, the weighting of 10,9 and 8 is 
attributable to only Hp4i the weighting of 7 and 6 is attributable to only Hp4 or Hps, the 
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weighting of 5,4,3 and 2 is attributable to only Hp4 or Hp5 or Hp6 and the weighting of I 
is attributable to any of Hp4, Hp5, Hp6 or Hp7. Normalising the number of weighting 
attributable to any one proposition then generates the mass assignment m(Hp) for fuzzy 
set Hp for fuzzy set Hp as based on the use of Equation 8.4, which is given as: 
m(Hp) = {Hp4} : NHp4 - ftHps, {Hp4, Hps} : ýHpS - fUHp6, {Hp4i Hp5, Hp6} : uHp6 
- PHp7 , 
{Hp4, Hp5, Hp69 Hp7} : ju Hp7 
= {Hp4} : 0.3, {Hp4, Hp5} : 0.2, 
{Hp4, Hp5, Hp6} : 0.4, {Hp4, Hp5, Hp6, Hp7} : 0.1 
Weightings 
m {H, 4} =0.3 
m {HDa, H, 51 =0.2 
m {H, 4, Hp5, H,, 6} =0.4 
m {Hpa, Hp5, Hj>6, Hp7 1 =0.1 
H,, 4 Hos Hnb Ho7 
Figure 8.12: A weighting interpretation of mass assignment of human performance output, H. 
This obtained MA can be restricted using the least prejudiced distribution to give a 
single probability distribution. This probability distribution is defined across the human 
performance set Hp as is the corresponding fuzzy set. Firstly, the magnitude of masses 
in Hp is: 
I {Hp} I=I {Hpg } 1: 1,1 {Hp4, Hps }I: 2,1 {Hp4, Hp5, Hp(, } j: 3,1 {Hp4, Hp5i Hp6, Hp7} 1: 4 
Having converted a fuzzy set into a MA, the calculus of MA can now be used to reason 
with fuzzy sets at the mass level. The advantage of this representation is the close 
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relationship between MAs and their corresponding families of probability distributions. 
MA therefore provides a crucial link between probability and fuzzy sets. This is a great 
enabler in developing maritime human element solutions based on a more unified 
theory than those that may be enacted by just a fully BN or FL approach. 
By distributing mass across singleton subsets of the four focal elements, this now 
provides the probabilities from using Equation 8.6 as follows: 
P(Hpq) + 
{Hp4, Hp5} 
+ 
{Hp4, Hp59 Hp6} 
+ 
{Hp4, Hps, Hp6, Hp7} 
I {Hp4} I I{Hp4, Hp5} I I{Hp4, Hp5, Hp6} i I{Hp4, Hp5, Hp6, Hp7} I 
3l 
+0.1(4) ý0.55g3' =0.3+0.2CJ 21 
+0.4CJ 
{Hp4, Hp5} 
+ 
{Hp4, Hp5, Hp6} 
+ 
{Hp4, Hp5, Hp6, Hp7} 
P(Hps) I {Hp4, Hp5} I I{Hp4, Hp5, Hp6} I I{Hp4, Hp5, Hpb, H p7) 
=0.2ýýý +0.4ý3ý +0.1(4) ý0.25g3' 
{Hp4, HP5, Hp6} 
+ 
{Hp4, HP5 
, 
Hp6, Hp7} 
P(Hr6) _ I {Hp4, Hp5, Hp6} II {Hp4, Hp5, Hp6, Hp7} 
+ 0.1 
4 (1) 
)Z0.15g3, 
= 0.4 3ý 
P(Hp7) _ 
{Hp4, Hp5, Hp6, Hp7} 
ý {Hp4jHp5ýHp6l Hp7} ý 
=0.1(4) =0.0250 
Thus, the probability distribution achieved from the fuzzy event of human performance, 
Hp, is given as: 
P(Hpa) = 0.5583', P(Hp5) = 0.2583', P(Hp6) = 0.1583', P(Hp7) = 0.0250 
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Note that ' is used after to show a recurring decimal digit, which in this case is the 
number 3. The reverse operation is also possible, that is, converting a probability 
distribution into a MA, and then into a fuzzy set. For this reverse operation some 
assumptions must be made to generate only one fuzzy set rather than a whole family of 
fuzzy sets. The problem arises since masses are assigned across members of the P(Hp) 
while the Hp fuzzy set is defined on the universe of Hp itself. 
Once again, the least prejudiced distribution approach of distributing mass across 
singleton subsets of the MA focal elements is favoured. This least prejudiced 
distribution notion relies on an assumption of an equal-likelihood prior to generate a 
single fuzzy set. 
For a normalised fuzzy set, the membership of an element with the largest frequency is 
always 1. This element is also that which gives the largest probability associated with 
the least prejudiced distribution assumption. Since the order of frequencies in Hp is 
given for the probabilities as: 
P(Hpa) > P(Hps) > P(Hr, b) > P(Hp7) 
Then, the order of frequencies in Hp is given for the elements in its fuzzy set can be 
given as: 
µHpa' µHp5' PHp6 > PHp7 
Therefore, the MA for Hp is well generated, by applying Equation 8.4, as: 
m(Hp) _ {Hp4} : fuHp4 - µHp5, {Hp4, Hp5} : , uHps - fuHp6, {Hpg, Hp5i Hpb} : ftHnG 
- PH 
p7, 
{Hpa, Hp5, Hp6, Hp7} : PHp7 
Now, using the least prejudiced distribution assumption, a corresponding fuzzy set can 
be generated by assigning each element within each focal element in the probability 
distribution the mass assigned to that focal element can be obtained via Equation 8.7 as 
follows: 
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P(Hna) _ JuHp4 - N1yp5 +(2) (ýHps - fuHp6) + 13 J (fýHý - fýlyp7) +4 %ýFIp7 'ýý o55$'1' \(J 
P(H C1ý C1 1 vs) =2 /I (µHPS - fUHp6) +3 (fuHp6 - f"Hp7) +4 
)'"Hp7 
P(Hp6) =I (fýHý fýHp7) + 14 
(13 JPH7O. 1583' 
P(Hp7) =14 
)PH, 
7= 
0.0250 
Thus, in working backwards, the focal element's membership values are obtained as: 
µHp7=O. 1, µHp6=0.5, µHp5=0.7andµHp4= 1 
Hence, this gives the discrete fuzzy set of Hp as: 
Hp ={1 /Hp4 +O. 7/H, s+0.5/Hý 
+ 0.1 /Hp7} 
The bi-directional processed values for the fuzzy, mass and probability level of the Hp 
output set focal elements is pictorially represented as shown in Figure 8.13. 
It has been well recognised that the element of human factor holds an all-essential input 
role into countless maritime risk investigation domains. For example, successful marine 
emergency escape, evacuation, and rescue (EER) are achieved through an effective and 
efficient interaction of the evacuees' human performance and the mechanical 
performance of the physical EER system (Bercha, et al., 2003). Nonetheless, without a 
fit for function physical EER system, human performance becomes an act of brute 
survival - running, jumping, swimming, and fighting hypothermia. 
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Fuzzy set level of HP: 
Mass assignment level of Hp: 
ýý 07 05 01 ýý 
ý 03 02 04 01 c_) ý QL. -) 
0ý 559 0ý 258 0ý 158 0ý 025 
Probability distribution level of HP: ýý ýý ýý 
Figure 8.13: Levels and values in the bi-directional processed human performance output, Ho 
Figure 8.14: A FBN of a marine evacuation analysis domain 
The subject here is not on human performance alone, but rather on the modelling of the 
interaction between humans and EER physical systems. As such, in following from the 
case study of the marine evacuation scenario as already analysed in Chapter 6, 
Section 6.7.1, the fuzzy event of human performance element (such as the Hp output 
example that has been analysed in this section) can be added and linked as a new node 
that has an effect on both free-fall lifeboat and rescue boat launch. In so doing, a FBN 
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as shown in Figure 8.14 is obtained. The probabilistic cause-effect analysis of this 
underlying network can thus be achieved via the BN module of the FBN methodology 
that has been presented in Section 8.6. 
In this setting, the human performance node will always remain as a fuzzy 
event/variable node since its probability cannot be directly ascertained unless via PSF 
interactions. In cases where sufficient data becomes available for a fuzzy event, then 
the node for such an event becomes a complete Bayesian chance variable node. Thus, 
the nodes of fire collision, flooding, fire alarm, flooding alarm, evacuation, free-fall 
lifeboat and rescue boat in Figure 8.14 are all Bayesian chance variable node. The life- 
saving node and the optimal survival node represent the standard utility node and 
decision node respectively that aids in achieving the decision-making aspect of the 
model. 
8.8 Concluding Remarks 
In the risk analysis of a safety-critical maritime system, each hazard event within the 
domain may be subject to prior insufficient and vague knowledge or that of an 
inherently random nature. To permit a combination of both such uncertainty 
characteristics, the modelling of their cause-effect relationship will require some form 
of possibility-probability linked inference mechanism. As the theory of possibility and 
probability, which can be handled by FL and BN respectively, are completely distinct 
but parallel theory, a link is made possible by way of their compatibility with MA 
theory. A framework for a proposed FBN permits the application of the inference 
algorithm whilst, justifying for data problem cases and at the same time, aiding to 
provide a proficient graphical tool for risk-based decision-making of the model. 
Incorporation of the human element into maritime risk assessment is an area prone to 
benefit from the combined use of fuzzy and Bayesian principle as a causal network 
solution. Furthermore, the hypothetical human performance outcome case study has 
demonstrated how the fuzzy PSFs can be incorporated into any random processing risk- 
based model. Therefore, the usefulness of the FBN modelling should offer a sound 
means for improving safety knowledge/assessments/practices in the marine and offshore 
industry. 
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Chapter Summary 
The research in this thesis was motivated by the requirement to tackle uncertainty and 
human element problem issues in the marine and offshore industry. As such, several 
powerful and efficient tools and techniques were employed in the development of 
integrative risk-based analytical models for maritime application domains. The 
development phases for the models had to be supplied with data and uncertainties were 
handled via inference processing that are based on sound theorems, rules or logic. The 
proposed methodologies were also enabled via resourceful maritime case studies in 
order to demonstrate their practicality. This falls into place with the overall aim of this 
thesis. Thus, this chapter revisits the goals achieved in this thesis and expresses its key 
findings. It also outlines those areas for further work as based on the major limitations 
to the research. 
9.1 Review 
Before the scene of this thesis was set, the background work had revealed safety in the 
marine and offshore industry as previously a case of being a reactive response to major 
accidents. A change in such culture provided for proactive approaches to be applied, 
and one that takes into consideration near misses and incident occurrences. These 
approaches, which are safety case (SC) for the offshore industry and formal safety 
assessment (FSA) for the marine industry, were thus reviewed. On the basis of the 
reviewed SC and FSA concepts, a proposed framework for the risk-based assessment 
settings of this research has been developed in a generic sense to be effectively 
applicable to all ship types, offshore installations, their systems/subsystems and the 
maritime environment (as reported in Chapter 1). The framework incorporates risk 
analysis for which data were obtained from industrial databases and/or by expert 
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judgement (as reported in Chapter 2), and for which safety and reliability analytical 
tools and techniques (as reported in Chapter 3) were applied to generate domain 
models. 
The concept of FSA was particularly examined as it provides an elegant route to the 
application of the well-established risk analysis methods that are already widely used in 
other industries within shipping activities. The developments in the risk analysis study 
of the FSA trial application to generic high speed passenger catamaran ferries (HSC) 
and bulk carrier (BC) ships were then briefly reviewed. This revealed that issues such 
as uncertainty treatment and the human element issue were still left unresolved in the 
advancement of the approach (as reported in Chapters 4 and 5). Thus, such unresolved 
issues were facilitated into maritime application domains of risk-based analytical 
reasoning. Bayesian network (BN) was adopted as the modelling that dealt with the 
random/inherent uncertainties and also enabled a powerful marine and offshore 
decision-support solution (as reported in Chapter 6). Fuzzy logic (FL) was utilised as 
the modelling tool that dealt with the vaguelsubjective uncertainties towards evidential 
reasoning synthesis in maritime engineering safety analysis (as reported in Chapter 7). 
As cases of both types of uncertainties are always recurrent in maritime human element 
issue, the excellent features of BN and FL modelling tools were therefore combined via 
the theory of mass assignment for the development of an advanced network-modelling 
tool. This network was given the name `fuzzy-Bayesian network' and furthermore, a 
case study was demonstrated for the incorporation of human error into safety 
assessments (as reported in Chapter 8). 
In following this review of the research conducted within this thesis, it can be confirmed 
that not only has the work followed a logical sequence, but that most importantly, the 
aim and objectives of this thesis have been successfully achieved. Collectively, each 
one of the developed tools for the risk-based analytical modelling can be integrated into 
the proposed framework given at the onset of the thesis and therefore, they may 
effectively be integrated into both the SC and the FSA approach. 
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9.2 Principal Findings 
The undertaken research in this thesis have resulted in the following key findings that 
may reflect salient issues: 
" The exponential distribution, which arises in the calculations of reliability, is 
particularly convenient for the risk-based mathematical modelling, because it 
implies a fixed rate of occurrence. This distribution is intimately linked with the 
discrete Poisson distribution. In fact, it is similar to Poisson distribution when 
the occurrence of the event is zero (clarify from Equations 2.3 and 2.5) and since 
the distribution of intervals between successive occurrences is exponential, the 
Poisson distribution is stationary. 
" Where it is difficult to describe the basic failure events of a system using 
probabilistic risk analysis methods, subjective reasoning analysis has been more 
appropriate to assess the safety of the system. Also, the information from one 
technique/tool, such as a risk contribution tree (RCT), can be used to process the 
information produced using another technique/tool, such as a BN. Therefore, 
the use of well-established safety and reliability analytical techniques (e. g., 
event tree and fault tree) and/or the developed risk-based analytical tools (e. g., 
fuzzy logic and Bayesian network) in an integrated manner may make safety 
assessment comparatively efficient and convenient since safety information and 
the advantages of each method may be more efficiently explored. 
The current offshore SC and marine FSA are appropriate proactive approaches 
for ensuring improved maritime safety and environmental protection, though the 
overriding problem on the handling of uncertainty and the human element issue 
is still not well embraced in such risk-based practice. Despite the fact that they 
can integrate the application of both well-established and the developed (e. g., 
BN and FL) risk analysis methods in a transparent and justifiable manner, the 
trial application of FSA to HSC and BC ships have utilised just the most widely 
used well-established methods of mainly fault tree, event tree and RCT, and 
thus, have falling short of the unrivalled handling for the different types of 
uncertainties present in each study. 
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" In dealing with aleatory (i. e., random/inherent) uncertainties for safety-critical 
marine and offshore systems may be best handled by the probabilistic analysis of 
probability theory and Bayes' theory, whilst its epistemic (i. e., vague/subjective) 
uncertainties could best be handled by the possibilistic analysis of possibility 
theory and fuzzy set theory. Inference processes between both types of 
uncertainty in risk-based models can be enabled effectively via reasoning 
evidentially by way of the Dempster-Shafer theory and/or the theory of mass 
assignment. 
" In FL risk-based analytical modelling that has been applied to offshore collision 
risk scenario between a floating, production, storage and offloading (FPSO) 
installation and a shuttle tanker, fuzzy set theory has provided a convenient 
framework for representing uncertainty, both in data and knowledge, in a 
manner that can be appreciated by the non-mathematical domain expert. 
However, the approach requires sufficient expert knowledge for the formulation 
of the rule-base, the combination of sets and the evidential reasoning approach, 
which emerges as a better preference to defuzzification in the safety assessment 
study. The input-output mappings of the FL model provided an intuitive insight 
that may not have been relevant from a theoretical viewpoint, but in practice 
have been well worth using. 
" Results from the BN risk-based analytical modelling that were undertaken for 
both an offshore FPSO installation collision scenario and a typical ship 
evacuation scenario case studies do indicate that BNs are promising techniques 
for maritime risk analysis. These BNs can also be expanded to form influence 
diagrams, which permits rapid development of a practical decision model. Thus, 
BN is an integrative model that can be used effectively within the existing SC 
and FSA decision-making process. Via the theory of mass assignment, FBN (a 
developed combination model of BN and FL) has better still been found to 
intuitively and realistically integrate the human element into the decision- 
making process. 
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These findings of the research do suggest that multiple dimensions of risk-based 
analytical modelling can be incorporated into the safety assessment and also decision 
model framework for any marine and offshore safety-critical units/systems. 
9.3 Major Limitations 
The developed risk-based analytical models provide useful integrative tools for a 
proactive maritime world but have limitations owing to the complex nature of ships and 
offshore installations. These limitations include the following: 
" Eliciting conditional probabilities is more difficult, especially if the probability 
is conditioned on several states. Besides, many of such probabilities required to 
quantify a BN cannot be derived from databases and scientific literature, so they 
may need to be elicited from domain experts, based on their knowledge and 
experience. 
" No industrial data could be found for situations of maritime near misses and 
errors and neither has any such subjective judgement been made available by the 
maritime industry for qualitative or FL risk-based reasoning to be enabled. All 
case study data are those from accident database and/or the opinion of experts. 
" While the FSA is intended to address safety and environmental aspects, the 
scope of this study was confined only to the safety of people. 
" Sensitivity analysis is generally deterministic and limited to one- and two-way 
analyses. Thus, only a partial sensitivity analysis could be conducted for the 
ship evacuation scenario BN case study. The impact of uncertainty in the input 
parameters has somewhat been expressed in the context of variance, i. e., ±20% 
change. 
" Reliable data for incorporating the human element performance shaping factors 
(PSFs) into safety assessment is scarce. For this reason, full-scale FL modelling 
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of human performance PSF was not feasible and therefore, it was considered 
viable to utilise a hypothetical example in demonstrating the practical 
applicability of a FBN risk-based analytical model. 
These limitations did not mitigate the efficacy of the conclusions and generalisations of 
the conducted research. Nonetheless, tackling these limitations should enable the 
advancement of the integrative risk-based modelling to safety-critical maritime systems. 
Suggestions can be made for further research where appropriate, e. g. the incorporation 
of human element, but this is not often a major requirement for the other cases. 
9.4 Future Work 
As based on the key findings and major limitations of this research, further work 
required in the areas which are related to the integrative of risk-based analytical 
modelling developed in this thesis for application its to safety-critical marine and 
offshore systems is described the following subsection. 
9.4.1 Formal Process for Eliciting Expert Opinion 
Expert opinion/judgement has always played a large role in science and engineering. 
Increasingly, this opinion/judgement is recognised as just another type of analytical 
information, data or evidence, and expert elicitation methods are developed to treat 
these as such. The Delphi technique (Helmer, 1969) is one such method for combining 
expert opinion preferences (weights) that are obtained through anonymous 
questionnaires, controlled feedback, and statistical analysis. Another combination 
approach is to use analytic hierarchy process pairwise comparisons (Saaty, 1980) with 
regards to information about the experts' qualifications. Through this later technique, 
the relative importance, or weights, of different factors can be measured and also, 
tradeoffs between objectives are explicitly considered in these pairwise comparisons. 
Overall, these elicitation techniques may provide the formal heuristic process that can 
be used in the safety assessment of a maritime application domain to gather information 
about model input parameters, model processes and on output change impacts. 
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9.4.2 Development of Linguistic Database 
As the application of database technology moves outside the realm of a crisp 
mathematical world to the realm of the real world, the need to handle imprecise 
information becomes important, because a database that can handle imprecise 
information shall store not only raw data but also related information that shall allow us 
to interpret the data in a much deeper context (Belli, et al., 2002), e. g. a Structured 
Query Language (SQL) query (Galindo, et al., 1998) "Which crew is young and has 
sufficiently good training grades? " captures the real intention of the user's query than a 
crisp query as: 
SELECT * FROM CREW 
WHERE AGE < 19 AND GPA > 3.5 
GPA is `grade point average'. 
Such a SQL technology can have wide applications in areas such as maritime human 
reliability, security, FSA of ballast water management and for near misses and errors 
event as the industry heads in the proactive risk-based direction because in such areas 
subjective and uncertain information is not only common but also extremely useful by 
the likes of experts, risk analysts and decision-makers. The developed database of this 
nature can enable a justified qualitative risk assessment. It can highly promote and, at 
the same time, ease the use possibility theory and fuzzy linguistic knowledge, and 
enable its transmission into that of a probability domain. 
9.4.3 Petri Net Dynamic Modelling 
Petri net is well known for its capability in modelling discrete event systems in terms of 
cause-consequence relationships possibly extended by timing information related to the 
underlying dynamic system variations. A Petri net is a directed graph with two kinds of 
nodes, places and transitions, and with arcs that run either from places to transitions or 
from transitions to places. The state of the Petri net is indicated by the presence of 
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tokens in one or more places, and a token moves from one place to another when a 
transition fires (Murata, 1989). The occurrence of an event is modelled by the firing of 
the corresponding transition. Petri nets are capable of describing the dynamic behaviour 
of process systems and handle the hierarchy. A RCT can form the basis for the 
hierarchy and therefore its analytical process may additional be useful for inspection 
and ultimately for reliability-centred maintenance. 
9.4.4 Environment Protection Case Study 
The developed risk-based methodologies can be expanded to tackle areas of 
environmental concerns such as those that lead to oil spillage, e. g., via FSA study of oil 
tankers and ballast water risk assessment, on a large scale. Evidence of oil tanker 
concern can be seen in Table 1.1 in which grounding, stranding and the loss of 
structural integrity has caused oil spillage to the sea. Other serious consequences for 
due consideration in oil tanker FSA can be that of dangerous gas release. Ballast water 
discharge may also expose the sea and its creatures to such dangerous release. 
To achieve better ship-handling characteristics, ballast is necessary for the safe 
operation of ships of all types. Prior to entering a port, the ballast of seawater will 
usually be discharged thus introducing the risk of harmful alien species invasion into 
that region of its discharge. With no historical database for detailing species 
assemblages under specific ballasting conditions, ballast water risk assessment can 
utilise FLs, BNs and FBNs in its application to the non-native introductions. The risk 
assessment should proceed in a species and site specific manner and seek to develop an 
in-depth understanding of the life-history of species a prior considered hazard, 
expressed through a series of bio-rules for these species (Hayes, 1998). 
9.4.5 Multiple Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis in BNs is broadly concerned with understanding the relationship 
between local network parameters and global conclusions drawn based on the network 
(Castillo, et al., 1997; Kaerulff & Van der Gaag, 2000; Laskey, 1995). A key aspect of 
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sensitivity analysis is the number of considered parameters (Chan, & Darwiche, 2004). 
The simplest case involves one parameter at a time, i. e., one can only be allowed to 
change a single parameter in the network to ensure a query constraint. Single parameter 
changes are easy to visualise and compute, but they are only a subset of possible 
parameter changes. Thus, a recommendation of great interest is that of changing 
multiple parameters in the network simultaneously to ensure the query constraint. This 
is significant since multiple parameter changes can be more meaningful, and may 
disturb the probability distribution less significantly than single parameter changes 
(Chan, & Darwiche, 2004). 
9.5 General Industrial Application of the Developed Methodologies 
When it comes to proactively ensuring maritime safety and environmental protection at 
the highest level, it is the practical industrial application of the developed 
methodologies in this thesis that matters. Any such practical application can thus be 
examined through the exploration of a specific case study of relevance to the safety- 
critical marine and offshore system/unit and via the use of the most reliable real-life 
data and competent expert judgment. 
9.6 Concluding Remarks 
Overall, the thesis have been successful in meeting its aim of generating proactive risk- 
based analytical models that implement novel techniques within a maritime safety 
framework via its set objectives. Whilst the FSA has provided an elegant route to the 
application of the well-established safety and reliability analytical techniques for 
conducting risk analysis, the risk-based analytical modelling of BN, FL and FBN were 
developed to provide powerful tools for uncertainty treatment. FBN was also utilised 
for demonstrating the incorporation of the human element into a safety assessment task. 
The thesis has revealed six principal findings and five main limitations of the research 
conducted. As such recommendations for further work were made in the areas of 
utilising a formal process for eliciting expert opinion, developing a linguistic database, 
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modelling with Petri nets, ensuring safety assessments of environmental nature and 
conducting multiple sensitivity analysis. The practicality of the developed 
methodologies can be justified for the safety assessment of real-life marine and offshore 
applications. 
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